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ABSTRACT 
The phrase “Right to Die with Dignity” has long been a tag-line for the topic of 
assisted suicide.  This dissertation tackles that topic through a qualitative policy 
evaluation study that includes a review and analysis of assisted suicide laws in 19 States 
in the United States, the District of Columbia, six countries other than the United States, 
and Supreme Court cases and other court decisions that are relevant to the topic.  The 
dissertation also considers whether the time is right for assisted suicide policy 
development, based on recent court interpretations of the Fifth, Tenth and most 
specifically the Fourteenth Amendment(s) and how recent court decisions have been 
influenced by either the Constitution or public policy.  The purpose of the dissertation is 
to recommend a public policy that establishes a new federal policy that represents a 
dignified, compassionate, and common-sense approach to assisted suicide. 
The primary methodology is the use of the “legal lens of study approach,” which 
lays the foundational groundwork for the five research questions this dissertation 
explores.  Analysis of the common elements of the existing laws was a first step in this 
policy evaluation and helped identify principles that should be included in any new 
policy.  Also key to the analysis and the proposal of a new federal policy was the legal 
study of most relevant assisted suicide cases from several states and from the federal 
court system, including Supreme Court cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment in 
decisions concerning socially relevant issues that involve liberty interests and individual 
rights.  Critical historical events concerning assisted suicide were uncovered in order to 
chronologically interpret the issue of assisted suicide over the past 45 years and how 
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these cases and more recent court decisions might create opportunities for policy 
changes.   
Results indicate that leaving the issue of assisted suicide to be dealt with by each 
individual state or waiting for the Supreme Court to make a ruling that would finalize the 
issue on a national level has created an intolerably diverse quagmire for society as a 
whole and especially for those competent adult individuals who would prefer to choose 
this end-of-life option. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation will develop and propose a public policy healthcare model for 
allowing assisted suicide decisions to be made without fear of prosecution and/or the 
exhaustive use of protracted civil litigation, using a dignified, compassionate and 
common-sense approach.  In order to develop and propose a compassionate and 
common-sense approach, this study will analyze and evaluate assisted suicide laws in 
nineteen states of the United States of America, plus the District of Columbia.  The states 
of California, Colorado, Hawaii (law goes into effect on 1-1-2019), Montana, Oregon, 
Vermont, Washington and the District of Columbia were selected because they have laws 
that allow “qualified terminally ill adults” to voluntarily request and receive a 
prescription medication to hasten their deaths.  In the case of Montana, the state Supreme 
Court has ruled that “physician-assisted dying” is legal (Starks, 2016, p. 1).  The other 12 
states (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, 
New Jersey, New York, Texas and Utah) were chosen at random after all 50 states were 
divided into six geographical categories and after removing the afore-mentioned seven 
states which have made statutory allowance for  assisted suicide.     
The most current legislation enacted (and in effect) is the Death with Dignity Act 
(physician-assisted suicide law) passed by the District of Columbia Council in December 
2016 with an effective date of February 17, 2017 (Richardson, 2017).  On July 14, 2017, 
the House Appropriations Committee of Congress advanced a measure to repeal the 
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District’s assisted suicide law.  The measure failed; therefore, under the law’s current 
implementation timeline, terminally ill District of Columbia residents are able to legally 
end their lives with the help of a physician beginning in late September 2017.  The state 
of Hawaii passed legislation allowing for physician-assisted suicide, which became law 
on April 5, 2018.  However, the law does not take effect until January 1, 2019 (Stutsman 
& Foster, 2018, p. 1). 
General overview, explanation of the issue and conceptual framework 
The topic of assisted suicide is one of those controversial social issues that seems 
to ebb and flow in the minds of the general public, not only as to importance, but also as 
to acceptance.  According to Neil M. Gorsuch, the newest Associate Supreme Court 
Justice, in his 2006 book, The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, “Whether to 
permit assistance in suicide and euthanasia is among the most contentious legal and 
public policy questions in America today” (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 1).  As the academic and 
public discussions of assisted suicide have grown over the years, the issue most always 
brings about increased political and legal activism.  As to political activism, beginning in 
1988 and continuing for a period of 10 years, more than 50 bills were introduced to 
legalize assisted suicide or euthanasia in at least 19 state legislatures, and several voter 
referenda were attempted in order to bypass these state house and senate chambers 
(Gorsuch, 2006, p. 3).  Legal activism hit an all-time high during the 15-year period of 
1991 to 2006.  The first wave of the legal onslaught was carried out by proponents filing 
federal lawsuits in Washington State and New York.  They sought to have statutes 
banning assisted suicide declared unconstitutional.  Some of these cases made it all the 
way to the United States Supreme Court.  The opinions of the lower courts, as well as 
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concurring opinions and minority opinions of some of the justices on the Supreme Court, 
signaled to all that the debate over assisted suicide was far from definitively over, and in 
fact had just begun. 
For this policy evaluation study dissertation, the topic of assisted suicide will be 
viewed mainly through a legal lens of study approach.  The legal lens of study approach 
allows for the use of one of the broadest, most insightful and comprehensive qualitative 
research methods.  The “legal lens of study approach” is defined as being the best and 
most studious qualitative research method that allows for locating, reading and 
understanding the investigative road map that will insure the discovery of the best 
primary sources of legal materials (cases, statutes and laws) and other secondary sources 
covering the topic being evaluated and analyzed.     
This study technique provides an all-embracing approach.  Judges, public 
administrators, attorneys, physicians and healthcare experts often use legal arguments to 
advance their positions, but many reference other approaches including moral, ethical, 
religious, political, psychological and financial arguments, which many times are 
included in the legal lens of study approach.      
In analyzing assisted suicide through the legal lens of study approach, a 
conceptual framework was developed and implemented in this dissertation to provide a 
wide basis of support for the relevance and importance of the issue of assisted suicide.  
The systematic and categorical approach to assisted suicide used herein is the 
foundational bedrock of the legal lens of study method.  Information has been researched, 
studied and evaluated in order to fully explain the subject matter from several important 
perspectives. 
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Several groups, including healthcare professionals, public administrators, federal 
and state legislators, constitutional purists, academic scholars and legal experts, support 
legalizing assisted suicide.  They advance their positions through lawsuits, articles, 
books, legislation, open debate forums, essays and social media.  Using the legal lens of 
study approach and assimilating all this information through comprehensive research 
provided a specific directional path to an acceptable public policy healthcare model for 
dealing with assisted suicide.       
Many individuals within the same categories mentioned above are against assisted 
suicide.  The extensive legal research using the methodology enumerated below and with 
specificity in Chapter 3 explains their reasons and reasoning that supports their point of 
view.  Using this objective and inclusive legal lens of study approach, it also illustrates 
how the myriad of thoughts, emotions and feelings that comprise public opinion conflict 
and counteract each other when governments ignore issues of extreme importance and 
modern-day relevance such as assisted suicide.   
The topic of this dissertation is captivating to health care professionals and public 
administrators alike.  It is a significant, socially relevant modern-day controversial topic 
that concerns and touches citizens all over the United States.  The main concerns and 
arguments put forth by proponents and opponents of assisted suicide are many times 
based on religious, moral and ethical philosophies.  The legal lens of study approach, as 
defined herein, provides a glimpse of the different kinds of reasoning used by 
administrators, lawyers, judges and jurists to explain, bolster or justify their diverse legal 
arguments. 
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Purpose of the study 
Many in the healthcare and public administration arenas believe the issue of 
assisted suicide is as relevant and important in today’s society as Medicare, Social 
Security, the economy, immigration reform or the selection of Supreme Court justices.  
The purpose of this policy evaluation dissertation is to thoroughly examine the laws 
pertaining to assisted suicide in the 20 jurisdictions selected; compare and contrast the 
similarities and differences in those laws; examine and explain the most important state, 
federal and Supreme Court case rulings about assisted suicide; and study the theoretical 
underpinnings that have the greatest effect on the subject matter in order to structure a 
public policy healthcare model for dealing with assisted suicide.   
The findings through the legal lens of study approach concerning assisted suicide 
reveal not only how major portions of our governmental policies, laws and directives 
were formulated and why, but how they are working, what changes can make them better 
and the best pathway to make these necessary changes.        
Five research questions have been formulated and will be answered in the body of 
this work in order to comprehensively analyze and explain the issue of assisted suicide.  
Those research questions are as follow:  
1. What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws and statutes in effect in the 20 jurisdictions selected for this study?  
2. What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws in the six countries other than the United States selected for this study? 
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3. Are there universal language elements in the assisted suicide laws of the 20 
jurisdictions and in the six countries other than the United States selected for this 
study? 
4. Over the past 45 years, how do the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases using the doctrines of equal protection and 
substantive due process as applied to assisted suicide laws reflect public opinion 
of the citizenry of the United States as reported in opinion polls? 
5. A. Does evidence in case law support Rohr’s “regime value/constitutionally-
directed” theory or Toobin’s more recently formulated theory that justices of the 
Supreme Court are increasingly motivated not by the Constitution but by politics 
and personal ideology when deciding Fourteenth Amendment cases?  Can both 
theories co-exist and not be in conflict? 
 B. What does the answer to part A suggest about the future of assisted suicide 
laws in the United States? 
Definition of terms 
There are three definitions that are extremely important to the understanding of 
the flow and the contents of this dissertation.  They are not complex definitions, but 
strategically important nonetheless.  
1. Legal lens of study approach—the best and most studious qualitative research 
method that allows for locating, reading and understanding the investigative road 
map that will insure the discovery of the best primary sources of legal materials 
(cases, statutes and laws) and other secondary sources covering the topic being 
evaluated and analyzed. 
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2. Shepardize or shepardizing—In the legal research field, Shepard's is the most 
highly regarded citation index.  It allows researchers to track particular judicial 
decisions, statutes, and other legal resources as they are invoked at different 
historical moments for a range of purposes.  Shepard's citations provide 
references to when and how cases and law review articles were cited by other 
sources.  Citations exist for both federal and state courts.  This type of legal 
research will reveal if a case has been reaffirmed, followed, applied, questioned, 
modified, distinguished, overturned or generally cited in later cases, thus 
upholding, modifying or adding some additional parameters to the ruling of the 
case (Shepard’s Citations, 2017, p. 1).  
3. Precedent or stare decisis—The doctrine that rules or principles of law on which a 
court rested a previous decision are authoritative in all future cases in which the 
facts are substantially the same.  Stare decisis is Latin for “to stand by things 
decided.”  In short, it is the doctrine of precedent.  According to the Supreme 
Court, stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”  In 
practice, the Supreme Court will usually defer to its previous decisions even if 
the soundness of the decision is in doubt (Stare Decisis, 2017, p. 1).     
Procedures and organization of dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is constructed and organized in the following 
manner: 
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Chapter 2 will provide an overview of assisted suicide from the perspective of 
legal adjudication and its constitutional foundation.  It includes a discussion of federal, 
state, and constitutional regulations as well as Supreme Court rulings.  The legal lens of 
study approach allows not only for a comparison of these state rulings, policies and laws, 
but also for a detailed analysis of the differences and commonalities.  Data collected by 
the Center for Disease Control (CDC), by the American Foundation for Suicide 
Prevention and by states that allow assisted suicide have been reviewed.  Theories as to 
why assisted suicide is currently at the top of many agendas are proposed.  The 
significance of stare decisis in proposing any regulations is discussed in detail.  The 
chapter concludes with the theories and teachings of prominent public administrators 
renowned for their expertise in the legal arena.  Even though the issue of assisted suicide 
was never evaluated or written about by them, their writings and theories add an 
important theoretical underpinning to the topic of this policy evaluation study. 
Chapter 3 discusses and explains the qualitative methodology used in this 
dissertation relative to research and data collection.  The methodology chapter identifies 
the long-standing and academically accepted descriptive and evaluative research 
approach followed in order to establish the five research questions and answer them as 
completely as possible.  The chapter presents the academic requirements followed in 
order to undertake the kind of legal evaluative research in this dissertation.   
Chapter 3 details the necessary steps taken to develop a complete and 
academically acceptable research methodology for this dissertation.  Four of the steps to 
describe the rationale of the procedures used to identify, select and analyze the research 
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information in order to fully develop the public policy healthcare model detailed herein 
are as follows: 
• The first step is to gather all the applicable and pertinent federal and state law 
concerning assisted suicide from the 19 states and the District of Columbia. 
• The second step compares and discusses the differences between these laws and 
policies and analyze why these differences exist, using techniques found in the 
legal lens of study approach.   
• The third step is to gather information from the writings of legal and public policy 
experts about the most persuasive arguments affecting judges, jurists, politicians, 
lawmakers, healthcare providers and public administrators. 
• The fourth step is to uncover important directional trends which will contribute to 
formulating and proposing a legal, rational and workable public policy healthcare 
model for dealing with assisted suicide using a dignified, compassionate and 
common sense approach.   
This type of methodological approach to research, with an emphasis on 
description and exploration, allows for a firm understanding of the reasons, motivations 
and opinions that have generated the diametrically opposed points-of-view concerning 
assisted suicide.   
Chapter 3 also reiterates the definition of the “legal lens of study approach” as 
stated above.  Articles from academicians were researched and studied in order to support 
the significance and importance of the legal lens of study approach for a policy 
evaluation study dissertation.  Secondary methodological considerations were followed in 
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order to complete the accepted substantive doctrinal research approach for this 
dissertation.   
In Chapter 4, the Findings Chapter, the information and data are presented in a 
well-organized strategy that is clear, explanatory and comprehensive.  The legal lens of 
study approach followed, presents the information and data covering the laws in the states 
of the United States of America and the District of Columbia that allow for assisted 
suicide in the most logical and precise manner.  The laws and policies of each state and 
the District of Columbia share several commonalities, but as importantly they contain 
differences that after a thorough study and review help structure a public policy 
healthcare model for dealing with assisted suicide.   
In addition, the laws and public policies of Belgium, Canada, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland and The Netherlands are included in the collaborative results-
oriented discussion in order to better understand assisted suicide from different cultural 
approaches.   
The information and data compiled, analyzed, discussed and explained in 
Chapters 2 through 4 provide an uncomplicated segue into a conclusion in Chapter 5, 
which will propound a public policy healthcare model for dealing with assisted suicide.           
In Chapter 5, the author evaluates and interprets the results of the study in order to 
structure a public policy healthcare model for dealing with assisted suicide.  The principal 
implications of all findings in this dissertation are concisely summarized in this chapter.   
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Significance of study 
The issue of assisted suicide is of critical importance especially to the peace of 
mind and well-being of the entire “baby-boomer generation” (those born in 1945 to 
1964).  Dealing with the issue of assisted suicide now, before a new wave of 
prosecutions, protests and rallies, and more wasteful civil litigation begins, will not only 
benefit society as a whole, but could offer a more dignified and caring path for millions 
of individuals who suffer needlessly at the end of their lives.      
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
An important national concern 
Currently, the controversy over whether to permit assisted suicide and allow 
individuals more autonomy over this end-of-life decision is a major public policy 
dilemma and, from a legal perspective, very contentious and litigious.  As public 
discussions and activism about assisted suicide increase, the legal and political arenas 
become filled with lawsuits and referendums advocating for changes to be made so 
individuals and those who assist individuals in ending their lives will have a more 
perspicuous direction to follow. 
This chapter identifies the research material undertaken for this paper, presents 
and reviews the research material and then clearly delineates how the legal lens of study 
approach was used to discover, examine, analyze, explain, clarify and update said 
research in order to propose a public policy healthcare model dealing with assisted 
suicide.  Research material compiled is examined from different perspectives and schools 
of thought.  The main stakeholder perspective examined originates from the individual 
patient.  However, the research material provides the perspectives of spouses of patients, 
family members and loved ones, physicians, nurses and other medical personnel, 
hospitals, hospice workers and public administrators who have either chosen or been 
forced to weigh in on the controversies surrounding assisted suicide.   
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Evaluating the public policy programs that have been utilized over the past two 
decades and understanding the history of the motives that have led to certain changes and 
modifications assisted in the promulgation of a more contemporary public policy 
healthcare model dealing with this extremely important issue.  Among many factors, any 
new public policy healthcare model should respect an individual’s right of autonomy and 
self-determination, consider mandated consent restrictions, examine any states’ rights 
issues, deal with the issue of any type of residency requirement, contemplate a mandatory 
“expected death” period and, in general, look to simplify guidelines and compliance 
protocols.             
Suicide and assisted suicide statistics 
Suicide rates vary considerably among different groups of people.  The Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC) and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP) 
both publish statistical reports on suicide rates.  The CDC uses four key demographic 
variables: age, sex, race/ethnicity, and geographic region/state (Curtin, Warner & 
Hedegaard, 2016).  The AFSP uses four key variables as well, albeit slightly different: 
age, race/ethnicity, methods, and attempts (Suicide Statistics, 2016).  Males take their 
own lives at nearly four times the rate of females and represent 77.9% of all suicides.  In 
2016, firearms were the most commonly used suicide method among males.  Poisoning 
by intentional overdose is the most common method for suicide for females (34.8%).  In 
2016, suicide was the tenth leading cause of death and one of just three leading causes 
that are on the rise among the U.S population (Suicide rates rising across the U.S., 2018). 
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In addition to the emotional toll that suicide and attempted suicide have on family 
and friends of those who died, there is an economic toll ($58.4 billion based on reported 
numbers alone), which includes many direct costs such as medical care, ambulance 
transport, investigations by medical examiners, nursing home care and general and 
specialty physician care.  There are also indirect monetary cost factors, lost productivity 
from premature death or lost time from injuries being the largest (97.1% of all in-direct 
costs).  Adjustments for under-reporting are also an indirect monetary factor representing 
an additional $93.5 billion annually ($298 per capita) for a total in excess of $151 billion 
per year (Shepard, Gurewich, Lwin, Reed & Silverman, 2016, pp. 352-353).      
These statistics on suicide and attempted suicide are not only overwhelming, but 
heart-breaking as well.  Although the topic and dilemma of assisted suicide is different 
from the general topic of suicide and accounts for fewer than 1% of all suicide deaths, it 
is just as important and emotionally charged (Warnes, 2014, p. 2).    
Reporting, state laws and laws of other countries 
Statistically speaking, the process of reporting deaths from assisted suicides varies 
by state.  Only those states where physician-assisted suicide is permitted by law 
{California, Colorado, Hawaii (as of 1-1-2019), Oregon, Vermont and Washington} have 
a reporting process, which is primarily based on applications filed with the proper state 
authorities by individuals wanting to end their lives (CNN, 2018, p. 1).   
In general terms, the vast majority of states have laws against individuals ending 
their lives via suicide, either on their own or through the aid of a doctor.  However, in 
1990 the U.S. Supreme Court did rule that patients or their designated health care agents 
may refuse life-preserving medical treatment, including feeding tubes (Cruzan v. 
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Director, 1990, p. 261).  A health care agent is an individual named by the patient to 
make health care decisions on his/her behalf, usually through a durable power of 
attorney.  Health care agents typically follow a patient's wishes laid out in a living will or 
a properly executed “do not resuscitate” medical form (“Death with Dignity” Laws by 
State, 2017, p. 1).   
In the few states that allow physicians to take an active role in assisting a patient 
in his or her death, a review of these laws indicates that most require the patient to: 
• Have a reasonable expectation of dying within a certain period of time (normally 
six months) 
• Be a resident of the state and be a certain age (18 years of age) 
• Have the ability to make and communicate health care decisions 
• Receive counseling and understand what is discussed  
• Follow other multiple written consent guidelines 
(“Death with Dignity” Laws by State, 2017, p. 2). 
Since 1997 in Oregon, according to the latest published statistics, prescriptions were 
written by physicians for self-administered lethal doses of medications for 1,967 
terminally-ill adults, and 1,275 patients died from ingesting the drugs that were legally 
prescribed (Oregon Death with Dignity Act 2017 Data Summary, 2017, p. 5).  The 
highest percentage of patients taking the prescription written by a physician was in 1999 
(81.8%).  The lowest percentage was in 2001 (47.7%).  In 2017, 65.6% of the patients 
requesting medications took the drugs.  Most patients were aged 65 years or older 
(80.4%) and had cancer (76.9%).  The median age at death was 74 years (Oregon Death 
with Dignity Act 2017 Data Summary, 2017, p. 12).  In 2017, the three most frequently 
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mentioned end-of-life concerns were decreasing ability to participate in activities that 
made life enjoyable (88.1%), loss of autonomy (87.4%), and loss of dignity (67.1%) 
(Oregon Death with Dignity Act 2017 Data Summary, 2017, p. 6).        
In Washington, since 2009, prescriptions were written for 1,401 terminally-ill 
adults and 1,364 patients died from ingesting the drugs (Washington State Death with 
Dignity Act Report, 2018, p. 5).  The highest percentages of patients taking the 
medication were in 2010 and 2012 (100%).  The lowest percentage was in 2017 (92.5%).  
Of the 196 participants in 2017 who died, the youngest was 33 years and the oldest was 
98 years.  Most patients had cancer (72%).  In 2017, the three most frequently mentioned 
end-of-life concerns were loss of autonomy (90%), decreasing ability to participate in 
activities that made life enjoyable (87%), and loss of dignity (73%) (Washington State 
Death with Dignity Act Report, 2017, p. 8).       
Depending on the length of time that assisted suicide statutes have been in place, 
the states of California, Colorado, Hawaii (as of 1-1-2019), Vermont and Montana, as 
well as the District of Columbia, also statistically track assisted suicide and report the 
findings to a designated public administration department or agency.  Those reports are 
then disseminated to the public.  A comparison of these statistical findings and the 
mechanisms used to generate said statistics helps with understanding the issue of assisted 
suicide from a public policy perspective. 
After dividing the United States of America into six geographical divisions and 
selecting twelve states at random (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Texas and Utah—see Chapter 
3 for an in-depth discussion as to how these states were chosen), the laws of those states 
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or the “common law” approach used in each state for assisted suicide are compared and 
contrasted not only among those states, but also with the states where assisted suicide 
laws are already in place.  In addition, the laws and public policies of the countries of 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and The Netherlands are 
examined, compared and contrasted in order to better understand assisted suicide from 
different legal and cultural approaches in other parts of the world (Emanuel, Onwuteaka-
Philipsen, Urwin & Cohen, 2016, p. 79).  These six countries were selected because they 
have laws in place allowing for physician-assisted suicide, or PAS, as they refer to it.  In 
his latest study, Emanuel examined the attitudes and practices of physician-assisted 
suicide (and euthanasia) in the United States, Canada and Europe, specifically the six 
countries listed above (Emanuel et al., 2016).  His main conclusion was that “physician-
assisted suicide (and euthanasia) are increasingly being legalized, remain relatively rare, 
and primarily involve patients with cancer” (Emanuel et al., 2016, p. 79).   
 Five critical events concerning assisted suicide 
From 1990 to early 2000, five events brought assisted suicide to the forefront of 
the thoughts and actions of America’s mainstream.  First was the most publicized event, 
which took place in 1990 when Dr. Jack Kevorkian assisted Janet Atkins in “killing 
herself” (People v. Kevorkian, 1994, p. 172).  The second event occurred in 1991 when 
The Netherlands passed legislation in favor of physician-assisted suicide (Holland’s 
Euthanasia Law, 2016, p. 1).  Next came a published article, also in 1991, by Dr. 
Timothy Quill in the New England Journal of Medicine “discussing and defending his 
decision to prescribe barbiturates to a cancer patient, even though she admitted that she 
might use them at some indefinite time in the future to kill herself” (Quill, 1991, p. 691).  
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The fourth event was the publication of an article in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association entitled, “A piece of my mind. It’s Over Debbie” by an anonymous writer.  
The article described how the physician-author administered a lethal injection to a 
terminal cancer patient after her plea “to get this over with” (Anonymous, 1988, p. 272).  
Lastly, the President of the Hemlock Society, Derek Humphry, published a book entitled 
Final Exit providing step-by-step instructions on various methods of “self-deliverance” 
(Humphry, 1991, p. 109).   
These five events, and the discussions, debates and arguments surrounding them, 
gave rise to multiple attempts over the next 15 years by assisted suicide proponents, legal 
activists and sympathetic state lawmakers to legalize assisted suicide (Gorsuch, 2006).  
However, as little progress was made by activists or through state legislative efforts, 
federal lawsuits were filed in Washington and New York seeking to have any statutes 
disallowing or banning assisted suicide declared unconstitutional (Gorsuch, 2006).   
According to Professor Brown Lewis, the Plevin Professor of Law and Director, 
Center for Health Law and Policy at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, the majority of 
terminally-ill patients who choose physician-assisted suicide do so because their illnesses 
prevent them from engaging in activities that they enjoy, cause them to lose their 
independence, and take away their dignity.  “Those patients are comforted by knowing 
that they control the time and place of their deaths” (Lewis, 2017, p. 3).  However, the 
reasons listed above by Lewis are sometimes overlooked, as both proponents and 
opponents of assisted-suicide use emotionally charged arguments meant to persuade 
lawmakers, public administrators and judges to accept or agree with their positions.        
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Before further discussing the term “assisted suicide” from a legal perspective, it is 
important to note that according to Teresa Yao, program coordinator for the Department 
of Life Issues, Archdiocese of Washington D.C., some proponents for assisted suicide 
base their main argument on the avoidance of suffering and the exercise of individual 
autonomy, both non-legal reasons.  She states that a merciful society should allow 
patients in great pain—specifically, uncontrollable physical pain caused by advanced 
illness—to end their lives when that is the only way to end their suffering.  She adds that 
since physical anguish is not limited to the last six months of life, the importance and 
sanctity of individual autonomy should take precedent (Yao, 2016, p. 385).          
“Whether to permit assistance in suicide (and euthanasia) is among the most 
contentious legal and public policy questions in America today” (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 1).  
Although the following statement by now Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch is 
simplistic in its content, the following descriptive and definitional misnomer is worth 
mentioning before further discussing some of the findings of the research into the 
statutes, cases, state constitutions, federal constitutional law and public policies that were 
examined and evaluated for this paper.   
There is no crime called “assisted suicide” and therefore no legal penalty exists 
for the patient who seeks help in dying.  Beginning with Dr. Kevorkian, the crime at issue 
was assisting in a suicide and the law targeted only those who helped another commit 
suicide.  The legal right sought by early activists and sympathetic state lawmakers was 
the right to receive assistance in killing oneself without the assistant suffering adverse 
legal consequences (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 5).          
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United States Constitution–Fourteenth Amendment Summary 
When viewing assisted suicide through the legal lens of study, the point of 
beginning must be the Constitution of the United States of America.  The text of Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
There are four basic principles asserted in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. Those 
principles include: 
1. State and federal citizenship for all persons, regardless of race, either born or 
naturalized in the United States was reaffirmed. 
2. No state would be allowed to abridge the “privileges and immunities” of any of its 
citizens. 
3. No person was allowed to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without “due 
process of law.” 
4. No person could be denied “equal protection of the laws.” 
       (Kelly, 2017, p. 1).  
       (See Appendix A for complete text of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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Supreme Court of the United States Fourteenth Amendment cases–1990 to 2018        
Beginning in the early 1900s, the Supreme Court of the United States first 
expanded the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to issues in addition to freedom, 
equality, equal protection, and due process for slaves (LaMance, 2017).  Over the past 
115 years, the Supreme Court has issued rulings and set the course of legal history by 
using the Fourteenth Amendment to decide cases in education, criminal law, abortion, 
voting rights, assisted suicide, same-sex marriage and immigration, and should tackle the 
subject of gender identity (via a transgender rights case) within the next year (LaMance, 
2017).   
The equal protection and substantive due process arguments used by proponents 
and opponents within these different categories of cases in front of the Supreme Court 
and other courts in the 19 states in this study are examined, analyzed, studied, compared 
and contrasted.  The main purpose is to understand the essential reasoning used by the 
courts to see why the subject matter being litigated was the primary factor for the ruling 
and what other secondary or tertiary factors were present to help determine the outcome 
of each case.  Understanding these factors help in developing a public policy that would 
likely be acceptable to the courts and the public.        
 Foundational litigation and case law from 1990 to 2018 
Federal trial court–state of Washington–1994 
In 1994, using the Fourteenth Amendment as the primary legal foundation, Judge 
Barbara Rothstein from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington 
became the first judge to hold assisted suicide to be a right guaranteed by the U. S. 
Constitution.  Her reasoning was based on the precedent that for many years the Supreme 
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Court, in case after case, has held that due process contains a “substantive” component – 
one that imposes a nearly absolute bar on certain governmental actions “regardless of the 
fairness of the procedures used to implement them” (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 8).  She observed 
that many of the substantive rights adduced by the court pertained to “personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, childrearing and 
education” that were constitutionally protected (Compassion in Dying v. State of 
Washington, 1994, p. 1459).   
Judge Rothstein relied extensively on the United States Supreme Court’s language 
from what was then the most recent substantive due process case, Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey (1992).  Even though the court was ruling on the right to abortion almost twenty 
years post Roe v. Wade (1973), the majority based its opinion on two of the liberties 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment: personal dignity and autonomy.  “At the heart 
of these liberties are the rights to define one’s own concept of existences, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of life” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992, p. 851).        
Judge Rothstein also expanded the minority view found in Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health wherein the U. S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
the right of a seriously ill person to terminate any life-sustaining medical treatment 
(Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1990).   The minority opinion 
contained strong dicta that clearly favored the right of a seriously ill person not only to 
terminate life-sustaining medical treatment, but to refuse medical intervention and be 
allowed to die (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1990).  Justice 
Rehnquist stated in the majority opinion of the Court that: 
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No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by common law, than 
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free 
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.  Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body.  (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health, 1990, p. 268)  
A majority of the justices separately declared that a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition.  The case 
primarily dealt with the standard of evidentiary proof required by the state of Missouri to 
allow co-guardians to order the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments based on the 
“wishes” of an incompetent individual who was in a non-reversible coma.  The Supreme 
Court stated that a person has a right to privacy and that privacy includes the right to 
terminate treatment as afforded by the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1990).  Relying on and 
agreeing with this right, Judge Rothstein found no difference between “finding a 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in refusing unwanted treatment which would 
result in death and committing assisted-suicide in the final stages of life” (Gorsuch, 2006, 
p. 9).   
Even though the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit in March of 1996 
eventually overturned the decision of Judge Rothstein by using the reasoning in the 
majority opinion espoused in Cruzan (Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 
1996, p. 586), the concurring opinions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the late 
Justice Antonin G. Scalia from 1990 bear further mention.  In her opinion, Justice 
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O’Connor expressed the view that “the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause 
protected an individual’s personal decision to refuse medical treatment, including the 
artificial delivery of food and water” (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health, 1990, p. 278).  Justice Scalia expressed the view “that it would be preferable for 
the United States Supreme Court to announce that the federal courts have no business in 
the field of preserving life, insofar as the American law had always accorded states the 
power to prevent suicide–including suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures 
necessary to preserve one’s life–by force if necessary, and the Federal Constitution had 
nothing to say about the subject” (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 
1990, p. 279).   
It is also worth noting that Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who was joined by 
Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry Blackmun in a dissenting opinion, 
expressed the view that “the evidentiary standard neither enhanced the accuracy of a 
determination of the woman’s wishes nor was consistent with an accurate determination.  
The woman had a fundamental right, under the due process clause, to be free of unwanted 
artificial nutrition and hydration and that right was not outweighed by the State of 
Missouri’s asserted interest in the preservation of life and which standard of evidence 
should apply” (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1990, p. 280).   
Justice John Paul Stevens was even more adamant in his dissenting opinion when 
he expressed the view that “the failure of Missouri’s policy to heed the woman’s interest 
with respect to private matters was ample evidence of the policy’s illegitimacy and the 
court’s deference to such policy was patently unconstitutional, insofar as it seemed to 
derive from the premise that chronically incompetent persons had no constitutional 
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cognizable interests at all, and so were not persons within the meaning of the 
Constitution” (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1990, p. 290). 
It is important to focus on the fact that the Supreme Court in Cruzan ruled that the 
state of Missouri could use the “clear and convincing evidentiary standard” relative to the 
testimony involving whether or not the feeding tubes could be removed from a comatose 
patient (a competent individual before coming to the hospital, 21 years or older).  But 
even more important is the fact that six of the justices in concurring or dissenting 
opinions repeatedly stated three beliefs: 
1. The liberty guaranteed by the due process clause protected an individual’s 
personal decision to refuse medical treatment.  
2. The United States Supreme Court should announce that federal courts have no 
business in the field of preserving life, insofar as the American law had always 
accorded states the power to prevent suicide and the Federal Constitution had 
nothing to say about the subject. 
3. Nancy Cruzan had a fundamental right, under the due process clause, to be free of 
unwanted artificial nutrition and hydration, and that right was not outweighed by 
the state of Missouri’s asserted interest in the preservation of life and which 
standard of evidence should apply. 
  (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1990, pp. 285-292).   
From a cumulative perspective, the concurring opinions and the dicta in the 
minority opinions in Cruzan support a very strong argument for the right of every 
individual to have possession and control of his or her own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others and the right of every human being of adult years and sound 
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mind to determine what shall be done with his/her own body, even the planning and 
fulfillment of an assisted suicide (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 
1990, p. 282). 
At about the same time that the federal courts in the State of Washington (and 
eventually the United States Supreme Court) were ruling on the issue of assisted suicide, 
physicians in New York were challenging a New York state law prohibiting the 
intentional assistance of suicide in the federal court system using a moderately different 
approach. 
Federal trial court–state of New York  1994      
Litigation continued post Cruzan (1990).  In 1994, Dr. Timothy Quill challenged 
the state of New York’s law prohibiting the intentional assistance or promotion of 
suicide, contending that it violated the substantive component of the 14th Amendment’s 
due process clause (Gorsuch, 2006).  The trial judge in the case of Quill v. Koppell, 870 
F. Supp. 78 (1994), denied Dr. Quill’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the 
enforcement of the relevant statutes, §§ 125.15(3) and 120.30 of the New York Penal 
Law, to the extent they apply to physicians who give assistance to those who wish to 
commit suicide.  The defendants (three officials in their governmental capacities 
representing the State of New York) opposed the plaintiff’s motion and cross-moved for 
judgment on the pleadings dismissing the action (Quill v. Koppell, 1994, p. 78). 
Chief Judge Thomas Griesa of the Southern District of New York denied Dr. 
Quill’s motion for preliminary injunction and granted the defendants' cross-motion to 
dismiss the action.  The motion to dismiss was treated as one for summary judgment 
since the court had considered matters outside the pleadings (Quill v. Koppell, 1994, p. 
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78).  Judge Griesa rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to rely on the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992).  Judge Griesa stated that the issue of 
personal autonomy being applied to assisted suicide cases was “too broad” since “the 
Supreme Court has been careful to explain that the abortion cases [Roe v. Wade (1973) 
and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)], and other related decisions on procreation and 
child rearing, are not intended to lead automatically to the recognition of fundamental 
rights on different subjects” (Quill v. Koppell, 1994).  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Griesa’s ruling.  The 
appellate court did not address the due process theory advanced by Dr. Quill, but instead 
adopted his equal protection theory because it could not agree with the “natural-artificial” 
distinction between refusing care and assisting suicide reasoned by Judge Griesa since it 
could not find anything “natural” about causing death by removing feeding tubes or 
ventilators (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 12).   
The appellate court ruled that “The New York statutes criminalizing assisted 
suicide violate the Equal Protection Clause because, to the extent that they prohibit a 
physician from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a mentally competent, 
terminally-ill person in the final stages of his terminal illness, they are not rationally 
related to any legitimate state interest” (Quill v. Vacco, 1996, p. 731).   This case would 
eventually be consolidated with another case (Washington v. Glucksberg) and be heard 
by the Supreme Court in 1997. 
It would take three years for these two landmark cases to come before the nine 
justices of the United States Supreme Court.  Each justice, in his/her own unique way, 
had something to say about assisted suicide.    
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Washington and Vacco–Journey to the Supreme Court–1997–All nine justices weigh 
in on assisted suicide                   
The case of Washington v. Glucksberg began its journey to the U. S. Supreme 
Court in January of 1994 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Washington under the name Compassion in Dying v. Washington.  Four Washington 
physicians, three gravely ill patients, and a nonprofit organization that counsels people 
considering doctor-assisted suicide filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of 
Washington Revised Code Section 9A.36.060, which makes it a crime to knowingly 
assist, aid, or cause the suicide of another person. The district court ruled the statute 
unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the liberty interest protected by the due 
process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
(Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 1994, p. 1454).   
The case was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
where a panel of judges reversed the district court's ruling and reinstated the Washington 
statute.  In a 2–1 decision, the court of appeals emphasized that no right to assisted 
suicide has ever been recognized by a court of final jurisdiction anywhere in the United 
States (Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 1995, p. 586).  Agreeing to rehear the case 
en banc (before all 11 judges on the Ninth Circuit), the court of appeals reversed the 
panel's decision and affirmed the district court's ruling, which had invalidated the 
Washington statute.  In an 8–3 decision, the appellate court said that “the Constitution 
encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's 
death,” including the liberty interest of certain patients to hasten their deaths by taking 
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deadly amounts of medication prescribed by their physicians (Compassion in Dying v. 
Washington, 1996, p. 790). 
The decisions in both the cases of Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill 
were announced the same day by the U.S. Supreme Court (June 27, 1997).  In both cases 
the Supreme Court decisions were unanimous in reversing the appellate court decision, 
but based on different reasoning.  In Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist wrote that the case turned on whether the Due Process Clause protects the right 
to commit suicide with another's assistance. The unanimous decision rejected such a 
constitutional claim for three reasons (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 717).  First, 
the Court observed that suicide and assisted suicide have been disapproved by Anglo-
Saxon law for more than seven hundred years. From thirteenth-century England through 
nineteenth-century America, the Court said, the “common law” has consistently 
authorized the punishment of those who have attempted to kill themselves or assisted 
others in doing so (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 710).  Second, the Court pointed 
to the overwhelming majority of states that currently prohibit physician-assisted suicide. 
Only Oregon expressly allows doctors to help their patients hasten their demise through 
lethal doses of prescribed medication, and the law that allows this practice is constantly 
being challenged in court (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 713).  Third, the Court 
found that the history of the Due Process Clause does not support the asserted right to 
assisted suicide (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 719). 
The third reason demands a discussion in greater detail.  The Court wrote that 
although the Due Process Clause protects certain “fundamental rights,” the asserted right 
to physician-assisted suicide does not rise to “this level of importance” (Washington v. 
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Glucksberg, 1997, p. 719).  Before a right may be deemed “fundamental” in nature, it 
must be deeply rooted in the nation’s legal history. The Court found the asserted right to 
physician-assisted suicide to be contrary to U.S. history, tradition, and practice; therefore, 
it concluded that it was not a “fundamental right” (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 
729).  When legislation affects a highly valued liberty or freedom, the Court must apply 
the “strict scrutiny” standard of “judicial review.”  Since the Court ruled that this was not 
the case, they applied “a minimal standard of judicial scrutiny” (Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 2017, p. 730).  This standard of judicial scrutiny, known as the rational 
relationship test, requires courts to uphold laws that are “reasonably related to some 
legitimate government interest” (Washington v. Glucksberg, 2017, p. 730).  In this case 
the Court said that the state of Washington had a legitimate interest in preserving life, 
preventing suicide, protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, and 
safeguarding vulnerable members of society, such as the poor, elderly, and disabled, from 
friends and relatives who see physician-assisted suicide as a way to end the heartache and 
burden that often accompany the protracted illness of a loved one (Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 1997, p. 731).   
As previously stated, on the same day that the Court released its decision in 
Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), it announced its decision in the companion case of 
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).  Vacco v. Quill (1997) differed from Washington v. 
Glucksberg (1997) in that the plaintiffs in Vacco (three doctors and three terminally ill 
patients) challenged a New York law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide on the ground 
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  New York Penal Law Section 125.15 makes it a crime to intentionally help 
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another person commit suicide.  However, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), New York 
permits competent adult patients to terminate life-sustaining treatment, such as artificial 
hydration, nutrition, and respiration (Vacco v. Quill, 1997, p. 794). 
The Equal Protection Clause requires the government to provide equal treatment 
to all similarly situated people. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government 
from denying legal rights to one group of persons when those same rights are afforded to 
another group confronted by indistinguishable circumstances.  The plaintiffs argued that 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is tantamount to suicide, because by definition 
its withdrawal typically ends life by ceasing to sustain it.  The plaintiffs in Vacco 
contended that, in allowing some patients to hasten their death by terminating life-
sustaining measures but not allowing other patients to hasten their deaths by taking lethal 
doses of prescribed medication, New York had denied patients equal protection of the 
laws (Vacco v. Quill, 1997, p. 799). 
The Supreme Court ruled that a fundamental distinction exists between letting a 
patient die and killing her.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in the unanimous opinion that 
in one instance, the patient is allowed to die by natural causes when life-sustaining 
treatment is withdrawn. The patient’s cause of death in that instance is the underlying 
illness.  In the other instance, death is intentionally inflicted by the joint effort of doctor 
and patient.  The cause of death in that instance is not the underlying illness, but human 
action (Vacco v. Quill, 1997, p. 808). 
The Court in Vacco also noted that a right to physician-assisted suicide has never 
been approved by the common law but has been historically discouraged by both 
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common-law and statutory schemes throughout the United States. Thus, the Court 
concluded that physician-assisted suicide is not substantially similar to refusing medical 
treatment and that the legal systems of New York and other states may treat each practice 
differently without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause (Vacco v. Quill, 1997, p. 
801). 
Although the decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco were both unanimous, it is very 
interesting to note that several of the justices wrote concurring opinions that were not 
only purposely designed to be applicable to both cases, but put forth different reasons and 
directions for why laws about assisted suicide may be changing in the future.  It is 
important to note that a concurring opinion filed by a judge or judges agrees with the 
majority decision, but it expresses his or her different reasons for the decision, or a 
different view of the facts of the case, or of the law (Concurring opinion, 2017, p.1). 
In a concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor in Glucksberg, which was joined by 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, O’Connor stressed that the states remain free to establish a 
right to physician-assisted suicide or to otherwise strike a proper balance between the 
interests of terminally ill patients and the interests of society.  State legislatures, 
O’Connor suggested, are a more appropriate forum for making such difficult decisions 
because their members are accountable to the electorate at the ballot box.  By contrast, 
the federal judiciary is often insulated from public opinion because its members are 
appointed to the bench for life.  Relying on several studies undertaken by the states to 
evaluate the problem of physician-assisted suicide, O’Connor said that the right to die 
must first be grappled with at the local level before entangling federal courts in the 
controversy (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 736).  This opinion by Justice 
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O’Conner read very much like Justice Antonin G. Scalia’s concurring opinion in the 
Cruzan case some seven years before (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health, 1990, p. 279).    
Justice John Paul Stevens’ concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg 
(1997) also underscored the need for further national debate on the propriety of 
physician-assisted suicide, but in a different vein.  Although the states’ interests may 
have been adequately served in Glucksberg and Vacco, Stevens cautioned that the 
Court’s holding in these two cases does not foreclose the possibility that other 
circumstances might arise in which such statutes would infringe on a constitutionally 
protected area.  “There will be times when a patient’s interests in hastening his death will 
outweigh the state’s countervailing interests in preserving his life.  This reasoning also 
applies to the Vacco case” (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 739).   
In both the Glucksberg and Vacco cases, Justice Stephen G. Breyer suggested that 
the right to die should be renamed “the right-to-die with dignity.”  Once recognized by 
the Court, Breyer said, “the right to die with dignity” would include a competent patient’s 
right to control the manner of his/her death, the quality and degree of professional care 
and intervention, and the amount of physical pain and suffering one is willing to tolerate.  
According to Breyer, a statute that would prevent patients from obtaining access to 
certain palliative care aimed at reducing pain and suffering might infringe on the right to 
die with dignity.  Competent, terminally ill adult patients, Breyer intimated, may enjoy a 
constitutional right to prescription medication that will minimize the agony that often 
tortures the final days of their existence (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997).   
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Justice David H. Souter articulated a different method of analysis for evaluating 
right-to-die cases in a very lengthy concurring opinion (37 pages) that he applied to both 
cases.  Souter argued that the so-called right to die is a species of “substantive due 
process.”  Substantive due process, Souter reminded the Court, is a doctrine under which 
a judge evaluates the substantive merits of a statute, as opposed to the procedure by 
which it is implemented or administered.  Under the rubric of substantive due process, the 
Court has recognized an individual’s interest in dignity, autonomy, and privacy, among 
other things, over the course of the last century.  The right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment recognized by the Court in Cruzan, for example, was designed in part to serve 
these three interests (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997). 
Souter further contended that the doctrine of substantive due process protects 
individuals from “arbitrary impositions” and “purposeless restraints” created by the 
government.  Souter advocated viewing substantive due process claims on a continuum 
of liberty in which the level of judicial scrutiny would increase in direct proportion to the 
level of government restraint or imposition.  First enunciated by Justice John Marshall 
Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), this approach to 
substantive due process would require courts to carefully balance the competing interests 
presented by the litigants in each right-to-die case (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997).  
Souter finalized his remarks by contrasting his “simpler” approach with the more 
complicated analysis presently employed by the Court, an analysis that involves multiple 
tiers of judicial scrutiny, ranging from strict to minimal scrutiny, different categories of 
constitutional rights, ranging from fundamental to non-fundamental rights, and different 
classes of protected status into which a plaintiff may fall, ranging from suspect to non-
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suspect classes.  A balancing approach like the one articulated in Poe, Souter maintained, 
would allow for the gradual evolution of a constitutional right to die, instead of the 
complicated all-or-nothing approach that the Court has effectively adopted (Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 1997). 
The case law and legal rulings discussed in this foundational litigation and case 
law section, which includes the myriad of contradictory decisions pronounced by the 
judges and jurists, presents us with the following important summarized points: 
• The decisions and rulings of the trial court judges, the appellate court judges and 
the justices of the Supreme Court are conflicting as to the issue of assisted 
suicide.  
• Beginning with Judge Barbara Rothstein in the state of Washington in 1994, the 
use of selected parts of previous case decisions (selective precedent) to make a 
ruling began in earnest. 
• The most publicized and important trial court rulings always favored the 
individual making the request to terminate their own life.  
• Trial court rulings, whether in the state or federal system allowing for assisted 
suicide based on the Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal protection and 
substantive due process were always overturned by the higher courts. 
• The minority opinions of the justices of the Supreme Court consistently favored 
the right of a seriously ill person to end his/her own life. 
• The concurring opinions of the majority of judges and the minority opinions of 
the justices supported a very strong argument for the right of every individual to 
have possession and control of his or her person, free from all restraint or 
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interference of others as well as the right of every human being of adult years 
and sound mind to determine what shall be done with his/her own body, even the 
planning and fulfillment of an assisted suicide.  
As the next decade unfolded, important Fourteenth Amendment cases dealing 
with issues other than assisted suicide would be heard by the Supreme Court.  These 
cases signaled an expansive shift in protected “individual rights” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Could this “new reasoning” based on equal protection and substantive due 
process be used in shaping assisted suicide laws? 
 A decade+ of expanding “individual rights” under the 14th Amendment–1997-2018  
Between 1997 and 2018, there were no cases involving assisted suicide heard by 
the Supreme Court.  However, in 2003, the Supreme Court in the case of Lawrence v. 
Texas expanded its approach to substantive due process by using the Fourteenth 
Amendment to strike down a Texas sodomy statute by stating the “liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct” (such as sex between two men or sex between same-sex couples) 
(Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p.563).  The Court concluded that the case should be resolved 
by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private 
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003).  The Court held that the 
Texas statute banning same-sex sodomy was unconstitutional relying on both the 
substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the 
fourteenth amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003).  In a 
dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin G. Scalia stated that “the majority’s position requires 
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it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of 
substantive due process” (by a unanimous ruling in Glucksberg, the Court ruled against 
any fourteenth amendment right to assisted suicide) (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003). 
In 2014, in a federal case at the trial court level in New Mexico, Judge Nan G. 
Nash, temporarily placed the state of New Mexico into the realm of allowing assisted 
suicide under the guise of a constitutional right.  “This court cannot envision a right more 
fundamental, more private or more integral to the liberty, safety and happiness of a New 
Mexican than the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to choose aid in dying,” 
wrote Judge Nan G. Nash of the Second District Court in Albuquerque (Morris v. 
Brandenberg, 2014, p. 12 & Eckholm, 2014, p. 1).  The state trial court had ruled that 
“terminally ill residents have a constitutional right to obtain ‘aid in dying’” (Eckholm, 
2014, p. 1).  At the time, the court ruling made New Mexico the fifth state to allow 
doctors to prescribe fatal drug doses that suffering patients can use to end their lives 
(Eckholm, 2014).  “The State argued that such an action by a doctor was covered by the 
law and that banning doctor-assisted suicide was consistent with individual rights under 
the State Constitution.  Judge Nash agreed that the law applied, but said that ‘the liberty, 
safety and happiness interest of a competent, terminally ill patient to choose aid in dying 
is a fundamental right under the New Mexico Constitution’” (Eckholm, 2014, p. 3).  This 
case, in which the competent adult patient asked the physician for medication that would 
end her life instead of using a gun to terminate her existence, appears to move us closer to 
accepting the act of assisted suicide when a terminally ill and competent patient “does not 
want to suffer needlessly at the end” (Eckholm, 2014, p. 3).  However, in 2016, the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico in a unanimous decision “declined to hold that there is an 
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absolute and fundamental constitutional right to a physician’s aid in dying,” thus over-
turning Judge Nash’s decision (Morris v. Brandenberg, 2016, p. 6).   
The issues of history and tradition, the backgrounds and personal beliefs of judges 
and jurists, and cultural trends may have a significant impact in the near future on the 
issue of assisted suicide (Myers, 2016).  In 2015, in the case of Obergefell v. Hodges 
supporting same-sex marriage, as both the Fourteenth Amendment doctrines of due 
process and equal protection were expanded once again, the Supreme Court reversed its 
historical approach to substantive due process and relied rather on its own understanding 
of the nature of liberty (Myers, 2016, p. 397).  This “understanding” emphasizes respect 
for individual autonomy, self-determination and choice.  The Court’s analysis was 
unconstrained by history or a careful description of the right to substantive due process or 
even an assessment of emerging trends.  The Court’s focus was more on its own 
reflections on the nature of liberty and its own discernment of new insights and societal 
understandings about “what freedom is and must become” (Myers, 2016, p. 398).  In a 
dissenting opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts stated, as had Justice Antonin Scalia in the 
Lawrence case, that the majority ruling in Obergefell effectively overruled Glucksberg 
which had previously “set the bounds of substantive due process” (Obergefell v. Hodges, 
2015, p. 587).   
Could the Supreme Court extend its reasoning based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the Lawrence and Obergefell cases to the issue of assisted suicide?  In 
doing so, the Court would be emphasizing the “autonomy of life” philosophy by 
concluding that ending one’s life is the ultimate act of liberty, freedom, belief and self-
determination (Myers, 2016, p. 399).       
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 State legislation from 1994 to 2018  
In 1994, Oregon was the first state to enact a “Death with Dignity” law that 
“allows terminally-ill Oregonians to end their lives through the voluntary self-
administration of lethal medications, expressly prescribed by a physician for that 
purpose” (Oregon Health Authority, 1997, p. 1).  The statute is entitled, “Chapter 127– 
Powers of Attorney; Advance Directives for Health Care; Physician Orders for Life 
Sustaining Treatment Registry; Declarations for Mental Health Treatment; Death with 
Dignity” (Death with Dignity Act, 1997, p. 2).   The statute was revised in 2016 by the 
Oregon legislature.  However, no substantive changes were made.   
The Oregon statute has five requirements that the patient must meet.  The five 
requirements are: 
• The patient must be an adult (18 years or older). 
• The patient must be a resident of the state of Oregon (Factors demonstrating 
residency include, but are not limited to a state-issued driver’s license, a lease 
agreement or property ownership document showing that the individual rents or 
owns property in the state, a state voter registration or a recent state tax return). 
• The patient must be mentally competent (defined as being capable of making 
health care decisions and being able to communicate those decisions with his or 
her physician).  
• The patient must be diagnosed with a terminal illness that will lead to death 
within six months. 
• The patient must be able to self-administer and ingest the prescribed medication 
without assistance. 
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Two physicians must determine whether these criteria have been met.  The process 
entails two oral requests, one written request and certain waiting periods.   
The attending physician must comply with six responsibilities/requirements. The 
six responsibilities/requirements are: 
• The physician must be licensed by the state and certified to prescribe medication. 
• The physician’s diagnosis must include a terminal illness, with six or fewer 
months to live. 
• The physician’s diagnosis must be certified by a consulting physician, who must 
also certify that the patient is mentally competent to make and communicate 
health care decisions. 
• If either physician determines that the patient’s judgment is impaired, the patient 
must be referred for a psychological examination. 
• The attending physician must inform the patient of alternatives, including 
palliative care, hospice and pain management options. 
• The attending physician must request that the patient notify the next of kin of the 
prescription request.     
Both the patient and the attending physician must send certain documentation to the State 
Registrar for Vital Records at the time the prescription is written (Oregon Health 
Authority, 1997, p. 1).  (See Appendix B for complete text of Oregon’s original statute 
with revisions).    
Beginning in 2008 and over the next ten years, the states of Washington, 
Montana, Vermont, California, Colorado, Hawaii and the District of Columbia, in 
chronological order, enacted statutes similar to Oregon’s.  These laws came into 
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existence either by the citizens of the state voting for enactment of an assisted suicide 
law, by enactment of legislation by the state government without a vote by its citizens or 
by a state Supreme Court case ruling.  All of the laws included patient and physician 
responsibilities and requirements similar to Oregon’s.  Included in the laws of all six 
states and the District of Columbia under patient responsibilities and requirements were 
the age requirement of 18, citizenship in the state or district, diagnosis of a terminal 
illness with less than six months to live and capability of making and communicating 
health care decisions by oneself.  The physician responsibilities and requirements in all 
six states and the District of Columbia were inclusive of those in the Oregon statute 
(Oregon Health Authority, 1997).  Colorado’s law added a requirement that the physician 
must inform the patient that the medication should be taken in a private place with 
another person present, and the Supreme Court of Montana’s ruling found no indication 
in Montana law that physician aid in dying provided to terminally ill, mentally competent 
adult patients is against public policy; therefore, the physician who assists is shielded 
from criminal liability by the patient’s consent.  Chapter 4 of this qualitative policy 
evaluation study dissertation herein contains Table 1 showing the similarities and 
differences among all six state statutes, the District of Columbia and the state of Montana 
via the Supreme Court of Montana case, Baxter v. Montana (2009).  (See Plural 
Appendices B through I for complete text of each state statute, the District of Columbia 
statute and the Supreme Court of Montana ruling of Baxter v. Montana).                 
In the additional 12 states selected for this study (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Texas and 
Utah), assisted suicide is illegal.  Each of the 12 states, other than Alabama and Utah, has 
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a specific statute against assisted suicide.  Alabama has accepted the “common law” 
approach to assisted suicide without promulgating a state statute, and Utah’s position is 
unclear since it does not recognize the “common law” approach, nor does it have a state 
statute concerning assisted suicide (State-by-State, 2017).  Chapter IV of this dissertation 
contains Table 2 showing the criminal laws/statutes and punishment guidelines for each 
of the 12 states. 
  The federal government does not have any assisted suicide laws. 
 Precedent (stare decisis) 
The bridge between the content of this literature review to this point and the 
theoretical underpinnings section below is grounded in a discussion of the importance 
and significance of historical legal precedent, and of how judges and justices explain, 
regard and align their own legal reasoning with said precedent.  “Since the ramifications 
of a legal proceeding extend beyond that one proceeding, legal research is grounded in 
the past (precedent), as well as the present, in order to suggest what future rulings may 
be.  Precedent is a pillar of the American legal system, and this principle is known as 
‘stare decisis’” (Stare decisis, 2017, p. 1). 
Providing an example of the importance of legal precedent (stare decisis) is the 
polarizing paradigm of opinions between Justices on the United States Supreme Court.  
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., believed that “the history test” offers “a comparatively 
objective approach to due process litigation” (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 19).  Powell stated in the 
case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977) that “an approach grounded in history 
imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based on the abstract 
formula suggested as an alternative” (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 19).  On the opposite end of the 
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spectrum, Justice David Souter believes that the analysis of historical legal rules and 
rights relative to substantive due process issues “bears little or no relevance to current 
substantive due process analysis” (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 19). 
It is important to understand that in the United States courts seek to follow 
precedent whenever possible, pursuing the maintenance of stability and continuity in the 
law.  Devotion to “stare decisis” is considered a mark of judicial restraint, limiting a 
judge’s ability to determine the outcome of a case in a way that he or she might choose if 
it were a matter of first impression (Stare decisis, 2017, p. 2).  An example of stare 
decisis (precedent) and its importance can be seen in the following two famous United 
States Supreme Court cases.  In the 1973 case of Roe v. Wade (Roe v. Wade, 1973, 113), 
the Supreme Court defined a woman’s right to choose abortion as a fundamental 
constitutional right.  Despite the controversy engendered by the decision, and calls for its 
repudiation, a majority of the justices, including some conservatives who might have 
decided Roe differently, invoked stare decisis in all succeeding abortion cases including 
the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992, 
844). 
The principle of “stare decisis” has always been tempered with a conviction that 
prior decisions must comport with notions of good reason, or they can be overruled by 
the highest court in the jurisdiction (Stare decisis, 2017, p. 2).  The United States 
Supreme Court rarely overturns one of its precedents, but when it does, the ruling usually 
signifies a new way of looking at an important legal issue.  For example, in the landmark 
case Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court repudiated the separate-
but-equal doctrine it endorsed in Plessey v. Ferguson (1896).  The Court ignored stare 
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decisis, renouncing a legal precedent that had legitimated racial segregation for almost 60 
years (Stare decisis, 2017).  This judicial principle of stare decisis is the single most 
important defining characteristic of the “rule of law” and therefore must be considered in 
any literature review involving legal research about assisted suicide. 
Final consideration from a legal perspective–an individual’s ability to manipulate 
information rationally 
The final and most stringent category (of legal debate) to consider when dealing 
with assisted suicide is whether a patient has the “ability to manipulate information 
rationally,” which is regarded as the toughest competency standard to meet and considers 
a patient’s “reasoning capacity or ability to employ logical thought processes to compare 
the risks and benefits of treatment options” (Stillman, 2016, 293).   
A patient who can understand, appreciate and communicate a decision may still 
be impaired because she is unable to process information logically, in accordance with 
her preferences.  “The appreciation piece takes place when the subject (patient) can 
acknowledge the conditions of his or her illness and the value of possible treatments.  
This standard has been further defined to consider whether a patient is able to knowingly 
and intelligently evaluate the information at hand and otherwise participate in the 
treatment decision by means of rational thought processes” (Stillman, 2016, p. 295).  This 
additional “ability to manipulate information rationally” maxim appears to be an extra 
legal psychological layer used by some to help determine the true desires and wishes of 
the patient who is choosing to terminate his or her own life. 
The different individual judicial views and approaches to assisted suicide as 
expressed in the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions of the cases discussed 
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herein, as well as changing public sentiment over the past 20 years towards assisted 
suicide, may signal an opportunity to proponents, activists, advocates and public 
administrators to begin developing a universal public policy healthcare model concerning 
the topic of assisted suicide, using a dignified, compassionate and common-sense 
approach. 
  Theoretical underpinnings–1801 to 2018  
As the literature review for this policy evaluation paper progressed, it became 
obvious, as well as imperative, to look through the legal lens of study at two public 
administrators who were and are renowned experts in the combined areas of law, ethics, 
the U.S. Constitution, the administrative state and the United States Supreme Court.  This 
part of the research added the foundational theoretical underpinnings to the topic of 
assisted suicide, even though the topic of assisted suicide was never directly addressed by 
either of them.  This, in turn, helped structure part of the methodology used herein and 
facilitated the process of being able to propose a public policy healthcare model dealing 
with assisted suicide.  The two public administrators chosen were the late John A. Rohr, 
the nationally renowned American political scientist who was Professor Emeritus at the 
Center for Public Administration & Policy at Virginia Tech for over 25 years, and Jeffrey 
A. Toobin, the Harvard-educated lawyer, author, public administrator, legal analyst and 
expert on the U.S. Supreme Court and many of its justices, both past and present.     
Professor John A. Rohr (1934–2011) 
Professor John A. Rohr was internationally acknowledged as an expert on the 
U.S. Constitution as it related to civil servants and public administrators.  He was an 
expert on “constitutionalism,” which refers to the “role of written constitutions and of 
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unwritten but constitution-like conventions or political agreements in promoting good 
government” (Uhr, 2016, p. 142).  The main theme of constitutionalist theorists such as 
Rohr has been the legitimacy of public administration within the American political order 
(Overeem, 2008, p. 48). In this regard, Rohr resuscitated normative concepts like “public 
interest” and “responsibility” and argued that the American administrative state is 
compatible with the constitutional republic envisaged by the Founders (Rohr, 1986, p. 
37).  Rohr elevated public administration to the central position of constitutional 
“guardian,” thus playing a role comparable to that of the original Senate (Rohr, 1986, p. 
39).  Rohr used this approach and the elevation of public administration (and thereby 
public administrators) to “guardian” status to present his concept of “regime values” in 
his first book, Ethics for Bureaucrats (Rohr, 1978).  Rohr’s basic argument was that an 
orientation on regime values can help bureaucrats to choose their path when the law gives 
them no guidance and they have to make use of their discretion (Overeem, 2013, p. 51).     
Rohr spoke of regime values as the “values of the people” or the “values of the 
American people” or simply “American values” (Overeem, 2013, 52).  Most importantly 
(to Rohr), was that these democratic responsibilities of public administrators were 
symbolized by their oath of office: “The oath to uphold the Constitution is the moral 
foundation of ethics for bureaucrats” (Rohr, 1978, p. 70).  Rohr’s basic regime values 
were defined as “freedom, equality, and property” (Overeem, 2013, 53).  These “values” 
Rohr refers to are discovered in the public law, in the Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitution, statutes and in court decisions by the Supreme Court and other important 
lower tribunals (Rohr, 1978, pp. 49-56).  More specifically, Rohr says that the most 
suitable source to study regime values is Supreme Court opinions.  His main reasoning on 
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this point is that the Supreme Court is the principal interpreter of the Constitution, and its 
opinions have four characteristics that make them particularly instructive for public 
administrators (Overeem, 2013, p. 53).   
It is important to note the four characteristics espoused by Rohr, not only for 
clarity’s sake, but to segue into the writings of Jeffrey R. Toobin.  The four 
characteristics are: 
1. Regime values are institutional in the sense that they have a certain grounding in 
the past which gives them stability [see precedent or stare decisis as explained by 
Toobin (Overeem, 2013)]. 
2. They are dialectic, consisting of concurring and dissenting opinions that can both 
sharpen the administrative mind. 
3. They are concrete and “disciplined by reality” and thus especially useful for 
administrative practice. 
4. They are pertinent, i.e., “useful for reflection on fundamental values” rather than 
trivialities. 
  (Overeem, 2013, p. 53). 
 Rohr received criticism from postmodernist scholars of public administration 
relative to his work and writings on constitutionalism, regime values and the importance 
of the opinions of the Supreme Court.  However, many academicians continued to agree 
with Rohr on a certain level by saying that the constitutional approach to public 
administration has merit, but the approach could not provide universal standards as 
suggested by Rohr.  In 2007, Michael W. Spicer from Cleveland State University argued 
that: 
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Constitutionalism encourages the resolution of conflict among cultural 
conceptions of the good by practices of adversarial argument and procedural 
justice rather than simply by force and in doing so, it makes possible the 
protection of a broader range of such conceptions of good than would otherwise 
be the case. (Spicer, 2007, p. 3)  
Spicer further stated that the constitutional approach to public administration has 
merit in directing our attention towards constitutional practices, but any attempt to 
legitimize public administration in terms of these practices is always potentially 
problematic since the practices are always contestable (Spicer, 2007, p. 3). 
In 2017, Sheila Kennedy, Professor of Law and Policy in the School of Public and 
Environmental Affairs (SPEA) at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, 
agreed with Rohr as she discussed and reiterated his belief that “one of the most 
fundamental problems with the public management movement is its failure to emphasize 
that the job of public manager is to implement the Constitution” (Kennedy, 2017, p.4).  
Kennedy claims that public administrators lack understanding in basic civic (including 
professional and ethical behavior) and constitutional knowledge because of a lack of 
teaching and training (Kennedy, 2017).  In re-emphasizing the importance of the 
constitutional roots of public management and agreeing with scholars Robert 
Christenson, David Rosenbloom and Michael Spicer on the proposition that the 
Constitution is “the normative base for our scholarship, and it demands that we 
reemphasize and reestablish a greater commitment to how the rule of law pervades public 
administrative management in its entirety,” she echoes Rohr’s conviction that the 
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“legitimacy of the administrative state requires fidelity to the Constitution” (Kennedy, 
2017, p. 6).       
In his writings, Jeffrey R. Toobin was not one of the public administrators who 
criticized Rohr’s work.  However, as described by Toobin in the next section of this 
paper, the ideology-driven opinions of the justices of the Supreme Court may have 
changed or unwoven some of the benchmark constitutionally-driven beliefs supporting 
Rohr’s main concepts (Toobin, 2007).    
 Jeffrey R. Toobin 
For more than 200 years, the United States Supreme Court has confronted the 
same political issues as the other branches of government.  During his long tenure (1801 
to 1835) as chief justice, John Marshall did as much as the framers of the Constitution 
themselves to shape an enduring structure for the government of the United States 
(Toobin, 2007, p. 2).  As the leading Federalist of the day, he solidified the position of the 
American judiciary as an independent and influential branch of government (Toobin, 
2007, p. 2).     
However, during the period of territorial and economic expansion before World 
War I, the Court shrank from a position of leadership to one of “accommodating business 
interests and their political allies who dominated the other branches of government” 
(Toobin, 2007, p. 2).  It was not until the 1950s and 1960s, under the tenure (1953 to 
1969) of Chief Justice Earl Warren, that the Court began to consistently re-assert itself as 
an independent and aggressive guarantor of constitutional rights.  Over the next 40 years, 
even though the Court was “divided” on the most pressing issues before it, the Court 
 50 
 
continued its main leadership quality of being “constitutionally directed” (Toobin, 2007, 
p. 2). 
Like all their predecessors, the justices during this time period belonged to a 
fundamentally antidemocratic institution.  They were not elected; they were not 
accountable to the public in any meaningful way; their life tenure gave them no reason to 
cater to the will of the people (Toobin, 2007, p. 2).  But according to Toobin, from 1992 
to 2005, the decisions of the Supreme Court reflected public opinion with great precision.  
“The opinions were issued in the Court’s customary language of legal certainty, 
announced as if the constitutional text and precedents alone mandated their conclusions, 
but the decisions in these cases probably would have been the same if they had simply 
been put to a popular vote” (Toobin, 2007, p. 2). 
Over many years, as the writings of Toobin developed, it is interesting to note the 
expanse and timing of his public administration experience.  Toobin served in the arena 
of public administration on three separate occasions, first as a law clerk to a federal judge 
(1987) and then as an associate counsel to Edward Walsh, the independent counsel during 
the Iran-Contra affair and the criminal trial of Oliver North (1989).  He then served as an 
Assistant U. S. Attorney in Brooklyn (1991).  He took the oath to uphold the U.S. 
Constitution as an associate counsel and an Assistant U.S. Attorney (Harvard Law Today, 
2013, p. 1).  The “taking the oath to uphold the U.S. Constitution” portion of Toobin’s 
resume would have been of particular interest to John Rohr.   
One particular event in history helped initially shape Toobin’s approach and 
guided his thinking to the conclusion that “the identity of the justices and therefore their 
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individual ideologies trump precedent, which in turn drives their opinions” (Toobin, 
2007, p. 339). 
That one particular event was the construction of the original Supreme Court 
building.  Legal historians have discussed and debated the significance of the 
processional approaches to the Capitol, the Washington Monument and the Lincoln 
Memorial since these landmarks were designed and built.  When Cass Gilbert, the 
architect who designed the Supreme Court building (or “home” of the Supreme Court as 
he referred to it), was commissioned to design the building, his main thought was to 
“convey to visitors the magnitude and importance of the judicial process taking place 
within the Court’s walls” (Toobin, 2007, p. 1).  Gilbert decided that the most important 
feature of the building’s exterior should be the steps.   
The public face of the building would be a portico with a massive and imposing 
stairway. Visitors would not have to walk a long distance to enter, but few would 
forget the experience of mounting those forty-four steps to the double row of 
eight massive columns supporting the roof.  The walk up the stairs would be the 
central symbolic experience of the Supreme Court, a physical manifestation of the 
American march to justice. The stairs separated the Court from the everyday 
world–and especially from the earthly concerns of the politicians in the Capitol– 
and announced that the justices would operate, literally, on a higher plane. 
(Toobin. 2007, p. 1) 
According to Toobin, as of 2007, the main leadership quality of the Supreme 
Court was that of being “constitutionally directed.”  However, at the same time, the 
“constitutionally directed decisions of the Court reflected public opinion with great 
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precision” (Toobin, 2007, p. 2).  Toobin claims that this “constitutionally directed” 
process of decision-making (and therefore the outcomes of most cases) from a 
historically antidemocratic institution was about to undergo a revolution.    
Justice William Rehnquist passed away in late 2005, and Justice Sandra Day 
O’Conner retired in early 2006.  According to Toobin, from these two events, plus a 
“conservative ideological offensive” being led by some elite law schools, evangelical 
churches and the White House, the upcoming general election in 2008 and lip service 
being given to retirement by Justices David H. Souter and John Paul Stevens, the 
“decisions being made by the Court equaling the public opinion of the people” paradigm 
was about to change (Toobin, 2007, p. 3). 
How did this revolution occur?  Has Toobin’s educated prediction come to pass?  
How do Toobin’s thinking and future predictions compare or conflict with Professor 
Rohr’s teachings of “ethics in public service involving an intense sensitivity to 
appropriate forms of constitutional practice where the bureaucratic code of conduct 
should be based on each government employee’s understanding of constitutional 
principles” (Rohr, 1998, p. 4)?  According to Rohr, “a government employee’s 
understanding of constitutional principles provides him or her with an instinctive sense of 
correct conduct in every situation they find themselves” (Rohr, 1978, p. 5).  Does 
Toobin’s predictive shift by the justices of the Court change the “benchmark of 
understanding” for these government employees? 
When John G. Roberts, Jr., was nominated to the Supreme Court at age 55 (2005), 
he reflected upon the great symbol at the heart of architect Cass Gilbert’s design–the 
steps (Toobin, 2007, p. 337).  “I always got a lump in my throat whenever I walked up 
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those marble steps to argue a case before the Court and I don’t think it was just from the 
nerves” (Toobin, 2007, p. 337).  Due to renovations in 2009, the steps were closed to the 
public and a new entrance to the building was built.  Visitors to the Supreme Court 
building are still allowed to depart down the original steps, but only to watch Gilbert’s 
vision recede behind them (Toobin, 2007, p. 337).  Is the closing of the steps (and the 
original intended architectural meaning of them that the Supreme Court Justices would be 
operating on a higher plane) a metaphor for a deeper change in the Court’s approach as 
was predicted (Toobin, 2017, p. 337)?   
More than any other influence, the Court has always reflected the political 
currents driving the broader society (Toobin, 2007).  But as Toobin noted in 2007, the 
fundamental divisions in American society are not regional or religious, but ideological.  
“When it comes to the core of the Court’s work, determining the contemporary meaning 
of the Constitution, it is ideology, not craft or skill that controls the outcome of the case” 
(Toobin, 2007, p. 338).  Toobin is an admirer of the recently retired conservative 
appellate judge (United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit), economist and 
law professor, Richard A. Posner.  Posner said, “It is rarely possible to say with a straight 
face of a Supreme Court constitutional decision that it was decided correctly or 
incorrectly.  Constitutional cases can be decided only on political judgment, and a 
political judgment cannot be called right or wrong by reference to legal norms” (Toobin, 
2007, p. 339). 
One needs to look no further than the case of Lawrence v. Texas (p. 21, supra) as 
an example of ideology trumping precedent or stare decisis.  As previously stated, in 
Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that the Texas statute banning same-sex sodomy was 
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unconstitutional relying on both the substantive component of the 14th Amendment's Due 
Process Clause and the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause (Lawrence v. Texas, 
2003, p. 579).  This 2003 decision overturned the Court’s barely 17-year-old decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) that had upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy 
law criminalizing oral and anal sex in private between consenting adults, in this case with 
respect to homosexual sodomy, though the law did not differentiate between homosexual 
sodomy and heterosexual sodomy (Toobin, 2007, p. 339).   
A second example of ideology trumping precedent is the 2015 case of Obergefell 
v. Hodges (2015).  In the case of Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), both the Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrines of due process and equal protection were expanded to support 
same-sex marriage, as the Supreme Court reversed its historical approach to substantive 
due process and relied rather on its own understanding of the nature of liberty (Myers, 
2016, p. 397).   
Some experts may not agree with Toobin and cite specific Supreme Court rulings 
since 2008 in order to validate their points of view.  Some may point to the National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius case in 2012 as an example.  In a 5-4 
ruling, the Supreme Court upheld the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
The Court held that the requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for 
not obtaining health insurance was constitutional under the Commerce Clause.  More 
specifically, in writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., found the 
mandate constitutional by characterizing the mandate as a tax.  Roberts reasoned that 
since the penalty is to be paid to the IRS, along with the individual’s income taxes, “it is 
not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness” (National Federation of 
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Independent Business v. Sebelius, 2012, p. 520). However, Roberts did not find the law 
valid under the Commerce Clause as did the four other justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor and Kagan) voting in the majority.  Roberts upheld the mandate citing the 
Congress’s power under the Taxing Clause.  But ideologically speaking, all but Roberts’ 
fit into Toobin’s theory.  However, this case is very different from the other cases 
discussed herein.  The NFIB case deals with the Commerce Clause and the taxing 
authority of Congress.  The rights, tenets and mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
not mentioned anywhere in the entire opinion.  Perhaps for some justices, the 
“ideologically-directed thinking” applies to all cases, but for others, it only applies to 
equal protection and substantive due process cases.  Until the Supreme Court rules on the 
next major Fourteenth Amendment case (possibly on assisted suicide), Toobin’s 
prognostication will remain untested. 
To date, Toobin’s “ideological-directed thinking” conceptual prognostication 
based on political appointments has not been disputed.  Unlike Rohr, whose ideas, 
writings and teachings have been around since the early 1960s, Toobin’s theory is very 
recent (2007) as far as judicial history is concerned.  His reputation as a writer, public 
administrator and legal analyst has been lauded by some as being esteemed, insightful, 
well-respected and balanced (Kakutani, 2007). 
Toobin’s main theory of “a new directional, politically-motivated revolution of 
individualized ideological-directed thinking by the Justices” coupled with his 
pronouncement (paraphrased) that “justices use their own individual ideologies when 
determining the meaning of the Constitution and when it comes to the core of the Court’s 
work, it is ideology, not craft or skill that controls the outcome of the case,” has support 
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from other authors.   
In 2010, in the Journal of Politics, Professor Christopher Zorn from Pennsylvania 
State University and Assistant Professor Jennifer Bowie from George Mason University 
“found robust support for the contention that ideological and policy-related influence on 
federal judges’ decision are larger at the higher levels of the judicial hierarchy” (Zorn & 
Bowie, 2010. p. 1212).  Also in 2010, Professor Corey Yung from the University of 
Kansas School of Law agreed that the theory of ideological-directed thinking (and thus 
how a judge would rule) was extremely important, but that the measuring techniques 
currently used were too limited, thus inadequate and should be expanded in order to help 
predict how a judge would rule (Yung, 2010, p. 2). 
Benjamin Oliphant, lawyer and adjunct Professor of Law at the UBC Allard 
School of Law in Vancouver, states that “judicial ideology is based on what a judge 
believes to be his or her role within the legal system, which in turn informs a set of 
principles and the interpretive methods they employ in going about their job” (Oliphant, 
2015, p. 2).  Oliphant further explains: 
In very broad terms, a judicial ideology with respect to constitutional law may 
require deference to elected bodies, or require adherence to past precedent and 
the intentions of lawmakers, or the original meaning of a law as passed, or it 
may seek to ensure the proper operation of robust democratic institutions or it 
may counsel making pragmatic decisions in the context of specific cases.  It is 
this form of ideology that I think is particularly important for principled 
constitutional decision-making. 
(Oliphant, 2015, p. 2).   
 57 
 
As to the issue of assisted suicide, any future decision by the Supreme Court may 
be weighed on the new scale of “ideologically-directed thinking based on politics and 
which jurists are appointed as Justices to the Supreme Court” and not on the historic 
precedent-based “scale of justice” (stare decisis) and the public opinion of the majority of 
Americans.     
Do the precedent-setting assisted suicide cases of Glucksberg and Vacco face the 
same fate as the Bowers case due to this shift and intertwinement of the collective 
ideologies of the current nine justices of the Supreme Court?  Do the writings of Toobin 
compromise a part of Rohr’s conception of regime values that emphasize the centrality of 
the U.S. Constitution in the decisions of the Supreme Court?  Have we unknowingly 
witnessed a decade (2007 to present day) where Rohr’s fundamental approach to public 
administrative ethics known as “constitutionalism” has been modified, abated or 
completely perished?   
If Toobin is correct and the future opinions issued by the Supreme Court are 
guided by the ideologically-directed thinking of nine justices, then said opinions may not 
reflect public sentiment.  They will simply be motivated by political judgment and will 
not therefore be constitutionally directed.  If so, what effect will this have on assisted 
suicide laws?   
 Synopsis 
Using the legal lens of study approach allowed for the broad examination and 
assimilation of the most important and pertinent research data about assisted suicide.  The 
legal lens of study approach provided not only the latest federal and state case rulings and 
updates, but insight into how jurists have been influenced in arriving at their decisions.     
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The subject matter of this dissertation is emotional and polarizing.  Judges are not 
immune from the “emotional influence” of this type of subject matter.  Therefore, in 
addition to following a path of legal reasoning that is objective, based on precedent, 
dispassionate, detached and constitutionally-directed, judges and justices apparently add 
their own personal experiences and ideologies to the legal decision-making process.  
According to Toobin (2006, p. 33), justices on the Supreme Court make their decisions 
based more on their own ideologies and not on the Constitution, at least when dealing 
with Fourteenth Amendment cases based on substantive due process and equal 
protection.  If he is correct, Toobin’s theory could change the entire landscape for laws 
concerning assisted suicide and possibly disrupt Rohr’s regime value theory.       
In the practice of law, there is an old legal aphorism that states, “If the facts of the 
case are against you, argue the law.  If the law is against you, argue the facts.  If the facts 
and the law are against you, just argue (some say, ‘pound the table and yell like hell’)” 
(Sandburg, 2009, p. 1).  Perhaps more importantly, the ideologies of the judges and 
justices need to be examined and understood and then argued as well.  The legal lens of 
study approach exposed the tenets of this aphorism as the facts of each case, each 
position and the legal arguments concerning assisted suicide were explored. 
This study is impacted on a major level by several pieces of research literature 
including Associate Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch’s book from 2006, The Future 
of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia.  The book introduces and examines the primary legal 
arguments deployed by those in favor of assisted suicide.  It also sets forth legal 
arguments for retaining existing laws against assisted suicide.  The book also debates 
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several ethical issues that are almost inseparable and inextricably linked to many of the 
legal issues involving assisted suicide (Gorsuch, 2006). 
Also impacting this study on a major level is Jeffrey R. Toobin’s book from 2007, 
The Nine.  This writing predicts a dramatic shift in the approach of the justices of the 
Supreme Court away from being constitutionally-centric to being ideologically-driven.  If 
Toobin is correct, the topic of assisted suicide should reappear before the Supreme Court 
in the near future, and a very different opinion may come forth than the opinions in the 
cases from the 1990s (Glucksberg and Vacco).  
Four of Professor John Rohr’s writings (as cited herein) impacted this policy 
evaluation study because of their importance to public administrators, public law and the 
Constitution.  Rohr’s approach using the Constitution as the foundational document for 
guidance, decision making and protection for citizens is tantamount to any public policy 
proposal concerning assisted suicide. 
The assisted suicide statute in the state of Oregon and the assisted 
suicide/euthanasia laws of The Netherlands form the basis for all of the other statutes and 
laws studied, within both the United States and the other five countries included in the 
study.  This fact alone makes the Oregon statute and The Netherlands law of extreme 
importance when attempting to propose a compassionate and common sense public 
policy healthcare model dealing with assisted suicide. 
Research literature dealing with the 1803 Supreme Court case of Marbury v. 
Madison and Justice Antonin G. Scalia’s dissent in the Cruzan case both are of vital 
importance.  Scalia announced in his dissent that “federal courts have no business in the 
field of preserving life, insofar as the American law had always accorded states the power 
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to prevent suicide—including suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary 
to preserve one’s life—by force if necessary, and the Federal Constitution had nothing to 
say about the subject.”  Both the Marbury case and Scalia’s dissent will be the 
antithetical lynchpins as to how a public policy healthcare model for assisted suicide 
should be approached on a federal level.  
The research literature surrounding the latest U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and Richard S. Myers’ study “The Constitutionality of Laws 
Banning Physician Assisted Suicide” are examples of the Court expanding the use and 
understanding of substantive due process.  This importance of both these pieces of 
research literature, coupled with other Fourteenth Amendment cases involving education, 
criminal law, abortion, voting rights, assisted suicide, same-sex marriage and 
immigration, served as a directional compass for proposing a public policy healthcare 
model for assisted suicide that would withstand both legal and ethical assaults.     
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY  
Research and data collection 
The current qualitative policy evaluation study looks at assisted suicide using a 
legal lens of study approach.  The purpose of the current study is to develop a public 
policy healthcare model for dealing with assisted suicide using a dignified, 
compassionate, and common-sense approach. 
Methodology overview 
From a methodological standpoint, the term “legal lens of study approach” must 
be carefully and constructively defined in order to give the term clear meaning and show 
academic evidence that appropriate and proper qualitative research rules exist for this 
approach and that they were adhered to in this dissertation.  But first, the long-standing 
and academically accepted descriptive and evaluative research approach followed herein 
must be identified in order to determine the research questions.  After determining the 
research questions, the methodology to accomplish this determination herein must be 
explained and adopted.  “All good legal research should begin by identifying the specific 
goal or goals which the researcher wishes to achieve” (Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p. 33).  
According to Arlene Fink, Professor of Medicine and Public Health at the University of 
California, Los Angeles, there are some general requirements to follow when undertaking 
this kind of research, regardless of whether the research is descriptive or evaluative or 
both (Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p. 33).   
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 Professor Fink specifies five requirements: 
  1. Specific research questions 
  2. Defined and justified sample 
  3. Valid data collection 
  4. Appropriate analytic methods 
  5. Interpretation based on the data (Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p. 33) 
In addition to Dr. Fink’s five requirements, Professors Epstein and King suggest 
four rules “that are, regardless of whether the research is qualitative or quantitative, 
essential to reaching valid inferences” (Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p. 33).  Their four rules 
essential to reaching valid inferences are: 
  1. Identify the population of interest 
  2. Collect as much data as is feasible 
  3. Record the process by which data come to be observed 
  4. Collect data in a manner that avoids selection bias 
 The general requirements of Dr. Fink are discussed in separate paragraphs below.  
The four rules of Professors Epstein and King relative to reaching valid inferences are 
examined as a unit in a separate paragraph.  The five requirements and four rules 
mentioned above were adhered to in this program evaluation study dissertation on 
assisted suicide. 
Requirement number one is that the researcher identifies specific research 
questions.  In this dissertation, after stating the general objective for this program 
evaluation study, the following five research questions were proposed in Chapter 2:            
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Question 1. What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted 
suicide laws and statutes in effect in the 20 jurisdictions selected for this study?  
Question 2. What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted 
suicide laws in the six countries other than the United States selected for this study? 
Question 3. Are there universal language elements in the assisted suicide laws of the 
20 jurisdictions and in the six countries other than the United States selected for this 
study?  
Question 4. Over the past 45 years, how do the rulings of the United States Supreme 
Court in Fourteenth Amendment cases using the doctrines of equal protection and 
substantive due process as applied to assisted suicide laws reflect public opinion of 
the citizenry of the United States as reported in opinion polls? 
Question 5. A. Does evidence in case law support Rohr’s “regime 
value/constitutionally-directed” theory or Toobin’s more recently formulated theory 
that justices of the Supreme Court are increasingly motivated not by the Constitution 
but by politics and personal ideology when deciding 14th Amendment cases?  Can 
both theories co-exist and not totally conflict? 
Question 5. B. What does the answer to part A suggest about the future of assisted 
suicide laws in the United States? 
The accepted methodology followed and used herein was established in order to 
answer as completely as possible the research questions proposed above (and in Chapter 
2).  The first step was to start with a comprehensive literature review of all laws covering 
assisted suicide in the states which allow for assisted suicide, and laws in other states 
randomly selected for this study that do not allow for assisted suicide or have chosen not 
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to promulgate any laws for or against the issue.  The second step taken in the 
comprehensive literature review was to look at six countries from other parts of the world 
and see how these countries have dealt with the issue of assisted suicide.  The 
comprehensive literature review consisted of a thorough and complete reading of all 
statutes and laws in order to uncover each pertinent element of the statutory laws 
promulgated.  The comprehensive review detailed the most important similarities and 
differences of each law and also detailed the historical placement from a chronological 
perspective.  The third step was to research general statistics about assisted suicide 
including the reporting systems used by states that allow for assisted suicide.   
Five additional research steps were taken in order to ensure that a substantial, 
complete and accepted research methodology was followed in this dissertation.  The topic 
of assisted suicide was researched, and the five most critical events as stated by experts 
on the subject matter, which brought the issue to the forefront of the thoughts and actions 
of America’s mainstream, were uncovered.  All United States Supreme Court cases on 
assisted suicide issues were researched, analyzed and shepardized.  When cases are 
“shepardized” (using the term to define the in-depth use of Shepard's Citations, the main 
legal citation source which is widely recognized by academicians such as McConville 
and Chui (see McConville and Chui, 2007), the process provided a list of all courts and 
judicial authorities citing a particular case or statutory authority from the date of the 
ruling of the case to present day.  This type of doctrinal legal research revealed if a case 
has been reaffirmed, followed, applied, questioned, modified, distinguished, overturned 
or generally cited in later cases, thus upholding, modifying or adding some additional 
parameters to the ruling of the case (Shepard’s Citations, 2017, p. 1).  The analysis of the 
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cases entailed an in-depth look into the chronology of the cases, the legal reasoning of the 
majority, how many justices voted in the majority, the main tenets of any dissenting 
opinions, different views expressed by any concurring opinions, main precedents 
followed (or not), and more.     
The research into the Supreme Court cases dealing with assisted suicide led to 
research centered around the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and other cases in the past 45 years relying on equal protection and substantive due 
process arguments before the Supreme Court, the same arguments used by proponents 
and opponents in the assisted suicide cases.  Cases concerning assisted suicide in other 
state and federal jurisdictions were researched, analyzed and shepardized to uncover how 
these cases were argued and resolved at the trial court and appellate court levels.  Finally, 
research was conducted into the history of “constitutionalism” and, in addition, how the 
justices of the Supreme Court have dealt with precedent in major Fourteenth Amendment 
cases over the past 45 years and how their directional reasoning has changed.     
In the strictest sense, most of Professor Fink’s second requirement does not apply 
to this qualitative study.  There were no interviews conducted, nor were there any surveys 
or questionnaires sent to a defined audience (sample).  Since this author has chosen a 
legal studies approach, as in one of the studies examined under this requirement heading 
by Professors Dobinson and Johns, the scope and depth of the research conducted for this 
study was exhaustive, “thus giving the conclusions drawn a much better chance of being 
valid” (Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p.35). 
Requirements number three, valid data collection, and number four, appropriate 
analytical method, were followed in the sense that all laws, statutes and cases were 
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researched, shepardized and analyzed in order to make certain that no data remained 
uncollected.  In addition, even though the analysis of all the data collected could be 
labelled as subjective, the experience and expertise of the individual doing the research 
for this study was skillful, proficient and competent. 
Requirement number five, interpretations based on the data, “is where most legal 
research falls down” (Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p.37).  The main general explanation is 
that “many conclusions are not justified by the data collected” (Dobinson & Johns, 2007).  
Dobinson and Johns’ comment refers to Fink’s requirement number five, interpretation 
based on data collected from surveys, interviews and questionnaires, not empirical 
qualitative legal research.  In this study, there are no methodological limitations due to 
survey sample.  The research questions herein are objective and avoid bias.  For this 
dissertation, how the data (research) was collected and how it was analyzed followed the 
appropriate and accepted “methodology along the lines of a social science literature 
review” (Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p.41). 
As part of the methodology for this study, Epstein and King’s four rules essential 
to reaching valid inferences regardless of whether the research is qualitative or 
quantitative were also followed.  The population (herein the subject) was identified, as 
much data as possible was collected, the process by which the data was observed 
(recorded) was explained and the manner in which the data was collected in order to 
avoid selection bias was observed and followed.   
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Legal lens of study approach defined 
The “legal lens of study approach” is defined as being the best and most studious 
qualitative research method that allows for locating, reading and understanding the 
investigative road map that will insure the discovery of the best primary sources of legal 
materials (cases, statutes and laws) and other secondary sources covering the topic being 
evaluated and analyzed.  In order to move forward under this approach, the fundamentals 
of the topic first need to be identified.  In this dissertation, the approach to the topic of 
assisted suicide falls into the category of doctrinal as opposed to non-doctrinal.  
“Doctrinal or theoretical research can be defined in simple terms as research which asks 
what the law is in a particular area.  The researcher seeks to collect and then analyze a 
body of case law, together with any relevant legislation (so-called primary sources)” 
(Epstein & King, 2002, p. 19).  Secondary sources such as journal articles, annotated 
statute books, black-letter law works, legal encyclopedias and law digests were 
researched as well.   
The qualitative legal research approach (legal lens of study approach) used herein 
is also non-numerical, in contrast to quantitative (numerical) research (Epstein & King, 
2002, p. 17).  The research approach to the subject matter of assisted suicide is of an 
academic nature as opposed to legal research for professional purposes or research by 
government agencies (Epstein & King, 2002, p. 17).      
 Secondary methodology considerations 
Since at least 2002, there has been a debate between social scientists and law 
professors concerning empirical legal research and empirical legal analysis.  A primary 
example of this “debate” was described by Professor Richard L. Revesz in an article 
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published in the University of Chicago Law Review entitled “Empirical Research and the 
Goals of Legal Scholarship: A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship” (Revesz, 2002, 
p. 169).  In a previous article published in the University of Chicago Law Review, two 
social scientists had criticized a law review article written by Revesz (one of many law 
review articles criticized that were written by multiple authors) claiming that he had 
“breached the basic rules of empirical research by being wholly unconcerned with 
questions of methodology and his article did not concern itself with understanding, 
explicating, or adapting the rules of inference” (Epstein & King, 2002, p.1).  
The afore-mentioned debate was primarily aimed at the issue of how legal 
research is being undertaken in law schools by graduate students and academics.  This 
dissertation will not address the debate.  However, it will use the main points of argument 
in the debate as a springboard to assist in explaining the following: 
1. Explaining the historical and accepted academic methodology followed in this 
dissertation;  
2. Acknowledging and explaining the type of research used in this dissertation; 
3. Explaining how the research was structured in order to insure that the most 
widely accepted doctrinal empirical approach was followed 
In the paragraphs and sections that follow the segment immediately below 
discussing “the importance of legal research in informing policy, law reform and in 
academia,” the doctrinal approach to determining the existing law for assisted suicide 
was followed.  Then in the appropriate sections, problems currently affecting the existing 
law(s) were considered.  Existing laws were also studied within a historical context in 
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order to uncover the stanchion-like strategy that was followed to develop these laws, 
including any flaws in the basic and secondary principles. 
Using the legal lens of study approach as defined herein, primary sources 
including state statutes and state laws covering assisted suicide, federal and state cases 
addressing assisted suicide, and other federal cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution as it has been applied to socially relevant issues and 
causes and laws from six other countries dealing with assisted suicide were researched 
and examined.  Secondary sources were used when necessary to elaborate or provide 
clarifications on these rulings.  When appropriate, the following resources were used: 
journal articles, annotated statute books, black-letter law works, legal encyclopedias, 
recorded expert legal reasoning, statistics, papers by academicians and experts, stances 
and positions promoted and published by opponents and proponents of assisted suicide, 
documented theoretical underpinnings and medical and psychological opinions.  As to 
these secondary sources, journal articles, recorded expert legal reasoning and papers by 
academicians and experts were the most useful (Law Library of Congress, 2018).    
As previously stated, the comprehensive literature review in Chapter 2 gave rise 
to five research questions that are addressed in the sections that follow, using the research 
and data collection methodological processes described in this chapter, as well as the 
sections below.  However, as a precursor to moving forward, the importance of 
qualitative legal research in informing policy and law reform and in academia must be 
emphasized.    
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The importance of legal research in informing policy, in academia and in qualitative 
policy evaluation dissertation studies in public administration  
Legal research is both an art and a science.  The significance and importance of 
using the legal lens of study approach as defined above cannot be overstated for several 
reasons.  One of the most important reasons was stated by Professors Christina L. Kunz, 
Deborah A. Schmedemann, Ann L. Bateson, Matthew P. Downs & C. Peter Erlinder in 
their 1992 textbook The Process of Legal Research: Successful Strategies.  Kunz stated, 
“Discerning what the law is requires gathering bits and pieces from a variety of sources, 
sorting them according to their relative weight and relevance to the problem (or issue), 
and combining them into as cohesive an analysis as possible.”  Another important reason 
is offered by Professor Ralph D. Mawdsley from Cleveland State University.  He stated, 
“What is most important to remember is that legal inquiry is a systematic investigation to 
interpret and explain the law on a particular topic” (Mawdsley & Permuth, 2006, p. 22).  
This systematic investigation of interpretation and explanation can lead to uncovering 
and understanding the articulated will of the people, as inferred by Jeffrey Toobin when 
discussing the “uncanny ear for American opinion” of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor and how “she kept her rulings closely tethered to what most people wanted or 
at least would accept” (Toobin, 2007, p. 7).   
Academic legal research and efforts to discover the “rule of law” and how it 
should be applied to public administration and used by public administrators have been 
under contentious discussion for many years.  Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., the Sid Richardson 
Research Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of 
Texas at Austin, when speaking from a historical perspective about this topic, described a 
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pendulum-like swing about how it has been perceived.  Lynn begins with Frank J. 
Goodnow’s emphasis on the need for the intimacy of law to be intertwined with public 
administration and be a substantial part of the fundamental principle of democratic 
governance, then moves to Leonard White’s “managerialism approach,” which describes 
the rule of law as a constraint on administrative direction and then back to the need to 
accept the rule of law as being indispensable to constitutional governance (Lynn, 2009, p. 
803).  Lynn stated that the main purpose of his essay was “to argue, as a matter of 
urgency, for assigning the rule of law the central place in public administration 
scholarship, teaching, and practice envisioned by Frank J. Goodnow” (Lynn, 2009, p. 
804).   
Expanding Lynn’s position of the rule of law being the indispensable centerpiece 
to constitutional governance, Professor Michael W. Spicer, Professor Emeritus of Public 
Administration and Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University, in his article “Value 
Conflict and Legal Reasoning in Public Administration,” explored how “legal reasoning” 
as a form of practical reasoning could help public administrators deal with problems and 
issues that arise because of “value pluralism” (Spicer, 2009, p. 537).  He argued that legal 
reasoning is valuable because “it is rooted in a process of adversary argument and 
analogical reasoning that promotes the consideration of conflicting values and 
conceptions of the good” (Spicer, 2009, p. 537).  Since the concept of value pluralism is 
rooted in “the conflict between equally good moral conceptions that are incompatible and 
at odds,” public administrators need a process that is rational, practical, reasonable, 
reasoned, analytical, and pluralistic to help them (public administrators) make the best 
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decisions.  That “process” is provided by legal reasoning and the rule of law (Spicer, 
2009, pp. 547, 551, & 555).   
 States and countries selected 
The first states selected for this policy evaluation study were the six states that 
have current statutes allowing for assisted suicide (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, 
Vermont and Washington) and the one state that allows assisted suicide based on case 
law from its Supreme Court (Montana), plus the District of Columbia, which statutorily 
allows for assisted suicide as well.  The laws (and case rulings) were examined using the 
legal research methods described herein.  These laws and case rulings were analyzed and 
compared for similarities and differences based on such components as time restrictions, 
residency requirements, counseling prerequisites, consent mandates, age requirements, 
what documentation must be in writing, expectation of death period requirements, 
historical policy underpinnings and other factors.  It was anticipated that the components 
of residency requirements, consent mandates and expectation of death period 
requirements will be the most conducive to comparison.  A table showing and explaining 
this comparative data is contained in Chapter 4.  
Twelve other states that do not currently have assisted suicide laws were selected.  
The states were “randomly” selected after placing the remaining 43 states into five 
geographical regions.  The random selection process used did not follow a “pure” random 
selection process.  In addition, the random selection process followed was not a “pure 
modified random assignment” approach (Lani, 2018, p.1).  The five geographical regions 
selected were Mid-America, Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and Southwest.  These 
regions and the states assigned to each of them were selected after researching and 
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finding the most widely-accepted definitions of geographical positioning in the United 
States.  The 12 states selected at random (by assigning each of the states a number and 
then using a blind-selection process) were Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Texas and Utah.   
Since six of the seven states that allow for assisted suicide are in the Northwest 
and Southwest regions (all states except Vermont), only one state was chosen from the 
Northwest (Utah) and only one state was chosen from the Southwest (Arizona).  For the 
remaining states and geographical regions, four were chosen from the Southeast 
(Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Mississippi), three were chosen from the Northeast 
(Maryland, New Jersey and New York) and three were chosen from the Mid-American 
region (Illinois, Missouri and Texas).  This type of hybrid random selection process, 
which took into account the geographic locations of the states that have assisted suicide 
laws, allowed for a more representative sample of states from the entire country.    
The states were selected in this manner for two additional important reasons.  The 
first reason is extremely obvious and pertains to the inclusion of the seven states and the 
District of Columbia that allow for assisted suicide.  The historical and current approach 
to dealing with assisted suicide of these states and the District of Columbia will be the 
practical foundational nexus for ascertaining how support for assisted suicide came into 
being in the United States.  The second reason pertains to the 12 states selected at 
random.  It was the best academic approach to randomly select the states used for this 
dissertation.  This process allowed for research to be commenced in order to gather the 
data, information, laws against assisted suicide, statutory legal directives, case law, public 
policies and current trends about assisted suicide from states throughout the United States 
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that have not promulgated statutes or directives allowing for assisted suicide.  A second 
table in Chapter 4 compares and contrasts the legal approaches and directives taken by 
these 12 states as to assisted suicide.  The comparison discussed in the table includes 
whether the state has accepted the “common law” approach to assisted suicide or whether 
there are specific statues against assisted suicide and more.        
In addition, the laws and public policies of the countries of Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and The Netherlands concerning assisted suicide 
were researched, identified and then compared and contrasted not only to each other, but 
to the laws of the states selected in order to better understand assisted suicide from 
different cultural perspectives in other parts of the world.  The laws and public policies of 
these countries were researched and analyzed following the detailed methodology 
explained on Chapter 3 herein.   
Accepted and proper standards and protocols of legal research were adhered to as 
these laws and public policies were researched and analyzed.  Reading, studying and 
comparing these laws and policies allowed for the ascertainment of similarities and 
differences and provided key issues and words to be compared and contrasted.  This type 
of legal research conducted by a thorough reading of each law and the use of the 
“common word” study application available in Microsoft Word allowed for the discovery 
of commonalities and differences in the laws.  Such rules as residency time restrictions or 
edicts, counseling prerequisites, written consent mandates, age requirements, physician 
authorization or approval and “expectation of death” period directives were compared 
and contrasted.  It was expected that the rules pertaining to residency time restrictions or 
edits, written consent mandates and expectation of death period directives would be the 
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most ascertainable and significance.  A third table in Chapter 4 contains this comparative 
data and information. 
The information obtained from the research and accepted methodological data 
processes used in this study was the cornerstone for answering the first three research 
questions from Chapter 2 as listed below: 
1. What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws and statutes in effect in the 20 jurisdictions selected for this study?  
2. What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws in the six countries other than the United States selected for this study? 
3. Are there universal language elements in the assisted suicide laws of the 20 
jurisdictions and in the six countries other than the United States selected for this 
study? 
 Statistics, state laws and statutes, U.S. Constitution, case law and legal precedent  
Statistics concerning suicide and assisted suicide were obtained from published 
reports from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the American Foundation for 
Suicide Prevention (AFSP).  These statistics not only underscored the importance of this 
major national concern, but helped frame some of the primary issues of this topic which 
clearly portray the ongoing debate of this emotional, contentious, polarizing and litigious 
subject. 
The process of reporting deaths from assisted suicides varies by state.  Only those 
states where physician-assisted suicide is permitted by law (California, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Oregon, Vermont and Washington) have a reporting process, which is primarily based on 
applications filed with the proper state authorities by individuals wanting to end their 
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lives (CNN, 2016).  The statistics from these reports were gathered and analyzed in order 
to have the latest information concerning trends, preferences and reasoning of those 
individuals choosing to follow assisted suicide protocols.  These statistics were compared 
in a table in Chapter 4 by analyzing them for common reporting principles such as 
frequency of reporting mandates, ages of those who died, number of attempts per person, 
success rate, number of physicians used, types of drugs administered (if available), 
history of the reporting process and other principles.         
The state of Oregon was used as the starting reference point for researching state 
statutes dealing with assisted suicide since Oregon was the first State to enact a “Death 
with Dignity” statute, which “allows terminally-ill Oregonians to end their lives through 
the voluntary self-administration of lethal medications, expressly prescribed by a 
physician for that purpose” (Oregon Health Authority, 1997, p. 1).  The history of how 
the Oregon state statute came into being was researched and studied in order to 
understand from a historical perspective the views, stances and arguments of both 
proponents and opponents of assisted suicide.    
Statutes allowing for assisted suicide in the states of California, Colorado, Hawaii 
Vermont, and Washington and the District of Columbia were researched and studied 
following the same primary reasoning listed in the previous paragraph and using the 
methodological structured approach stated on pages 2 and 3 herein.  However, an 
additional reason for researching and studying the statutes of these states is that all five 
states and the District of Columbia based most of their laws on the Oregon statute.  Also, 
for the reasons espoused herein, the ruling of the Supreme Court of Montana in the case 
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of Baxter v. Montana (2009) was studied since much of the language from the Oregon 
state statute was used in this opinion allowing for assisted suicide (Knaplund, 2009).          
The federal cases and state cases from the 19 states selected were identified, 
researched, analyzed and shepardized in order to uncover the current state of the law.  As 
previously stated, the process of “shepardizing” a case [using Shepard's Citations as the 
main citation source, which is widely recognized by academicians such as McConville 
and Chui (2007)] provided a list of all courts and judicial authorities citing a particular 
case or statutory authority from the date of the ruling of the case to present day.  This 
type of doctrinal legal research revealed if a case has been reaffirmed, followed, applied, 
questioned, modified, distinguished, overturned or generally cited in later cases, thus 
upholding, modifying or adding some additional parameters to the ruling of the case 
(Shepard’s Citations, 2017, p. 1). 
The 12 cases listed immediately below were used as a broad foundational base for 
the study of the federal and state cases (from the selected states) concerning assisted 
suicide. The cases were chosen after research revealed that they were the most important 
cases regarding assisted suicide (and other Fourteenth Amendment issues) decided by the 
United States Supreme Court, supreme courts of the states chosen, appellate courts in the 
federal judicial system and some federal trial courts.  The first case studied is from 1990 
(Cruzan), and the last case studied is dated 2016 (Morris), covering over a quarter of a 
century of cases heard by these courts on the issue of assisted suicide: 
1. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990) 
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) 
3. Compassion in Dying et al v. Washington et al (W.D. Wash. 1994) 
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4. People v. Kevorkian, 517 N.W. 2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) 
5. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)  
6. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)  
7. Quill v. Vacco, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) 
8. Baxter v. Montana (2009 MT 449) 
9. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538 (2003)  
10. Morris v. Brandenberg, Second District Court, New Mexico (No. D-202-CV-
2012-02909) 2014 
11. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
12. Morris v. Brandenberg, 376 P. 3d 836 (2016) 
(Full citations for all twelve cases are located in the Table of Cases) 
As the legal history of judicial precedent unfolded for this policy evaluation 
study, the 1803 United States Supreme Court case of Marbury v. Madison (1803) was 
examined and analyzed.  The main reason for examining and analyzing the case of 
Marbury v. Madison is that in the Marbury case, the United States Supreme Court held 
that “federal courts have the power under Article III of the Constitution to declare 
statutory law enacted by elected legislatures null and void if it violates the supreme law 
of the land” (p. 176).  This landmark Supreme Court decision, which is still the “law of 
the land” today, will be of utmost importance to the legal, practical and functional 
formation of the proposed public policy healthcare model dealing with assisted suicide to 
be enunciated in Chapter 5. 
As additional methodological justification for legal research into the importance 
and significance of historical legal precedent, and of how judges and justices explain, 
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regard and align their own legal reasoning with said precedent, was a look into and an 
analysis of how this foundational pillar-like concept matters to the issue of assisted 
suicide.  “Since the ramifications of a legal proceeding extends beyond that one 
proceeding, legal research is grounded in the past (precedent), as well as the present, in 
order to suggest what future rulings may be.  Precedent is a pillar of the American legal 
system, and this principle is known as ‘stare decisis’” (Stare decisis, 2017, p. 1). 
Included in the view into the precedent/stare decisis landscape was a glimpse into 
ancient Roman law and English Common Law.  This judicial principle of stare decisis is 
the single most important defining characteristic of the “rule of law” and therefore is one 
of the foundational bases of all legal research as per the accepted methodology followed 
herein. 
It was also necessary to research, uncover and analyze some critical events in 
recent history that spearheaded the interest in assisted suicide.  It was imperative that 
these events be analyzed in order to properly determine the beginning of the modern-day 
timeline for the subject of this policy evaluation study dissertation. 
For this dissertation, researching and understanding the public policy programs 
that have been utilized over the past two decades, and understanding the history of the 
motives that have led to certain changes and modifications in those policies, were 
foundational necessities for being able to propose a more contemporary public policy 
healthcare model dealing with assisted suicide.  
This section of the doctrinal legal research and methodological data collection 
process provided extremely important information with which to help answer research 
questions 1, 2, & 3 (as previously stated herein) and also provide the information 
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necessary to answer research question number 4 as listed in Chapter 2 and immediately 
below: 
4. Over the past 45 years, how do the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases using the doctrines of equal protection and 
substantive due process as applied to assisted suicide laws reflect public opinion 
of the citizenry of the United States as reported in opinion polls? 
Following the methodology elaborated herein and adhering to the promulgated 
mandates of doctrinal legal research, the information researched and studied covering the 
topics listed below provided an articulate and intelligent set of guidelines explaining how 
the issue of assisted suicide should be dealt with in the future: 
1. Selection of the 19 states and the District of Columbia, and the research and 
examination of the laws on assisted suicide in those jurisdictions;   
2. Researching reported information and statistics on assisted suicide from the 
states with assisted suicide laws; 
3. Researching and examining the federal and state case from the 19 states 
selected for this study; 
4. Researching, studying and explaining the 13 foundational assisted suicide 
cases; 
  5. “Shepardizing” the federal and state cases; 
6. Researching, analyzing and applying the concept of legal precedent (stare 
decisis) to assisted suicide and other Fourteenth Amendment cases; 
7. Researching and analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S Constitution  
and the inclusive rights of equal protection and substantive due process  
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to assisted suicide cases and other socially relevant issue cases; and 
8. Researching and analyzing the works of Rohr and Toobin to uncover and 
determine the correctness and therefore applicability of their theories to the issue 
of assisted suicide.              
Theoretical underpinnings  
Researching and examining what is referred to as the legal and somewhat ethical 
“theoretical underpinnings” to the topic of assisted suicide from the perspectives of 
renowned public administrators helped answer research question number 5 in Chapter 2 
and also listed in this chapter.    
The methodology used herein for this portion of the dissertation, began with 
research into the iconic writings of Professor John A. Rohr.  An in-depth look into Rohr’s 
“constitutionalism” concept provided an excellent comparative starting point in which to 
study the normative concepts of “public interest” and “responsibility” in public 
administration and how they helped frame the approaches taken by different states in 
dealing with assisted suicide.   
Since Rohr was the first to elevate public administration to the central position of 
constitutional guardian, it was discoverable just how this stepping stone of “guardian 
status” enabled Rohr’s concept of “regime values” to become the “guiding-light” for 
bureaucrats when the law failed to fulfill that role (Rohr, 1986, pp. 37–39).  If, or how, 
Rohr’s principles were considered and followed by the states that promulgated statutes 
dealing with assisted suicide as the courts were interpreting the Constitution was 
important relative to discovering, understanding and comparing the actions of the states 
with the court rulings. 
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Following the accepted methodological doctrinal research path as defined at the 
beginning of the chapter for updating Rohr’s writings on “constitutionalism” and “regime 
values,” as well as those of his distractors, enabled this public policy evaluation study to 
uncover the most recent authoritative writings that may have unwoven or at least 
modified some of Rohr’s (1986) benchmark constitutionally-driven beliefs.   
The work of legal expert, writer and public administrator Jeffrey R. Toobin 
(2007) was analyzed and explained using the methodological approach delineated herein 
in order to see if his “ideology motivated decision-making” theory about the justices of 
the Supreme Court will have an impact on the laws dealing with assisted suicide.  The 
analysis and explanation of Toobin’s work in an academic context also allowed for a 
determination as to whether it is in conflict with Rohr’s teachings or the two theories can 
co-exist relative to the topic of assisted suicide. 
As the legal and somewhat ethical “theoretical underpinnings” to the topic of 
assisted suicide were uncovered and examined, it became clear that other Fourteenth 
Amendment cases dealing with such issues as education, criminal law, abortion, voting 
rights, same-sex marriage, immigration and transgender/gender identity rights were of 
value in giving other researchers an understanding as to how the Supreme Court’s 
approach, position and rulings have changed over the past quarter century and, as to this 
dissertation study, how they related to future arguments for and against assisted suicide.  
This approach lead to a more predictive understanding of how the Supreme Court may 
rule on the next assisted suicide case, if the justices choose to approach the topic of 
assisted suicide as they have in the past 45 years when dealing with the other “rights” 
issues mentioned herein.  The information and data collected and analyzed using the 
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approach in this section of the study helped provide an answer to research question 
number 5 in Chapter 2, which is also stated immediately below:  
5. A. Does evidence in case law support Rohr’s “regime value/constitutionally-
directed” theory or Toobin’s more recently formulated theory that justices of the 
Supreme Court are increasingly motivated not by the Constitution but by politics 
and personal ideology when deciding Fourteenth Amendment cases?  Can both 
theories co-exist and not totally conflict? 
  B. What does the answer to part A suggest about the future of assisted suicide  
  laws in the United States? 
 Synopsis  
By using the “legal lens of study” approach (as defined herein, infra, p. 7) in this 
dissertation, the most important and pertinent data concerning assisted suicide was 
gathered, studied and examined using accepted and proven academic methodology in 
order to propose a public policy healthcare model using a dignified, compassionate, and 
common sense approach.  Even though the legal lens of study approach is the most 
objective and dispassionate approach (as opposed to ethical, moral or religious 
approaches), the subject matter itself remains emotional, fervent and polarizing.  It was 
imperative that the five research questions generated herein be objective, relational, 
comparative, functional and revealing.  However, these research questions also needed to 
be enlightening and thought provoking in order to be able to create and propose a public 
policy healthcare model for the extremely important issue of assisted suicide.    
The roadmap of methodological direction used herein and explained throughout 
Chapter 3 has many important steps covering many essential and significant parts, all 
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dealing with the topic of assisted suicide.  If analogizing methodology to a roadmap 
which contains a designated destination point, there are not only a primary expressway to 
follow, but also many secondary and tertiary throughways to traverse.  As the goal of a 
methodology chapter in any dissertation is to provide a clear and complete description of 
the specific steps taken to address the research questions propounded therein, the journey, 
inclusive of explaining all tributaries taken, is as important as arriving at the destination.               
In addition to being comprehensive and informative, the methodological rationale 
used for identifying, selecting and analyzing the information and data herein was 
inductive, emphatic, contextual, analytical and non-manipulative by design.  But this type 
of rationale also revealed the political views, emotions, sentiments and ideological 
approaches of the judges and justices as they explained their reasoning, how they came to 
their decisions concerning assisted suicide (and other Fourteenth Amendment based 
issues), and where they may be taking us in the future. 
Finally, proper academic protocol was followed in requesting at the appropriate 
time and receiving an exemption report from the IRB (see Appendix J). 
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Chapter IV 
FINDINGS 
Overview 
 This chapter presents the findings and results of this qualitative policy evaluation 
study concerning assisted suicide.  The main avenue of methodology used throughout this 
dissertation is a legal lens of study approach.  The findings and results are meant to be 
descriptive and therefore are arranged in a logical sequence and presented in an analytical 
and objective manner following the methodology described in the previous chapter.  The 
academic approach taken in this chapter is non-manipulative and without bias.     
As to the flow of this Chapter, since the Supreme Court has not ruled on a case 
involving assisted suicide since 1997 (Washington and Vacco), it was important to 
structure the contents in a distinct thematic and chronological order, not only centered 
around the five research questions, but by discussing other socially relevant issue cases.   
The first several pages of the chapter cover the history of assisted suicide from 
1938 to the present.  This overview leads to the first research question and a discussion 
concerning the seven states and the District of Columbia which allow for assisted suicide.  
It continues with an examination of definitional similarities in the statutes and ends with 
information regarding the main “takeaways” from the case of Baxter v. Montana (2009), 
which is the basis for the state of Montana allowing for assisted suicide. 
The next section examines the twelve states selected at random for this study 
without laws allowing for assisted suicide.  The section contains Table 2 which shows the 
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diversity of the approach to assisted suicide of the twelve states.  Informational statistics 
from the seven states and the District of Columbia allowing for assisted suicide are 
contained in the next section.  Table 3 categorizes and breaks down the data from each 
state using six columns of information. 
Research question number 2 is in the next section along with Table 4 which 
contains information from the six countries other than the United States chosen for this 
study with laws allowing for assisted suicide.  The next section contains research 
question number 3, the methodology followed to answer the question and a breakdown of 
the ten major foundational universal language elements found in the statutes and laws.   
The next section answers research question number 4 by looking at the socially 
relevant case of Roe v. Wade (1973).  The section also contains information about 
Supreme Court Justices O’Connor and Powell and their “uncanny ear for American 
public opinion.”  Polling data about abortion from 1973 to 2013 is also contained in this 
section, along with a discussion of how it pertains to assisted suicide. 
The next three sections discuss the further expansion by the Supreme Court of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal protection and substantive due process by its 
rulings in cases involving socially relevant issues other than assisted suicide.  These cases 
include the latest decisions of the first Supreme Court through its first session in 2018, 
which ended in June.  The cases are then compared to the assisted suicide cases of 
Washington (1997) and Vacco (1997).  This part of the chapter ends with a discussion of 
stare decisis (precedent) and what it means to the issue of assisted suicide. 
The last section of the chapter answers research question number 5 concerning 
Rohr’s (1978) “regime value/constitutional-directed” theory and Toobin’s (2007) theory, 
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which propounds the idea that beginning in 2008, the political and personal ideology of 
the Supreme Court Justices will be the main reasoning behind their decisions, and how 
both theories pertain to assisted suicide.   
Introduction 
The topic of assisted suicide is one of the most important issues facing society 
today.   But as with many issues dealing with death, assisted suicide has taken a backseat, 
at least temporarily, to other important societal issues in part because many people 
psychologically avoid end-of-life decisions (Elliot & Thrash, 2002).      
In 1938, the “right to die” movement (later to become known as the “death with 
dignity” movement) started with the founding of the Euthanasia Society of America 
(ESA) in New York.  In Florida, State Representative Walter S. Sackett, a physician, 
introduced unsuccessful “right to die” legislation in 1967.  It was the first legislation of 
its kind to be introduced in any state legislature (Humphry, 2018).     
Next came the historic United States Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade decided 
in 1973.  The Supreme Court of the United States held that all state and federal laws 
against abortion violated a “constitutional right to privacy” even though nowhere is such 
a right written in the Constitution of the United States.  The Roe (1973) case dealt with a 
woman’s right to have an abortion and did not contain any mention of the topic of 
assisted suicide.  However, the case set the legal tone and directional compass for using 
the Fourteenth Amendment to decide important social issues (Roe v. Wade, 1973).   
In 1976, California’s “Natural Death Act” became law, making Living Wills (the 
first Advance Directives for Health Care) legal.  The original Living Will was a directive 
by which the signer refused medical treatment in the event he or she had a “terminal 
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condition” and was deemed incapable of making decisions.  An unintended consequence 
of the Act was that the Living Will blurred the distinction between allowing a person to 
die naturally and intentionally causing death (Towers, 1978).  Once a physician had 
ordered a life-sustaining procedure for the patient and/or had prescribed medication that 
is keeping the patient alive (albeit temporarily), this document sets up a situation when 
the actions of the physician could be said to be intentionally causing the patient’s death if 
he/she orders the procedure stopped or terminates the medication.  The conundrum of the 
physician as proposed in this question is how the distinction between allowing a person to 
die naturally and intentionally causing death became blurred (Towers, 1978).           
That same year, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the first “right to die” 
case.  Karen Ann Quinlan, a young woman with brain damage, was on a ventilator for 
several months.  Her parents wanted the ventilator removed so that Quinlan would be 
allowed to die, but the hospital refused to do so.  The court ruled in favor of her parents 
based on a constitutional right of privacy, arguing that this unwritten right “is broad 
enough to encompass a patient’s decision to decline medical treatment under certain 
circumstances, in much the same way it is broad enough to encompass a woman’s 
decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions” (In Re Quinlan, 1976).  The 
case set three important precedents.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey was the first 
court ever to recognize a “right to die.”  Secondly, the court held that the decision of 
another person to refuse treatment for an incompetent patient was the same as “a patient’s 
decision” (In Re Quinlan, 1976).  Thirdly, the patient’s right to privacy can be exercised 
and “vindicated” by a legal guardian (In Re Quinlan, 1976).                  
Then in 1987, 32-year-old Nancy Ellen Jobes died from dehydration after the 
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New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision that family members could 
refuse medical care, including tube-feeding, without clear evidence of a patient’s wishes 
even though two neurologists had found Nancy to be “aware, responsive and purposeful” 
(In The Matter of Nancy Ellen Jobes, 1987, p. 420).  The Hemlock Society and the 
Americans Against Human Suffering organizations were founded in the 1980s and in 
1990.  These organizations were founded to promote death-on-demand without 
restrictions (History of Suicide Laws and Development, 2014, p. 5). 
Next, in 1990, in Michigan, Dr. Jack Kevorkian assisted Janet Adkins in 
committing suicide.  Adkins was a 54-year-old Oregon woman in the early stages of 
Alzheimer’s disease.  Criminal charges against Kevorkian were dropped, but a judge 
ordered him not to use his “self-execution machine” again (Meehan, 1990).   
Also in 1990, Congress enacted the “Patient Self-Determination Act” that forced 
all health care facilities and programs to provide education about Advance Directives for 
Health Care.  Non-compliance would be penalized by loss of federal funds such as 
Medicare reimbursements (History of Suicide laws and development, 2014).   
The U. S. Supreme Court decided its first “right to die” case in 1990.  The case of 
Cruzan v. Missouri (1996) held that “a State may apply a clear and convincing evidence 
standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of 
a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state” (Cruzan v. Missouri, 1996, p. 
261).   
In 1991, the President of the Hemlock Society, Derek Humphry, published a book 
entitled Final Exit providing step-by-step instructions on various methods of “self-
deliverance” or “how-to-commit suicide.”  It topped the USA bestseller list (Humphry, 
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1991, p. 109).   
The state of Oregon became the first state to enact a “Death with Dignity” statute 
in 1994 by voter referendum.  Because of legal battles that ensued, brought by opponents 
of assisted suicide, the statute did not take effect until 1997 (Oregon Health Authority, 
Death with Dignity Act, 1997).   
In 1998, the state of Michigan passed a law making assisted suicide a crime 
(History of Suicide laws and development, 2014). 
In 2008, the state of Washington became the second state in which residents voted 
in favor of a “Death with Dignity” law which legalized doctor-assisted suicide 
(Washington Death with Dignity Act, 2008).   
By way of the Baxter v. Montana case (2009), the Supreme Court of Montana 
ruled that “physician-assisted suicide is not against public policy,” thus making the state 
of Montana the third state to allow assisted suicide (Baxter v. Montana, 2009, p. 449).     
In 2012, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a state law that restricted 
assisted suicides, siding with four members of a suicide group who said the law violated 
their free speech rights.  The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the law 
violated the free speech clauses of the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions.  Georgia’s law did 
not expressly forbid assisted suicide.  In 1994, lawmakers had adopted a law that bans 
people from publicly advertising suicide assistance.  The law made it a felony for anyone 
who “publicly advertises offers or holds himself out as offering that he or she will 
intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide and commits 
any overt act to further that purpose” (Fox News, 2012).  As per Table 4 herein, the state 
of Georgia still has a law against assisting anyone in committing suicide.     
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In 2013, Vermont became the fourth state with a “Death with Dignity” law 
allowing for physician assisted suicide (History of Suicide laws and development, 2014).  
In 2014, Brittany Maynard died by her own hand after moving from California to Oregon 
where her “right to die” was protected by law.  She had terminal brain cancer and was 29 
years old.  In the last six months of her life, she became a spokesperson for national 
“Death with Dignity” organizations promoting physician-assisted suicide (History of 
Suicide laws and development, 2014).       
In 2016, California became the fifth state to permit assisted suicide as an end of 
life option.  It joined Oregon, Washington, Montana and Vermont (Alifiers, 2016).  Also 
in 2016, Colorado became the sixth state with an “End-of-Life” option for assisted 
suicide.  The measure allows Colorado residents over 18 to request assistance to die if 
they are ill and have less than six months to live. They must also be judged competent 
enough to make their own choices and must voluntarily ask for the medicine that would 
cause their death.  Before this measure, helping someone end his or her life was a crime. 
The referendum was passed in 2016 and became law in 2017 (Chen, 2016). 
The District of Columbia (Washington, D.C.) became the seventh jurisdiction 
(sixth by referendum and/or law) in the United States to enact an assisted suicide dying 
statute.  The D.C. Death with Dignity Act went into effect on February 18, 2017, and 
implementation started on June 6, 2017 (Richardson, 2017). 
On April 5, 2018, the state of Hawaii legislature passed HB 2739, Hawai’i Our 
Care, Our Choice Act, which allows “qualified patients in the State with a medically 
confirmed terminal illness with less than six months to live and possessing decisional 
capacity to determine their own medical care at the end of their lives” (Hawaii HB 2739, 
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p. 1).  The law will take effect on January 1, 2019, thus making Hawaii the seventh state 
and eighth jurisdiction in the United States to enact an assisted suicide statute.    
As in Roe v. Wade (1973), in two cases, the first in 2003 and the second in 2015, 
the U.S. Supreme Court used the equal protection and the substantive due process clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to expand its approach to protecting and allowing certain 
actions or conduct under the banner of “liberty presuming an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain conduct” (Myers, 2016).  In 
the cases of Lawrence v. Texas (2003) (a criminal case based on a sodomy statute) and 
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) (a same-sex marriage case), the Supreme Court expanded 
and affirmed its rulings concerning the right to autonomy and the Fourteenth  
Amendment.  These two cases are purposely placed out of chronological order as to the 
“history” of assisted suicide to emphasize the most current legal perspective and the latest 
rulings of the Supreme Court relative to Fourteenth Amendment issues.  The rulings in 
these two cases [Lawrence (2003) and Obergefell (2015)], as well as the other historical 
information contained herein, provide an important foundational segue into answering 
each of the five research questions.  
Research Question 1 
What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws and statutes in effect in the 20 jurisdictions selected for this study? 
1. Seven States and the District of Columbia with assisted suicide laws 
The state of Oregon was the first state to enact a “Death with Dignity” statute 
allowing for physician assisted suicide.  By way of a voter referendum, the citizenry of 
the state voted in favor of the proposed statute in 1994.  However, because of multiple 
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lawsuits filed by opponents of assisted suicide, the referendum did not become law until 
1997.  Since Oregon was the first state to enact a statue allowing for assisted suicide, the 
states that followed Oregon’s lead based most of their laws on the Oregon statute. 
Four more western states followed in Oregon’s footsteps by passing legislation 
allowing for assisted suicide.  Washington (2008), California (2015), Colorado (2016) 
and Hawaii (effective January 1, 2019) all passed legislation allowing for assisted 
suicide, basing most of their laws on the Oregon statute.  These states used the same 
residency requirement, minimum age specification and life expectancy based on a matter 
of months terminology, except Washington and California used “terminal illness 
diagnosis” language instead of the “less than six months to live” directive.  Vermont and 
the District of Columbia used the Oregon statute as the basis for their statutes, but 
Vermont placed the decision for determining whether an individual was a resident of the 
state on the physician.  Both Vermont and the District of Columbia followed the 
prerequisite of the California and Colorado laws of having an individual make a total of 
three requests to the physician for the medication to terminate their lives, instead of two 
requests as in the Oregon statute.   
The Supreme Court of Montana’s decision in Baxter v. Montana (2009) allowing 
for assisted suicide uses many of the tenets of the Oregon statute in its ruling. Table 1 on 
the next page, entitled “7 States and DC with Legal Physician Assisted Suicide” includes 
a listing of all seven states and the District of Columbia and shows the effective date of 
each jurisdiction’s law, the residency requirement, the minimum age required, the 
number of months expected until death or use of a different mandate, and the number of 
physician interactions required and whether the interaction must be in writing.  Table 1 
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also contains Figure 1, which is a map of the United States showing the geographical 
location of the jurisdictions that allow for assisted suicide.   
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Figure 1 
Map of Jurisdictions in U.S. That Allow Assisted Suicide 
(Map from ProCon.org. at https://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132)
 
Table 1 
7 States and DC with Legal Physician Assisted Suicide 
 
 
 
Effective 
date-Year 
Residency 
Required 
Age # of months 
until expected 
death 
# of requests to 
Physicians 
Oregon 1997 Yes* 18 6 Two - one oral & one 
in writing 
Washington 2008 Yes* 18 Terminal 
illness 
diagnosis 
Two – one oral & one 
in writing 
Montana 2009 Yes 18 Terminal 
illness 
One – oral or written? 
Vermont 2013 Yes** 18 6 Three – two oral & 
one in writing 
California 2015 Yes* 18 Terminal 
illness 
diagnosis 
Three – two oral & 
one in writing 
DC 2016 Yes* 18 6 Three – two oral & 
one in writing 
Colorado 2016 Yes* 18 6 Three – two oral & 
one in writing 
Hawaii 2019 Yes* 18 6 Three – two oral & 
one in writing 
*Proof of State driver’s license, registered to vote, owns or leases property, tax return filing 
**Physician’s responsibility to determine if individual is a resident 
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Any state moving in the direction of allowing for assisted suicide would be well-
served by replicating what the state of Oregon has done statutorily.  The mandates of the 
Oregon statute have been for the most part replicated by the other six states and the 
District of Columbia.  The laws in all jurisdictions have the same residency requirement 
mandates, minimum age specification (18 years old) and the same life-expectancy 
language of “less than six months to live.”  However, two states, Washington and 
California, use the words “terminal illness diagnosis” instead of “less than six months to 
live.”  In all jurisdictions, the patient must make either two or three requests to the 
physician to terminate his or her life, one of which needs to be in writing.  In every 
jurisdiction, proof of residency is a prerequisite.  Residency can be proven by showing a 
valid State driver’s license, being registered to vote, owning or leasing property or filing 
a state tax return.  However, there is one major difference in the Vermont statute.  The 
Vermont statute requires that the physician determine if the patient is a resident.   
Important information to mention, not specifically contained in Table 1 on the 
previous page, is that each of the state statutes begins with a “Definition” section.  To 
find the most common words defined in each statute, the common word element of 
Microsoft Word was utilized to discover how many repetitions of certain words were 
contained in the definitional sections of the statutes.  The definitional common words 
were also analyzed in a contextual manner to make sure that the words were being used 
in same definitional sense.  This comparative process known as comparative 
extrapolation has been used in legal research for many years (Van Hoecke, 2015, p. 2).  
Examples of some of the words used most often were; residency, written, time, 
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counseling, age, physician, death expectation, competent, consulting, medication, 
citizenship, suffering and incurable.        
Each of the statutes use this definition section to define the following common 
words, phrases and terms and they do so by using very similar language: 
a. Adult—an individual 18 years of age or older. 
b. Attending physician—the physician who has primary responsibility for the care of 
the patient and treatment of the patient’s terminal illness. 
c. Capable—in the opinion of a court or in the opinion of the patient’s attending 
physician or consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, a patient has the 
ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care providers, 
including communication through persons familiar with the patient’s manner of 
communicating if those persons are available.   
d. Consulting physician—a physician who is qualified by specialty or experience to 
make a professional diagnosis and prognosis regarding the patient’s disease. 
e. Counseling—one or more consultations as necessary between a state licensed 
psychiatrist or psychologist and a patient for the purpose of determining that the 
patient is capable and not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder 
or depression causing impaired judgment. 
f. Health care provider—a person licensed, certified or otherwise authorized or 
permitted by the law of the state to administer health care or dispense medication 
in the ordinary course of business or practice of a profession, and includes a 
health care facility. 
g. Informed decision—a decision by a qualified patient, to request and obtain a 
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prescription to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner, which is 
based on an appreciation of the relevant facts after being fully informed by the 
attending physician on all important matters about his or her disease and 
prognosis.  
h. Medically confirmed—the medical opinion of the attending physician has been 
confirmed by a consulting physician who has examined the patient and the 
patient’s relevant medical records. 
i. Patient and qualified patient—a person who is under the care of a physician, is an 
adult and who is a resident of the state and has satisfied other requirements in 
order to obtain a prescription for medication to end his or her life in a humane and 
dignified manner. 
j. Terminal illness—an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically 
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six 
months.  
k. Self-administer—any patient requesting a prescription for medication for the 
purpose of ending his or her life must be able to be primarily responsible for 
taking the medication.  
The exact list of common words, phrases and terms is not contained in each 
statute, but all statutes are similar to and in conformity with the definitional section of the 
original Oregon statutory provision.  Each of the six state statutes, the District of 
Columbia law and the case of Baxter v. Montana (2009) are contained in their entirety in 
Appendices lettered B through I at the end of this dissertation as previously noted in 
Chapter 2.    
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 The Supreme Court ruling in the Montana case of Baxter v. Montana (2009) does 
not define the provisions for assisted suicide with the same specificity as the statutes from 
the states or the District of Columbia.  But a careful reading of the case reveals that the 
Supreme Court of Montana, in affirming the appellate court’s decision “that a competent, 
terminally ill patient has a right to die with dignity under Article II, Sections 4 and 10 of 
the Montana Constitution, which includes protection of the patient’s physician from 
prosecution under the homicide statute,” rephrased the issues on appeal, thus covering 
many of the parameters mandated in the state statutes.  The court ruled that there was “no 
indication in Montana law that physician aid in dying to terminally ill, mentally 
competent patients is against public policy” (Baxter v. Montana, 2009, p. 457).  
However, the court reversed the District Court of Appeals’ decision granting attorney’s 
fees to Baxter, but that fact is irrelevant to the issue of assisted suicide and is only 
mentioned to fully detail the entire ruling.    
The key issue for the Supreme Court of Montana was the fact that in physician aid 
in dying scenarios, the patient – not the physician – commits the final death-causing act 
by self-administering a lethal dose of medicine.  Through dicta in his concurring opinion, 
Justice John Warner summarized exactly the ruling of the court when he stated, “Is it, as 
a matter of law, against the public policy of Montana for a physician to assist a mentally 
competent, terminally ill person to end their life?  The answer is: No, it is not, as a matter 
of law” (Baxter v. Montana, 2009, p. 470).   
The main take-away(s) from the court’s decision are that a patient must be an 
adult (18 in the state of Montana), mentally competent, a resident of the state, have a 
terminal illness, and the one to request aid in dying from a physician and self-administer 
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the lethal dose of medicine provided, thus making the ruling an almost exact replication 
of the Oregon statute.  Since the Baxter ruling in 2009, there has not been any state court 
litigation that has changed, modified or reversed this Supreme Court of Montana ruling 
(Compassion & Choices.org, 2017).  Also, since the court’s ruling, all legislation 
introduced by state lawmakers to change the ruling or any parts therein has been defeated 
(Compassion & Choices.org, 2017).  
2. Twelve States selected at random without laws allowing for assisted suicide  
The twelve states selected at random for this study were Alabama, Arizona, 
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, 
Texas and Utah.  The laws of these states dealing with assisted suicide are compared in 
Table 2 on page 17.  As the information in Table 2 reveals, none of the twelve states has 
laws allowing for assisted suicide.  Table 2 shows that assisted suicide is illegal in all 
twelve states by way of specific statutes and by adoption of common law (Alabama), 
except possibly for the state of Utah.  Utah does not have a specific statute making 
assisted suicide illegal, nor does it recognize “common law” under which assisted suicide 
was illegal.   
Common law, also known as judicial precedent, judge-made law or case law, is 
one of the two major legal systems of the modern Western world (the other is civil law).  
It originated in the United Kingdom and is now followed in most English-speaking 
countries.  Initially, common law was founded on common sense as reflected in social 
customs.  Over the centuries, it was supplanted by statute law (rules enacted by a 
legislative body such as a Parliament, Congress or State Legislatures) and clarified by the 
judgments of the higher courts (that set a precedent for all courts to follow in similar 
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cases).  These precedents are recognized, affirmed, and enforced by subsequent court 
decisions, thus continually expanding the common law.  In contrast to civil law (which is 
based on a rigid Code of rules), common law is based on broad principles (Common 
Law, 2010). 
Seven of the states have made assisted suicide a felony of one class or another and 
do not differentiate with any further specificity.  Three of the states (Illinois, New Jersey 
and Texas) further divide their assisted suicide laws into categories of “class” for felonies 
and, depending on the specific circumstances of the individual and his/her death, Illinois 
and Texas downgrade the crime to a misdemeanor.    
 Providing further clarification, Table 2 shows that assisted suicide is a felony in 
all the states except Utah and sometimes in Illinois and Texas.  The status of the law in 
Utah has been explained.  In Texas, assisted suicide is a “Class C misdemeanor if no 
suicide or bodily injury results; a state jail felony if suicide or attempted suicide with 
serious bodily injury occurs.”  The statute in Illinois is an example of a state that divides 
its law on assisted suicide into four different categories based on how the level of 
assistance was provided.  “Assistance” is defined in terms of operative words such as 
“direct, coercion, inducement, resulting and compulsion” (Illinois Law on Assisted 
Suicide, 2012, p. 1). 
Normally, the two major differences between a felony and a misdemeanor, 
regardless of which “Class” it falls into, is the length of imprisonment allowed under the 
charging statute and where the incarceration time will be spent: county jail or a 
state/federal penitentiary.  A felony is a much more serious crime than a misdemeanor 
and carries much higher penalties, such as long-term jail sentencing.  For example, 
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murder and armed robberies are felonies, while shoplifting, which typically is a 
nonviolent crime, is a misdemeanor.  The penalty for misdemeanors often involves only a 
fine and no jail sentence.  If jail time is ordered, it is for no more than one year 
(Misdemeanor v. Felony, 2015. pp.1-3).   
The information in Table 2 demonstrates that the approaches of the states chosen 
for this study that don’t have laws allowing for assisted suicide are extremely diverse.  
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Table 2 
Twelve States Randomly Selected for the Study Without Laws Allowing for 
Assisted Suicide 
 
States Criminal Statute   Type of Crime  
Alabama Common law Class A felony  
Arizona 13-1103 Manslaughter  
Florida 782.08 Second Degree Felony  
Georgia 16-5-5 One to ten years imprisonment  
Illinois 12.34.5 Class 2, 3 or 4 felony or class A 
misdemeanor 
 
Maryland 3-102 Felony  
Mississippi 97-3-49 Felony  
Missouri 565.023.1 Voluntary manslaughter (class B 
felony) 
 
New Jersey 2C:11-6 Second or fourth degree crime   
New York 125.15 Second degree manslaughter  
Texas 22.08 Class C misdemeanor or state jail 
felony 
 
Utah Unclear Utah does not recognize 
common law and has no specific 
statute for assisted suicide 
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3. Informational statistics from the seven States and the District of Columbia allowing 
for assisted suicide  
Table 3 on page 107 contains assisted suicide information from the latest  
reports filed by the seven states and the District of Columbia that allow for physician 
assisted suicide. The state of Hawaii has not yet experienced a mandatory reporting year 
since its law does not take effect until January 1, 2019.  The District of Columbia has yet 
to publish its latest annual report.  The state of Montana does not have a mandatory 
reporting system in place since it allows for assisted suicide based on case law and not a 
state statute.   
Reporting deaths by assisted suicide is mandatory in each state or jurisdiction that 
has a statute allowing for assisted suicide. Each state statute and the District of Columbia 
law contain the following common elements relative to mandatory reporting: 
1. There is an administrative department designated that is tasked with 
reviewing a sample of the records on an annual basis. 
2. The administrative department must make rules to facilitate collection of 
the information. 
3. The information collected shall not be a public record and is not available 
for inspection by the public. 
4. The administrative department must generate and make available to the 
public an annual statistical report of information.  
5. Any healthcare provider dispensing medication meant to terminate a 
patient’s life must file a copy of the dispensing record with the 
administrative department so designated.   
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The information contained in Table 3 as reported by the jurisdictions allowing for 
assisted suicide shows the year each law was enacted and the State’s latest reporting year.  
As discussed previously herein, the state of Oregon was the first state to enact a physician 
assisted suicide statute in 1997.  Hawaii will be the latest state to enact a physician 
assisted suicide statute when (of if, depending on litigation) its law goes into effect on 
January 1, 2019.  Each state has a mandatory report process it must adhere to.  The most 
recent year for reporting by each state is 2017, with the exception of Montana and 
Hawaii.  The reason for this is that Montana’s law is case-law-based with no mandated 
provision for reporting, and Hawaii’s law is yet to take effect. 
One important reporting provision in each statute are statistics about the 
“percentage of patients over the age of 65” and the “median age at death” of the 
individuals who choose physician assisted suicide.  Earlier the point was made that 
assisted suicide is a very important and immediate societal issue which needs to be 
addressed.  “Baby Boomers” (those individuals born between 1946 and 1964) currently 
represent 22 percent of the population in the United States (Newcomb & Iriondo, 2017).  
Add the 25 million individuals in the U.S. who comprise the “Silent Generation” (those 
born between 1925 and 1945), representing approximately 8 percent of the population, 
and you have approximately 30 percent of the U.S. population currently facing the 
potential of the issues of terminal illness, pain and long-term suffering from these 
illnesses, loss of independence, poor quality of life, loss of autonomy, the fear of not 
being able to take care of themselves, loss of dignity and not being able to participate in 
the activities that made life enjoyable (Missouri.edu., Generations, 2010). 
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There is no stated reason in any of the statutes as to why the “main type of 
illness” is tracked.  A reasonable inference would be that in tracking this category insight 
may be gained into the type of illness most dominant relative to terminality, pain and 
long-term suffering and quality of life (Lannon v. Hogan, 1983, p. 521).   
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Table 3 
Assisted Suicide Statistics from the 7 States and the District of Columbia 
 
State Year law 
enacted – 
latest 
reporting 
year 
Number of 
patients 
requesting 
medication 
Number of 
patients 
taking 
medication 
Percentage 
of patients 
over the 
age of 65 
Median 
age at 
death 
Main type 
of illness 
Oregon 1997 
2017 
 
218 143 80.4% 74 Cancer 
76.9% 
Washington 2008 
2017 
 
212 164 74.5% 72 Cancer 
68.9% 
Montana 2009 
 
 
0 0 0 0 No 
reporting 
on assisted 
suicide** 
Vermont 2013 
2017 
(4-year 
report) 
52 29 Not 
reported 
Not 
reported 
Cancer 
83% 
California 2015 
2017 
 
191 111 76.7% 78 Cancer 
58.6% 
District of 
Columbia 
2016 
2017 
 
0 0 0 0 Not 
reported 
Colorado 2016 
2017 
69 50 78.6% 75 Cancer 
63.8% 
Hawaii 2019 
Annual 
reporting is 
mandated 
in statute 
N/A* N/A* N/A* N/A* N/A* 
*N/A - not applicable 
**Montana does not have a reporting system in place for physician assisted suicide. However, 
according to the state’s own statistical reporting department, Montana is one of the top 3 states in 
suicides in the nation.  
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Research Question 2 
What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide laws in 
the six countries other than the United States selected for this study? 
On page 111, Table 4 contains a listing of the laws/policy referendums of the six 
countries allowing for assisted suicide, other than the United States that were chosen for 
this dissertation.  The countries of Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland 
and The Netherlands are compared to better understand assisted suicide from different 
legal and cultural approaches in other parts of the world with the intent of garnering 
information that might be helpful in crafting a nationwide policy for the U.S. 
There are several unique differences between the laws of the countries listed in 
Table 4 and the laws in the seven states and the District of Columbia allowing for 
physician assisted suicide.  Examples of some of the most unique and differential are: 
a. In Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland and The Netherlands there is no 
requirement that the individual be under an “expectation of death” in terms of 
months/time left to live.  In the United States jurisdictions allowing for 
assisted suicide, a patient must be either terminally ill or have six months or 
less to live. 
b. There is no residency requirement in Switzerland or Belgium, but in 
Belgium there is a comprehensive registration process.  In each United States 
jurisdiction there is a residency requirement which must be proven. 
c. In Luxembourg, a minor the age of 16 or above may make a request to 
terminate his or her life with his parent’s permission.  In the Netherlands, a 
minor the age of 12 or older may make a request to terminate his or her life 
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with the permission of a parent or a guardian.  In the United States, the age of 
18 is the minimum age for each jurisdiction.   
d. Only Germany allows a pharmacist to be involved in its process and 
provide the medication instead of a physician.  In all other countries and in the 
United States jurisdictions, a physician must be involved.  In several of the 
jurisdictions in the United States, the involvement of more than one physician 
is required. 
e. Likewise only in Germany, there is a written mandate that the patient must 
be able to take the medication by himself or herself with no assistance 
whatsoever. The laws and statutes in the other countries and the jurisdictions 
in the United States make provisions for those that are incapable of taking the 
medication alone, such as an oral request for help. 
f. Each of the laws in the six countries and the United States jurisdictions 
specifically mandate that the individual requesting assistance in dying must be 
“medically or mentally” competent” except for Belgium and Canada.  
However, the lengthy registration process in Belgium and the preamble to the 
law in Canada speak to mental competence.          
Only the country of Switzerland has allowed for assisted suicide longer than the 
state of Oregon, due primarily to an omission in the country’s euthanasia law in 1940.  
The countries of Canada and Germany had to use their court systems, much like the state 
of Wyoming, to eventually have a law allowing for assisted suicide.    
As the information in Table 4 reveals, the laws of these six countries are 
significantly more open and less restrictive than the assisted suicide laws in the 
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jurisdictions within the United States.  The law/referendum in Switzerland is by far the 
most liberal and uniquely different.  The Canadian law addressing assisted suicide most 
resembles the laws in the U.S.  
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Table 4 
6 Countries other than the United States with  
Laws Allowing for Assisted Suicide 
 
Countries Year 
provision 
established 
Residency 
Restrictions 
Consent 
mandates 
Age Expectation 
of death 
Physician 
Involvement 
Belgium 2002 No; but must 
complete a 
lengthy 
registration 
form 
Yes; in writing 
plus physician 
registration  
18 or an 
emanci-
pated 
minor 
No One or two; 
depending on 
expectation of 
death 
Canada 2016 (by 
Supreme 
Court) 
 
Yes; residency 
or waiting 
period 
Yes; multiple 
consents in 
writing 
18 Yes; grievous 
and 
irremediable 
medical 
condition 
One; with 
oversight from 
the Minister of 
Health 
Germany 2017 (by a 
Federal 
Admin.   
Court) 
Yes; 
medically 
competent 
citizen of 
Germany 
Written request 
to pharmacy by 
patient or 
physician 
18 Yes; seriously 
& incurably 
ill  
No; plus the 
individual 
must take 
medication by 
themselves 
Luxembourg 2009 Yes; 
competent 
citizen of 
Luxembourg 
Yes; written 
request to 
physician 
18, but 
16 with 
parent’s 
permis-
sion 
Incurable 
condition   
Multiple 
meetings with 
physician 
Switzerland 1940 & in 
2011 by 
referendum  
No; but must 
be mentally 
competent 
No; based on 
conversations 
with physician 
Unclear Suffering 
intolerably 
One; also must 
document 
diagnosis 
The 
Netherlands 
2002 Yes; must be 
a mentally 
competent 
citizen 
Yes; written 
request to 
physician after 
several 
meetings & 
second 
physician 
report 
16* No; but 
physician 
must hold 
conviction 
that P’s 
suffering is 
lasting & 
unbearable 
Two; 
physicians 
must consult 
and agree  
*In the Netherlands, a minor between the ages of 12 and 16 may request to terminate his/her life but must 
have the permission of a parent or guardian. 
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Research Question 3 
Are there universal language elements in the assisted suicide laws of the 20 jurisdictions 
and in the six countries other than the United States selected for this study?  
There are ten major foundational universal language elements in the assisted 
suicide laws examined as part of this study.  Following the methodology described in 
detail in Chapter III, the first priority in answering research question number 3 was to 
“identify the specific goal which the researcher wishes to achieve,” said goal being to 
define the term “universal language element” (Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p. 33).  In order 
to answer research question 3 properly and ascertain the universal language elements 
contained in the laws, a broad and sufficient amount of data was collected, read and 
studied.  This collection and study process avoided any selection bias because of the 
thoroughness of the process and the experience of the legal researcher.     
A step-by-step methodological approach was followed, the main tenets of which 
are explained in detail in Chapter 3, to ascertain the universal language elements in the 
assisted suicide laws studied herein.  The chronological steps followed were:   
1. First, a detailed, studious and comprehensive reading of all laws was 
performed.  This type of reading brought some common key elements and 
provisions of the laws into focus.   
2. Second, the common word element of Microsoft Word was utilized to discover 
the repetitions of certain common words contained in the laws, as well as in the 
definitional sections of the statutes. This approach provided an analysis of the 
entire contents of the statutes by identifying common words which were repeated 
most often.  Examples of some of the words used most often were: residency, 
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written, time, counseling, age, physician, death expectation, competent, 
consulting, medication, capable, provider, citizenship, suffering, terminal and 
incurable.  However, a second step of comparison was necessary to ensure that 
these oft-used common words were being used in the same context.  The sentence 
containing the common word, as well as the sentence before and the sentence 
after the one containing the common word were analyzed.  This allowed for the 
comparative process known as comparative extrapolation to be used to verify that 
the common words were being used in the same contextual sense and with the 
same definitional meaning (Guala, 2010, p. 1070).      
3. As the “universal language elements” started coming into focus, a search was 
performed for a common and proper definition of the term.  The definition of the 
term most applicable from a legal lens perspective and settled upon is as follows: 
“Recurring or oft-repeated words, phrases or concepts used as building blocks or 
mandatory components in all the laws, regardless of the language of the text”  
(Lockwood & Katrin, 2016, p. 2).   
4. The data collected was then recorded in a manner which was not only unbiased 
but used as a precursor to the formation of Table 4 on page 23 (Dobinson & 
Johns, 2007, p. 33). 
5. The final step was to make sure that the data collection process and the 
analytical techniques used followed the appropriate and accepted methodology for 
a social science qualitative literature review study as described by in Chapter 3 
(Dobinson & Johns, 2007, p. 41).  
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This five-step approach was used to ensure that an academic pathway to 
answering the question was followed, instead of the approach used for professional 
purposes or by government agencies (Epstein & King, 2002, p. 17).  This approach also 
provided some of the information necessary to formulate and propose the public policy 
healthcare model for allowing assisted suicide decisions to be found in Chapter 5.      
The ten major foundational universal language elements found were: 
1. The adult (varying ages in statutes) and/or the child (with parental permission) 
must be “mentally capable” to make the important decision relative to terminating 
his/her own life. 
2. At some point in the overall process, some type of “healthcare provider” must be 
involved, including an option for professional counseling. 
3. The procedure to terminate one’s life as dictated in all the laws must be humane 
and dignified. 
4. The only acceptable form of assisted suicide is by prescribed medication and the 
procedure and death should be painless.  
5. The probable result of taking the prescribed medication must be explained orally 
or in writing to the individual making the request to die. 
6. A written record of the process must be kept in order to provide statistical data to 
the appropriate reporting agency or department. 
7. The autonomy and privacy of a person’s right to control his/her individual end-of-
life circumstances must be respected. 
8. Death must be reasonably foreseeable, regardless of the terminology used to 
define “reasonably foreseeable” (six months to live, intolerable suffering, 
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suffering that is lasting and unbearable, enduring suffering, suffering that will 
continue, an incurable condition, serious and incurably ill, a terminal illness or 
irremediable medical condition). 
9. “Interested persons” (spouses, family, friends, co-workers, neighbors, 
acquaintances) can be contacted, but only with the direct and unforced permission 
of the individual going through the process. 
10. The individual may rescind the written or oral request for the medication or 
continuing the process regardless of his/her mental state. 
These ten major foundational universal language elements serve as a transitional 
intersection in this chapter. The chapter now moves from describing and understanding 
the contents and mandates of all the laws and answering the first three research questions, 
to the findings and discussion centered around the cases concerning assisted suicide and 
other socially relevant 14th Amendment cases and answering research questions 4 and 5.                 
 Research Question 4 
Over the past 45 years, how do the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases using the doctrines of equal protection and substantive due 
process as applied to assisted suicide laws reflect public opinion of the citizenry of the 
United States as reported in opinion polls? 
There have not been any assisted suicide cases heard by the Supreme Court since 
1997 (Washington and Vacco).  When conducting legal research for an academic study, if 
there are no cases covering the issue (assisted suicide), an important historical legal 
axiom dictates that research should be conducted into cases which either contain subject 
matter of like-kind or into cases which have been decided by using the same legal 
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arguments and principles of the older cases (14th Amendment rights or other applicable 
constitutional rights).   
Also, as the contemporary cases are heard by the Supreme Court with a different 
makeup in terms of “new” Justices, a study of these cases allows for an in-depth 
comparison of the rulings in terms of the backgrounds, ideological beliefs, avenue of 
appointment, ages, previous written opinions, party affiliations and other important 
personal information about the Justices.     
1. Expanding the use of the doctrines of equal protection and substantive due process in 
the 14th Amendment by the Supreme Court beginning in 1973 with the case  
of Roe v. Wade (1973). 
Since 1973, beginning with the “abortion rights” case of Roe v. Wade, the 
Supreme Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment doctrines of equal protection and 
substantive due process to rule on cases dealing with education, criminal law, voting 
rights and other socially relevant issues such as gay rights, same-sex marriage, 
immigration, privacy rights and illegal search and seizure issues in the criminal law area.   
Legal scholar and analyst, public administrator and author Jeffrey Toobin, in his 
bestselling book, The Nine, claimed that in most socially relevant issue cases, “Justices 
Sandra Day O’Connor and Lewis F. Powell steered the Court in line with their own 
cautious instincts, which were remarkably similar to those of the American people” 
(Toobin, 2007, p. 2).   
Justice Powell served on the Supreme Court from 1971 to 1987 (Biography, 1999, 
p. 1).  In the case of Roe v. Wade, Justice Powell was part of the 7 to 2 majority allowing 
for abortion (Roe v. Wade, 1973, p. 113).  Justice O’Connor served on the Supreme Court 
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from 1981 to 2006, including six years on the Court with Justice Powell.         
Toobin honed in on the touchstone years of 1992 to 2005 and claimed that the 
Supreme Court decisions “reflected public opinion with great precision” (Toobin, 2009, 
p. 2).  He said that “the decisions in these cases probably would have been the same if 
they simply had been put to a popular vote” (Toobin, p. 3).  “She [Justice O’Connor] had 
an uncanny ear for American public opinion, and she kept her rulings closely tethered to 
what most people wanted or at least would accept” (Toobin, p. 7).  Justice Powell used 
his years as a practicing attorney (34 years), being the chair of a city school board for 
over a decade and his service in the military as an intelligence officer as the foundational 
basis for a desire to stay aware of the public’s opinion (Biography, 1999, p. 2).        
In 1973, 54% of Americans believed that abortion should be legal “under certain 
circumstances” (Saad, 2002, p. 1).  The Supreme Court ruled in 1973 that abortion was 
legal “but a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion was not considered an absolute 
right” (Roe v. Wade, 1973, p. 113).  In its opinion, the Court set up a framework for the 
definition of the term “under what circumstances” (Roe v. Wade, 1973, p. 114).  The 
Court defined the framework as to the first trimester of a pregnancy as follows:  
In the first trimester (the first three months of the pregnancy), a woman’s right to 
privacy surrounding the choice to have an abortion outweighed a state’s interests 
in regulating this decision.  The state’s interests are not yet compelling; it cannot 
interfere with a woman’s right to privacy by regulating or prohibiting her from 
having an abortion during the first trimester.  (Roe v. Wade, 1973, p. 115). 
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The Court went on to define the term “under what circumstances” and the word 
“framework” as to the second and third trimesters of a woman’s pregnancy and how a 
State could or could not regulate abortions during those two trimesters (Roe v. Wade, 
1972, p. 116).     
From 1975 to 2013, Gallup asked the same question more than 50 times in its 
nationwide polls of Americans: “Should abortion be legal in certain circumstances?”  In 
1975, 54% said “yes” and in May 2013, 54% said “yes” (Bowman & Marsico, 2014).  
During that same period (1975–2013), the lowest percentage answering “yes” was 48% 
in 1993 and the highest percentage was 61% in 1998 (Gallup.com., 2018).  The ruling by 
the Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v. Wade granting women the right to have an abortion 
(under certain circumstances) and the view of the majority of the public on the issue of 
abortion were very similar and aligned.  
2. The Supreme Court moves forward from the historic ruling on abortion in 1973 to 
rulings on other socially relevant issues by further expanding the equal protection and 
substantive due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment  
The Supreme Court of the United States did not issue an opinion concerning 
assisted suicide in either Lawrence v. Texas (2003) or Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).  
However, what the Court did do, much like in the 1973 case of Roe v. Wade, was to use 
the equal protection and the substantive due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to grant an endorsement to the “autonomy of self” approach to liberty 
concerning social issues (Myers, 2016, p. 398).     
In the case of Lawrence v. Texas, a 2003 criminal case involving a Texas sodomy 
statute, the Supreme Court held that the Texas statute banning same-sex sodomy was 
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unconstitutional relying on both the substantive component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 579).   
In 2015, the Supreme Court expanded its approach to the doctrines of due process 
and equal protection in the 14th Amendment and emphasized the right to “autonomy, 
self-determination and choice” in the same-sex marriage case of Obergefell v. Hodges 
(Myers, 2016, p. 397).  The Court’s analysis and ruling in the Obergefell case was 
“unconstrained by history [precedent/stare decisis] or a careful description/examination 
of the right to substantive due process and equal protection” (Myers, 2016, p. 398).  In 
the Obergefell ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized an individual’s right to “autonomy, 
self-determination, privacy and choice” (Myers, 2016, p. 397).  The majority ruling by 
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan) held that:  
The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages 
validly performed out of State.  Since same-sex couples may now exercise the 
fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to 
refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the 
ground of its same-sex character.  (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, p. 2589)      
In 2007, Americans opposed legalizing same-sex marriage by a margin of 54% to 
37% (Masci, Brown & Kiley, 2017).  The polling centers of Pew Research and Gallup 
did not conduct a major poll specifically concerning same-sex marriage until 2007.  
However, it is almost a certainty that the majority of Americans opposed legalizing same-
sex marriage in 2003, the year in which the Court handed down its ruling in Lawrence v. 
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Texas.  In 2015, when the court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in the Obergefell 
case, 55% of Americans favored same-sex marriage (Masci et al, 2017).   
Justice O’Connor ruled with the majority in the Lawrence case in 2003 (6 to 3).  
In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor argued that because the law 
prohibited homosexual sodomy and not heterosexual sodomy, it was a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, the majority did not 
join her extension of Equal Protection rights to gays (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 578).  
Even though Justice O’Connor’s ruling was not in line with the opinion of the majority of 
Americans in 2003, two important facts must be remembered.  The first is that the 
Lawrence case was a criminal case involving a sodomy statute, not a same-sex marriage 
case. Polling data using questions with exact information concerning adults “consenting 
to sex in the privacy of their own homes” is not available for 2003.  But in several Gallup 
polls covering the period from 1978 through 2017, the following similar question was 
asked:  “Do you think gay and lesbian relations between consenting adults should or 
should not be legal?”  In 2003, 60% of Americans polled said that gay and lesbian 
relations between consenting adults should be legal.  In 2015, the percentage in favor 
[should be legal] was 70% (Gallup staff, 2017).  
Secondly, since Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion extended equal protection 
for gay rights, her ruling was a precursor to the Obergefell case [same-sex marriage] in 
2015, when the majority of Americans favored same-sex marriages [57% in favor]. 
The second part of Toobin’s analysis of Supreme Court cases dealing with the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the decisions in these cases equaling the majority view of the 
public (“the rulings in these cases probably would have been the same if they simply had 
 121 
 
been put to a popular vote”) was that this phenomenon would change beginning in 2008 
(Toobin, 2007, pp. 2, 8).  However, the decision in the Obergefell same-sex marriage 
case (2015) and the fact that 55% of Americans favored same-sex marriage in 2015 
seems to contradict the second part of Toobin’s theory that the Court would move away 
from and not be aligned with the public’s majority opinion. 
3. The issue of assisted suicide and the Fourteenth Amendment; comparing assisted 
suicide cases to other socially relevant issue cases   
In the 1997 cases of Washington and Vacco, the Supreme Court rejected the idea 
that there is a fundamental right to assisted suicide, thus preserving the line between 
withdrawal-of-treatment cases like Cruzan (1990) and active measures to terminate life 
cases.  But since “there is a very thin line between many of the withdrawal-of-treatment 
cases and the right to assisted suicide, the distinctions the Court has drawn in those cases 
may be more practical than logical” (Myers, 2016, p. 396).  Since the 1997 rulings in 
Washington and Vacco, there have not been any cases dealing with assisted suicide heard 
by the Supreme Court.   
In one of the most important historical approaches followed in the legal world of 
reasoning, when there has not been a case dealing with the subject matter of discussion 
(assisted suicide), other cases dealing with like-kind socially relevant issues and how the 
Supreme Court approached these Fourteenth Amendment cases becomes of primary 
importance. 
In Obergefell (2015), the dissenting opinions of Justices Roberts, Scalia and 
Thomas were twice as voluminous as the majority opinion in the length of pages.  When 
this has occurred in the past, it usually signals an extremely high level of disagreement 
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and dissatisfaction by the dissenters with the majority opinion.  The main relevance of 
these capacious dissenting opinions is that the “dicta” contained therein sometimes turns 
into the majority opinions in future cases.  All three Justices concurred in their dissenting 
opinions that “recognizing same-sex marriage should not be mandated by the Supreme 
Court.”  Justice Roberts wrote on page 2 of his dissenting opinion: 
Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may 
be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not.  The 
fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its 
definition of marriage.  And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of 
marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly 
be called irrational.  In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of 
marriage.  The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex 
couples, or to retain the historic definition.  (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, p. 2620) 
Of equal importance to the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in Obergefell  
(2015) is Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence (2003).  Justice Scalia 
stated that “the majority’s position (in Lawrence) requires it to effectively overrule 
Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), the leading modern case setting the bounds of 
substantive due process” (in ruling against any 14th Amendment right to assisted suicide) 
(Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 587). 
After hearing oral arguments in February 2018, the Supreme Court ruled in the 
case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD., et al v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission on June 
4, 2018.  Although the case was primarily brought under the guise of a First Amendment 
argument–“Whether applying Colorado's public accommodations law to compel the 
petitioner to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about 
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marriage violates the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment” – 
many of the oral arguments expounded before the Court were based on the substantive 
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, LTD., et al v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 2018, p. 1).   
Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion of the Court in which Justices 
Roberts, Breyer, Alito, Kagan and Gorsuch joined.  There were several concurring 
opinions written, one by Justice Thomas in which he concurred in part and concurred in 
the judgment, thus making the decision a 7 to 2 ruling.  The Court held for the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop owner (Jack Phillips), ruling that the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission violated his right to free speech and his right to free exercise of religion 
when the Commission ruled that his refusing to create a cake for the wedding of a same-
sex couple discriminated against them based on their sexual orientation (Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, LTD., et al v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 2018, p. 1).  
There were four main reasons given by the Supreme Court in the 56-page opinion 
(including the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg, who was joined by Justice 
Sotomayor), for ruling in favor of Phillips. 
• The Court relied on the precedent it set in the Obergefell case saying that 
the laws and the Constitution do protect gay persons and gay couples in 
the exercise of their civil rights, but religious and philosophical objections 
to gay marriage are protected views and, in some instances, protected 
forms of expression. 
• The crux of the ruling was that at the time, Colorado state law afforded 
some latitude in declining to create specific messages they (in this case, 
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bakers) deemed offensive.  While this case was pending, the States Civil 
Rights Division concluded in at least three cases that a baker acted 
lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations that demeaned gay 
persons or gay marriages.  “Phillips too was entitled to a neutral and 
respectful consideration of his claims in all circumstances of the case.”  
• The commission showed elements of a clear and impermissible hostility 
toward the sincere beliefs motivating Phillips’ objection.  The record 
showed that the Commission “disparaged Phillips’ faith as despicable and 
characterized it as merely rhetorical, and compared his invocation of his 
sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust.”   
These comments cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the 
adjudication of Phillips’ case. 
• The Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty 
under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a 
religion or religious viewpoint.  The official expressions of hostility to 
religion in some of the commissioners’ comments were inconsistent with 
that requirement, and the Commission’s disparate consideration of 
Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same.   
(Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD., et al v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 
2018, pp. 1-6).  
The Masterpiece Cakeshop case rebuked a state government for its overt hostility 
to religion.  The Court simply ruled that “tolerance” is a two-way street (Farris, 2018, p. 
1).  If the Court uses this type of “balanced reasoning” in dealing with the issue of 
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assisted suicide, state laws against assisted suicide could be banned for being intolerable 
of the right to privacy and the liberty of choice that individuals possess.  “The Court 
refused to strip the First Amendment of its enduring promise of freedom, reminding us 
once again that the government exists to protect our liberty, not take it away” (Farris, 
2018, p. 3).  The Court’s position in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case could bolster the 
proponent’s view of assisted suicide being the ultimate right of freedom to choose one’s 
own end-of-life experience.           
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a ruling on 
August 2, 2017, in a lawsuit filed by Gavin Grimm, a sixteen-year-old transgender boy, 
against the Gloucester County School Board in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia. Grimm, represented by the national and Virginia ACLU, proceeded 
under Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He sought a preliminary and permanent injunction 
allowing him to use the boys’ restroom at school, claiming that the school board’s policy 
of requiring transgender students to use a private restroom facility violated his rights 
under Title IX.   “The big question is whether transgender rights are protected by the 
Constitution as well as Title IX, the 1972 federal law that bans discrimination ‘on the 
basis of sex’ in schools that receive federal money” (Barnes, 2017, p. 3).   
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that after he had used the boys’ restroom with 
the school’s permission for seven weeks without incident, the school board released a 
policy stating that students’ access to restrooms was restricted based on their “biological 
gender” and that students who were unable to use the corresponding restroom because of 
“gender identity issues” were to use an alternative private facility.  At the time, the 
plaintiff was the only student at the school required to use the private facility.  However, 
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as in the Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD case, secondary arguments in many of the amicus 
curie briefs filed by “interested parties” were based on the substantive due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (Grimm v. Gloucester County 
School Board, 2017, p. 1).  The Supreme Court originally agreed to hear the case, but 
then decided against it saying that “the issue involved (transgender rights and the 
applicability of Title IX) had not been fully explored in the lower courts” (Barnes, 2017, 
p. 2). 
In a poll conducted by Vox-Morning Consulting in May 2016, respondents were 
asked to choose between two options: “We should have laws and regulations in place to 
ensure that transgender people do not face discrimination because of their gender 
identity” or “We do not need laws or regulations to ensure that transgender people do not 
face discrimination because of which gender they say they identify with.”  While 48% of 
Americans favored having laws and regulations in place, 35% of Americans said they 
were not needed (Lopez, 2016).  The Grimm case is mentioned here as an example of 
another socially relevant issue type case which will eventually be heard by the Supreme 
Court.  When the Supreme Court does hear a “transgender rights” case, additional facts 
and insights should become available to see if the Court’s ruling is aligned with the 
public’s opinion on the issue.    
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court, in the case of Murphy v. NCAA, et al, 
struck down a 25-year old federal law known as the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (PASPA) that largely outlawed sports betting outside Nevada (Murphy v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2018).  The court’s 6-3 decision overruled the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, saying PASPA violates the state’s Tenth Amendment 
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rights, thereby creating a path for New Jersey and other states to offer sports betting 
(Murphy v. NCAA et al, 2018).  The case was decided based on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation and application of the 10th Amendment, known as the “Reserved Powers” 
Amendment (Legal Information Institute, 1992), not the 14th Amendment issues of equal 
protection and substantive due process.  The Murphy case is mentioned and addressed at 
this point to illustrate that the Court could use this type of contemporary precedent to 
decide that the issue of “a right to assisted suicide” should be left to each individual State 
to decide.  Instead of dealing with the issue of assisted suicide on a federal level, the 
Court could choose this Tenth Amendment path (as it did in Murphy), thus leaving it up 
to each State and the proponents and opponents of assisted suicide in each state to 
continue in the time-consuming, expensive and litigation-laden battle over this issue.     
The crux of the matter in research question number 4 and, the issue of assisted 
suicide, bears repeating.  The Supreme Court has not ruled on an assisted suicide case 
since 1997, over 21 years ago.  If an assisted suicide case is heard by the Supreme Court 
and ruled upon in favor of allowing for assisted suicide, the majority of the justices will 
have to use the expansive Fourteenth Amendment approach it has taken in the other 
socially relevant issue cases in the past several years as discussed herein, and not its own 
precedent as discussed further on the following pages.  The Court will also need to veer 
away from the Tenth Amendment path it has recently taken in the Murphy case in order 
to reach a decision that allows for the option of assisted suicide on a national level.            
In a Gallup poll in May 2017, 73% of Americans said that doctors should be 
allowed to assist a terminally ill patient in severe pain “to commit suicide if the patient 
requests it” (Wood & McCarthy, 2017, p. 1).  “Consistent majorities have expressed 
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support for doctor-assisted suicide in Gallup’s trend polls since the question was first 
asked in 1997.  Before this latest poll, the high point in favor was in 2015 (70%) and the 
low point in favor was in 2013 (51%)” (Wood & McCarthy, 2017, p. 2).   
Support for assisted suicide has nearly doubled since Gallup first polled on the 
question in 1947, when 37% said it should be allowed by law (assisted suicide was 
referred to as euthanasia in 1947) (Wood & McCarthy, 2017, p. 2).  Views on the issue of 
assisted suicide often differ based on an individual’s religious and political persuasions.  
“A slim majority of weekly churchgoers (55%) support allowing a doctor to end a 
terminally ill patient’s life through a painless means upon request, whereas nearly nine in 
10 adults who rarely if ever go to church say this should be allowed (87%)” (Wood, 
2017, p. 3).  The issue is somewhat less divisive among party and ideological groups.  
“About nine in 10 liberals (89%) support assisted suicide, compared with 79% of 
moderates and 60% of conservatives” (Wood & McCarthy, 2017, p. 3).    
Even though the majority of Americans believe that physician-assisted suicide 
should be legal, it is still against the law in almost every U.S state (43), not to mention 
almost every country in the world (CNN Library, 2018).  “The tension between current 
policy and the climate of public opinion will soon force the question: Which is the correct 
path–to provide the most compassionate care possible short of offering physician assisted 
suicide–or to offer compassionate care with the option of physician-assisted suicide as a 
last resort” (Blizzard, 2002).   Rick Blizzard, the healthcare editor of Gallup at the time, 
made the comment in this article in 2002.  His definition of “soon” has gone on to be 
almost 16 years. 
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In 2016, LifeWay Research, a division of LifeWay Ministries, conducted a survey 
using the web-enabled Knowledge Panel®, a probability-based panel designed to be a 
representation of the U.S. population to conduct a study on physician assisted suicide.  
The title of the survey was “American Views on Assisted Suicide.”  The sample 
stratification and weights used in the survey were different from those of Gallup or Pew 
in that it divided the responses by gender, age, race/ethnicity, region, metro/non-metro, 
education and income (LifeWay Research, 2016, p. 2).  Of those Americans responding 
to the survey, 67% agreed that it is morally acceptable for a person to ask for a 
physician’s aid in taking his or her own life (LifeWay Research, 2016, p. 4).  Seven out 
of 10 agreed that physicians should be allowed to assist terminally ill patients in ending 
their lives (LifeWay Research, 2016, p. 5).  Males from the northeast between the ages of 
18 to 24, who are white/non-Hispanic, have a college degree or graduate degree, are non-
religious or without evangelical beliefs and attend a religious service less than once a 
month, were the group most supportive and agreed with both previous questions (82%). 
All the cases mentioned in this section, including the Grimm case, even though it 
was sent back to a lower court in Virginia, as well as the information contained in the 
public opinion polls, answer Research Question 4.  This data confirms that the rulings of 
the United States Supreme Court in Fourteenth Amendment cases using the doctrines of 
equal protection and substantive due process in dealing with important societal issues are 
aligned with the opinion of the majority of Americans.  
The rulings in these relevant social issue cases may be signaling that the legal 
landscape has changed, and the Supreme Court may be willing to further expand its 
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Fourteenth Amendment “autonomy rationale” to allow for and protect physician assisted 
suicide and once again align itself with the public’s majority opinion on the issue. 
If another assisted suicide case makes it to the Supreme Court, this will probably 
afford an opportunity to determine if public opinion and the Fourteenth Amendment are 
more persuasive than the Court’s latest Tenth Amendment directive in the Murphy case. 
4. The concept of precedent (stare decisis) and what it means regarding the issue of 
assisted suicide  
In 2018, the key “legal rights” question that must be asked concerning assisted 
suicide is, “Does the Constitution of the United States encompass a due process liberty 
interest in controlling the time and manner of one’s death?” (Compassion in Dying v. 
Washington, 1996, p. 790).  As of today, according to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the answer is no (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, and Vacco v. Quill, 1997). 
What legal path did the issue of assisted suicide travel in order to arrive at the 
Supreme Court?  In 1994, Judge Barbara Rothstein from the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Washington began the march to the Supreme Court for assisted 
suicide when she ruled that since “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child-rearing and education were constitutionally 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, assisted suicide should be as well” 
(Compassion for Dying v. State of Washington, 1994, p. 1459).  Citing precedent and 
dicta from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) 
(precedent) and the minority view of the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Missouri 
Department of Health (1990) (dicta), Judge Rothstein ruled that a competent adult has the 
right to terminate his/her own life because of two of the liberties protected by the 
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Fourteenth Amendment: personal dignity and autonomy.   
Judge Rothstein’s ruling and the concurring opinions in Cruzan (1990), along 
with other federal court cases (see below), eventually placed the issue of assisted suicide 
before the Supreme Court. Their basis lay on the cumulative legal perspective that “every 
individual has the right to the possession and control of his or her own person, free from 
all restraint or interference of others and the right of every human being of adult years 
and sound mind to determine what shall be done with his/her own body, even the 
planning and fulfillment of an assisted suicide” (Compassion in Dying v. State of 
Washington, 1996, p. 586). 
At the same time the case of Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington (1996) 
was making its way to the Supreme Court under the name of Washington v. Glucksberg 
(1997), the case of Quill v. Koppell (1996), eventually named Vacco v. Quill (1997), 
began its journey to the Supreme Court originating from the Southern District of New 
York.  (The name of a lawsuit/case may change as it moves through the federal court 
system due to the fact that some parties are dropped from the lawsuit, the successful party 
at the appellate court level changes from the trial court level due to a ruling that is 
reversed or modified, a court modifies the name for reporting purposes or other reasons).  
Both the Washington case and the Quill case arrived at the Supreme Court with appellate 
court rulings that invalidated the state’s criminal statutes that prohibited physician 
assisted suicide. 
The decisions in both cases were announced by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 
27, 1997.  Both Supreme Court decisions were unanimous in reversing the appellate court 
decisions based on the following abbreviated five reasons: 
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1. In Washington, the Court observed that suicide and assisted suicide have been 
disapproved by Anglo-Saxon law for more than seven hundred years.  From 
thirteenth-century England through nineteenth-century America, the Court said, 
the “common law” has consistently authorized the punishment of those who have 
attempted to kill themselves or assisted others in doing so (Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 1997, p. 710).   
2. The Court pointed to the overwhelming majority of states that currently 
prohibit physician-assisted suicide. At this time, only Oregon expressly allows 
doctors to help their patients hasten their demise through lethal doses of 
prescribed medication, and the law that allows this practice is constantly being 
challenged in court (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 713).   
3. The Court found that the history of the Due Process Clause does not support the 
asserted right to assisted suicide (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 719).  The 
Court wrote that although the Due Process Clause protects certain “fundamental 
rights,” the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide does not rise to “this level 
of importance” (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 719).  Before a right may be 
deemed “fundamental” in nature, it must be deeply rooted in the nation's legal 
history. The Court found the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide to be 
contrary to U.S. history, tradition, and practice; therefore, it concluded that it was 
not a “fundamental right” (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997, p. 729).   
4. In Vacco, the Supreme Court ruled that a fundamental distinction exists 
between letting a patient die and killing him/her.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in 
the unanimous opinion that in one instance, the patient is allowed to die by natural 
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causes when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn.  The patient’s cause of death 
in that instance is the underlying illness.  In the other instance, death is 
intentionally inflicted by the joint effort of doctor and patient.  The cause of death 
in that instance is not the underlying illness, but human action (Vacco v. Quill, 
1997, p. 808). 
5. The Court in Vacco noted that a right to physician-assisted suicide has never 
been approved by the common law but has been historically discouraged by both 
common-law and statutory schemes throughout the United States. Thus, the Court 
concluded that physician-assisted suicide is not substantially similar to refusing 
medical treatment and that the legal systems of New York and other states may 
treat each practice differently without running afoul of the Equal Protection 
Clause (Vacco v. Quill, 1997, p. 801). 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not decided any cases concerning 
assisted suicide since 1997, except for the case of Gonzales v. Oregon in which the Court 
removed an obstacle to state (Oregon) efforts to authorize physician-assisted suicide 
(Gonzales v. Oregon, 2006, p. 243).  In a 6 to 3 ruling, the court stated that John 
Ashcroft, the former attorney general of the United States, acted without legal authority 
in 2001 when he “threw the federal government's weight against Oregon's Death with 
Dignity Act” (Greenhouse, 2006,  p.1).  Justice Kennedy wrote, “The authority claimed 
by the attorney general (Ashcroft) is both beyond his expertise and incongruous with the 
statutory purposes and design of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)” (Greenhouse, 
2006, p. 2).  Ashcroft was trying to invoke the tenets of the 1970 federal law that helped 
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establish the framework of a federal drug policy for regulating physicians as they wrote 
prescriptions for controlled substances.  Ashcroft claimed that the CSA could be used to 
take away the license of any physician that prescribed lethal doses of drugs for the 
purpose of assisting a suicide.  Justice Kennedy went out of his way to emphasize the 
unilateral nature of Ashcroft’s action.  Kennedy stated that his (Ashcroft) position was an 
executive branch attempt to declare as criminal actions that which Congress had not 
designated as crimes (Greenhouse, 2006, p. 3).  Regardless of the rebuke of the Attorney 
General and his position, the ruling in the Gonzales case did not modify, change or 
reverse the Court’s decisions in Washington (1997) and Vacco (1997).  Therefore, the 
rulings in Washington and Vacco represent the current state of the “law of the land” in the 
federal court system in the United States relative to assisted suicide.   
If the Supreme Court is to change its collective mind or modify its current 
position to allow for assisted suicide, it will have to choose to follow the more expansive 
and contemporary application of the Fourteenth Amendment it has espoused in other 
socially relevant cases instead of its own precedent which was set in Washington and 
Vacco.  Also, as previously noted, the Court will need to choose the expansive Fourteenth 
Amendment approach over its own strict Tenth Amendment State’s rights precedent 
found in the Murphy case. 
Research Question 5 
A. Does evidence in case law support Rohr’s (1986) “regime value/constitutionally-
directed” theory or Toobin’s (2007) more recently formulated theory that justices of the 
Supreme Court are increasingly motivated not by the Constitution but by politics and 
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personal ideology when deciding Fourteenth Amendment cases?  Can both theories co-
exist and not be in conflict? 
B. What does the answer to part A suggest about the future of assisted suicide laws in the 
United States? 
The latest research did not uncover any papers written or opinions expressed on 
the issue of assisted suicide by either the late Professor John A. Rohr or by Jeffrey R. 
Toobin, attorney, Supreme Court expert and public administrator.  But their individual 
work on the Constitution, in public administration and on the Supreme Court supplies an 
expectation of direction for how public administrators should be guided to deal with the 
issue of assisted suicide (Rohr) and where the Supreme Court may be going and how they 
may get there on this very important social issue (Toobin). 
In June of 2018, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy announced his retirement from the 
Supreme Court.  After being nominated by President Ronald Reagan in 1987, Justice 
Kennedy was sworn in on February 18, 1988.     
“Justice Kennedy, 81, has been a critical ‘swing vote’ on the sharply polarized 
court for nearly three decades as he embraced liberal views on gay rights, abortion and 
the death penalty but helped conservatives trim voting rights, block gun control measures 
and unleash campaign spending by corporations” (Shear, 2018).   
One month later, President Donald J. Trump nominated U.S. Court of Appeals 
jurist Brett Kavanaugh to replace Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on the Supreme Court.  If 
history provides any precedent, the political games of the confirmation process will 
begin, most likely laced by scare tactics and semantical chess games of wordsmanship by 
members of Congress. 
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In choosing Judge Kavanaugh as his Supreme Court Justice nomination, the 
President conferred with the same individual he relied on when he nominated Justice Neil 
Gorsuch to the Supreme Court in 2017.  Leonard Leo, an attorney and executive vice 
president of the Federalist Society, is President Trump’s main adviser concerning 
selection of Supreme Court Justice nominees.   
As Toobin suggested in 2007 and as previously discussed herein, when making 
decisions, Supreme Court Justices “use their own individual ideologies when determining 
the meaning of the Constitution.  When it comes to the core of the Court’s work, it is 
ideology, not craft or skill that controls the outcome of the case” (Toobin, 2007, p. 338).    
Leonard Leo agrees with Toobin concerning Supreme Court Justices and ideology 
but believes the issue is more important during the nomination and selection process.  
Leo’s focus on ideology is more compartmentalized and narrower than Toobin’s 
(Michaelson, 2018).  He uses an “ideological test” that covers four primary items of 
major consequence.  Those four primary items are: 
1. The prospective justice understands the limits on government power in the 
Constitution (commonly referred to as being a constitutionalist). 
2. The prospective justice interprets the law (statutes, codes, bills, regulations) as 
written (textualism). 
3. The prospective justice is an originalist.   
Originalists attempt to discern the original meaning of the Constitution.  An 
originalist jurist believes that the meaning of the Constitution does not change 
or evolve over time, but rather the meaning of the text is both fixed and 
knowable.  An originalist believes that the fixed meaning of the text should be 
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the sole guide for a judge when applying or interpreting a constitutional 
provision.  Originalism and textualism are different, albeit subtly.  Textualism 
is based on a reading of the statute to see how the text would have been 
understood to mean by an ordinary person at the time it was written.  A 
textualist is an originalist who gives primary weight to the text and structure 
of the Constitution.  However, textualists often are skeptical of the ability of 
judges to determine collective "intent" (Exploring the Constitution, 2016).    
4. The prospective justice should also have a strong belief in “natural law” and 
how it was emphasized in the Constitution.  
It is also important to Leo that the prospective justice not be a “judicial activist” 
meaning that he or she does not try to change the original meaning of the Constitution in 
order to move in a new judicial direction (decision) that was never intended by the 
framers.  (Bravin, 2018)   
Judge Brett Kavanaugh was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in on October 6, 
2018, becoming the 114th Supreme Court justice, creating a conservative majority on the 
nation’s highest court by a margin of 5 to 4.  The five “conservatives” on the Court, 
which will represent a majority, will be Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Roberts and 
Thomas.  The four “liberals” on the Court are Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.   
Based on the foregoing, the five conservative justices could easily rule that there 
is no “right to assisted suicide” in the Constitution.  On the other hand, the liberal 
justices, after convincing one of the conservative justices to vote with them, could create 
a new “right to assisted suicide” from the situational or relational context of the 
Constitution as has been the case with other important socially relevant issues.  Of 
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course, this will only be of major consequence if an assisted suicide case makes it to the 
Supreme Court. 
As to Rohr’s mandate of the need for public administrators to be 
“constitutionally-directed” ultimately by the Supreme Court, there have not been any 
articles that claim his directive should not be followed.  The better unasked and therefore 
unanswered question is, “If the basis of the court’s ruling is ideologically misguided and 
therefore incorrect or erroneous, should administrators still follow the rulings?”  This 
conundrum, if ever raised, is for another paper at another time.      
If a federal statute such as the one proposed in Chapter 5 is implemented, it would 
certainly marginalize the arguments over the structure of the Court and the “war of 
words” about judicial activism versus strict constitutional originalist interpretation and 
precedent, at least as far as assisted suicide is concerned.  
Conclusion 
As previously stated in Chapter 2, Rohr elevated public administration to the 
central position of constitutional “guardian,” thus playing a role comparable to that of the 
original Senate (Rohr, 1986, p. 39).  To Rohr, the main democratic responsibilities of 
public administrators were symbolized by their oath of office: “The oath to uphold the 
Constitution is the moral foundation of ethics for bureaucrats” (Rohr, 1978, p. 70).  Rohr 
believed that the most suitable way to understand the Constitution was through the 
interpretation of Supreme Court decisions (Overeem, 2013, p. 53).  So how does the 
Supreme Court interpret the Constitution in matters involving assisted suicide?  To date, 
the Supreme Court says that assisted suicide is prohibited, unless an individual is in total 
compliance with the state laws in one of the seven states or the District of Columbia that 
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allow for physician assisted suicide (Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill).  
Therefore, depending on the state in which a public administrator is practicing, he or she 
will need to follow the constitutional mandate of the Supreme Court as to the issue of 
assisted suicide, regardless of whether the constitutional mandate is extremely diverse in 
its application from state to state.   
According to Toobin, the Supreme Court has traveled one long road of 
ideological change and a much shorter road of being in sync with public opinion dogma 
with great precision.  Between 1801 and 1992, the Supreme Court went from establishing 
itself as an independent and influential branch of government to “accommodating 
business interests and their political allies” and back to consistently asserting itself as an 
independent guarantor of constitutional rights, with its main leadership quality being that 
it was “constitutionally directed.”  From 1992 to 2005, the decisions of the Supreme 
Court reflected public opinion with great precision (Toobin, 2007, p. 2).     
Toobin believes that both paradigms mentioned above are about to be disrupted 
and supplanted by a new directional, politically-motivated revolution of individualized 
ideological-directed thinking by the justices (Toobin, 2017, p. 3).  This “new direction” 
based on the individual ideological-directed thinking of each justice may well be in 
conflict and contrary to the mandate of interpreting the Constitution by its content and the 
precedents set by rulings in previous cases.  If Toobin’s prognostication comes to pass, 
what constitutional direction will be afforded to public administrators as they attempt to 
follow their own oath of office (as espoused by Rohr)? 
As to the issue of assisted suicide, any future decision by the Supreme Court may 
be weighed on the new scale of “ideologically-directed thinking based on politics and 
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which jurists are appointed as Justices to the Supreme Court” and not on the historic 
precedent-based “scale of justice” (stare decisis) and the public opinion of the majority of 
Americans.     
The research and information in this chapter underscore a new social directional 
trend and more contemporary legal-minded thoughts concerning physician assisted 
suicide that have come to the forefront.  Since the legal and cultural situations have 
changed dramatically, it now seems that the majority of justices on the Supreme Court 
could be willing to extend the autonomy rational relied on in the Obergefell case and 
further described herein to allow for and protect physician assisted suicide (Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 2015, p. 2584).  Toobin’s theory may still be correct, but applicable only to 
certain kinds of cases.  He said the Court’s new individual ideological-thinking would be 
in conflict with public opinion.  But the Obergefell case, despite the close 5 to 4 decision, 
seems to disprove this part of his overall theory.  As reflected in public opinion polls and 
as mirrored in the Court’s decision, opinions favoring gay rights and gay marriage are 
almost at an all-time eye high (Masci et al, 2017).       
Chapter 5 proposes a public policy healthcare model for allowing assisted suicide 
decisions to be made without fear of prosecution and/or the exhaustive use of protracted 
civil litigation, using a dignified, compassionate and common-sense approach.  The social 
and legal landscapes within the United States may be ready for such an approach to this 
important social issue, as they have been over the past several years relative to abortion, 
education rights, same-sex marriage, immigration, political elections, gerrymandering 
and transgender rights.  
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
The myriad of reasons given by individuals requesting assistance to terminate 
their own lives is wide-ranging.  For example, in the fall of 2013, Tim Bowers, an 
Indiana man, was paralyzed in a hunting accident.  Bowers was heavily sedated as 
multiple tests were performed, and the diagnosis of total paralysis (from the shoulders 
down) and life on a ventilator was explained to his parents and sister.  His parents asked 
if Bowers could be brought out of sedation, so he could hear the diagnosis and decide his 
own fate.  Bowers was informed of the diagnosis and decided to end his own life by 
asking his doctors to remove the breathing tube they had inserted when he arrived at the 
emergency room (Sabalow & Guerro, 2013).   
The Bowers case was unique in many ways.  First and foremost, in accident cases 
it is normally the family members, spouses or surrogates–not the patient–who make end-
of-life decisions, as the patient is normally comatose and incapable of making any 
decisions, let alone the one to end his/her life.  Second, the patient did not have a terminal 
disease and a reasonable expectation of dying within six months, a requirement of all 
state laws that allow for assisted suicide.  Although he did have the ability to make and 
communicate health decisions, it was not reported if he received the requisite counseling 
mandated by the state laws that allow assisted suicide and complied with other written 
consent guidelines under those laws.  Bowers decided for himself to end his life within 48 
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hours of his accident, which is very rare, according to medical ethicists (Sabalow & 
Guerro, 2013, p. 2). 
Each person deals with death in his or her own individual way.  A person’s “own 
individual way” is defined and determined by many factors including but not limited to 
the individual’s health, belief system, ethics, morals, personality, pain and psychological 
distress levels and personal living conditions.   
On the other end of the spectrum from the Tim Bowers’ accident case decision is 
the growing trend to hasten death by self-starvation and dehydration.  Approximately 10 
years ago, geriatric practitioners and other experts started to notice that many terminally 
ill patients wished to hasten their deaths by forgoing all food and water.  In the past 
several years, this trend started to include non-terminally ill patients who knew their 
health was failing them and were simply tired of the pain, discomfort and immobility of 
“growing old” (Kaplan & Mestel, 2005, p. 1).     
In 2011, at the ages of 92 and 90, Armond and Dorothy Rudolph’s bodies were 
failing them.  He suffered from severe pain from spinal stenosis, and she was almost 
entirely immobile.  Both suffered from early dementia, but according to their son, they 
both possessed the requisite mental faculties to make both simple and important decisions 
(Span, 2011, p. 1).  The Rudolphs, who had been married for 69 years, decided to refuse 
food and water in order to end their lives.  At the time they made this decision, they were 
living in an assisted living facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Three days into the 
fast, the couple told their plans to the staff at the facility.  The head administrator 
immediately called 911, citing an attempted suicide.  The assisted living facility evicted 
the Rudolphs.  They moved into a private home where they again stopped eating and 
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drinking.  Ten days after their fast began, Armond Rudolph died.  Dorothy Rudolph died 
the following day (Span, 2011, p. 2).   
Armond and Dorothy Rudolph did not ask anyone to assist them in dying.  The 
opposite was true.  Other than informing some of the staff at the assisted living facility 
where they lived of their intentions, no outside help or actions were requested.  The 
Rudolphs simply refused to eat or drink any of the food or beverages which they were 
given.  They apparently could communicate health decisions and did so by informing 
certain individuals about those decisions, instead of asking for permission or assistance of 
any kind.   
Both the Bowers’ and Rudolphs’ stories are disturbing, mournful, sad, tragic and 
heart-breaking.  Neither situation fits the exact parameters of the terminally-ill competent 
adult patient with less than six months to live asking for assistance in ending his or her 
life.  However, these two examples do underscore the highly emotional, over-reactionary 
and dramatically impassioned approach most people take concerning assisted suicide.  
Instead of putting the individual’s needs and desires first, most people insert their own 
fervent sentiments and feelings into the equation.  These types of reactions are normal 
perhaps, but not very helpful in addressing the issue or to the individual who desires 
assistance in terminating his or her own life.  
The most helpful and progressive approach to the issue of assisted suicide is the 
legal lens of study approach for reasons of objectivity, the contextual nature of a 
historical legal perspective, the allowance for minority opinions and ideas, positions 
based on solid facts, fewer emotional characteristics and procedures based on problem-
solving reasoning.   
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This qualitative study evaluation dissertation began with five research questions 
using the legal lens of study approach.  The five research questions are as follows:  
1. What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws and statutes in effect in the 20 jurisdictions selected for this study?  
2. What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws in the six countries other than the United States selected for this study? 
3. Are there universal language elements in the assisted suicide laws of the 20 
jurisdictions and in the six countries other than the United States selected for this 
study? 
4. Over the past 45 years, how do the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases using the doctrines of equal protection and 
substantive due process as applied to assisted suicide laws reflect public opinion 
of the citizenry of the United States as reported in opinion polls? 
5. A. Does evidence in case law support Rohr’s “regime value/constitutionally-
directed” theory or Toobin’s more recently formulated theory that justices of the 
Supreme Court are increasingly motivated not by the Constitution but by politics 
and personal ideology when deciding Fourteenth Amendment cases?  Can both 
theories co-exist and not be in conflict? 
 B. What does the answer to part A suggest about the future of assisted suicide 
laws in the United States? 
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Research Questions, Findings and Implications 
By following accepted qualitative research techniques and by using a legal lens of 
study approach, this dissertation revealed three foundational approaches to the issue of 
assisted suicide that have been followed in the past.  As this chapter re-examines the five 
research questions and analyzes their substance and implicational importance, the 
approaches followed in the past will be discussed as the five research questions are 
answered.  In order to best explain and support the answers to the five research questions, 
this chapter was divided into five separate parts.  The three previous approaches to the 
issue of assisted suicide are discussed in Parts A, B and C and the first 4 research 
questions are answered therein.  Specifically as to Parts A, B and C:            
1. Part A of this chapter discusses and explains the first approach taken, that 
being the promulgation of individual state legislation.  Within the context of 
this approach, the first 3 research question are answered.   
2. Part B of this chapter discusses and explains the second approach taken, that 
being the federal and state court litigation approach.  This approach answers 
research question 4.   
3. Part C deals with the third approach taken, that being the “status quo” method 
of resolving an issue.  The information revealed and explained in this part of 
the chapter shows that this approach, which includes an under-lying desire to 
not deal with the issue of assisted suicide in a progressive manner, helps 
answer research questions 1 through 4 by promoting the basic belief that the 
issue is a non-issue. 
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The remaining two major parts of the chapter, Parts D and E, examine and discuss 
the “current state of affairs” of the issue of assisted suicide and makes a specific 
recommendation as to how the issue could be approached on a national level, and 
answers research question 5.   
Specifically as to Parts D and E:  
4. Part D will re-examine and discuss how the current “state of affairs” as to the 
issue of assisted suicide, the directions ignored and the paths not taken, and 
where we may be going relative to the issue as research question 5 is 
answered. 
5. Part E contains a specific recommendation as to how the issue of assisted 
suicide could be approached on a national level based upon what some refer to 
as an “informal amendment to the Constitution.”    
This chapter also describes and explains the overall findings in terms of 
expectations and surprises.  As stated above, the three courses of action that have not 
been successful in the past 25 years are examined within the context of the five research 
questions.  The new federal statutory approach proposed to address the issue of assisted 
suicide on a national basis respects the Constitution and may be the best remedy for this 
extremely important socially relevant issue.   
Part A—Individual State Legislation—Research Questions 1, 2 and 3 
(A very long road to travel) 
The first three research questions focused on the similarities and differences 
between the 19 states, the District of Columbia, and the six countries other than the 
United States selected for this study, as well as universal language elements contained in 
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those laws and statutes dealing with assisted suicide.   
The answers to research questions 1, 2 and 3 revealed the first major foundational 
directional approach to the assisted suicide issue.  This directional approach taken over 
the past 25 years left each state to deal with the issue of assisted suicide on their own.  
This approach has not been very successful for the citizenry of the nation and has created 
a hodge-podge of multi-directional rules and regulations for those wanting assistance in 
ending their own lives.        
Research Question 1 
What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws and statutes in effect in the 20 jurisdictions selected for this study? 
To answer research question 1, seven states that currently allow assisted suicide 
were used (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, Oregon, Vermont and Washington), 
as well as the District of Columbia.  These were compared with 12 randomly selected 
states that do not allow assisted suicide: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Texas and Utah.         
The most important link of compatibility between the seven states currently 
allowing for assisted suicide as well as the District of Columbia was that the mandates 
and tenets contained in the state of Oregon’s law were replicated and used as the 
foundational basis of the laws in each jurisdiction.  This does not come as a surprise since 
Oregon was the first state to pass a law allowing for physician assisted suicide in 1997 
and the Oregon statute has withstood several lawsuits by opponents to invalidate the 
statute.   
The importance of research question 1 and its answer is that it lays the main 
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foundational predicate for the entire section of this dissertation concerning a state’s right 
to promulgate a statute covering the issue of assisted suicide, but at the same time 
showing how long and difficult the process can be.  It was expected that each statute 
would be very comprehensive in nature, but it was surprising how similar the statutes 
were and how each government in the seven jurisdictions other than Oregon chose not to 
“re-invent the wheel” as far as the substance of their own statutes. 
However, a major surprise discovered in answering research question number 1 
was that in the states that do not allow for assisted suicide, although all 12 states list the 
topic as a crime either statutorily or by common law, an extreme diversity of punishment 
exists for violating the laws in the different jurisdictions.  As Table 2 on page 103 
describes, some states view the act as the lowest category of a misdemeanor, while other 
states treat it as a Class A felony with prison time of well over ten years.  
The laws in each of the eight jurisdictions allowing for physician-assisted suicide 
contain a provision to gather and report certain statistical information concerning the 
issue.  Table 3 in Chapter 4 details the most important categorical statistics reported by 
each state.  It was not surprising that cancer was the main type of illness reported.  The 
percentage of patients over 65 and the median age at the time of death of the patients who 
requested assistance in dying was also not a surprise.  These two statistical facts support 
the importance of the issue of assisted suicide to the three generations which make up 
almost 30% of the United States population: the “Baby Boomer” generation, those 
individuals born between 1946 and 1964; the “Silent” generation, those individuals born 
between 1928 and 1945; and the “Greatest” generation, those individuals born between 
1901 and 1927 (CNN Library, 2018).                    
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The latest example of how a state becomes part of the select group that has a law 
allowing for assisted suicide follows.        
The story of the state of Hawaii’s history in finally passing legislation to allow its 
citizens an alternative to end of life suffering is extremely complicated. Coupled with the 
length of time other states have had to invest in the death with dignity movement, this 
process demonstrates that the solution to the important and necessary social reform issue 
of assisted suicide for all citizens must not be left up to the individual states.   
Efforts to pass physician-assisted suicide legislation in Hawaii began in 1998 
(Stutsman & Foster, 2018).  At that time, 72% of Hawaii residents supported right to die 
legislation.  The first bill introduced into the state legislature closely modeled Oregon’s 
law, which was passed the year before (Stutsman & Foster, 2018).  From 1999 to 2018, 
no fewer than fourteen bills supporting physician assisted suicide were sponsored and 
introduced into the state legislature of Hawaii (Stutsman & Foster, 2018).  The public 
support for this type of legislature never fell below 71% of Hawaii residents.  The 
journey toward policy reform in Hawaii for physician assisted suicide paralleled the 
efforts in Vermont (12 years), Washington (17 years) and California (25 years) (The 
Inside Story of Hawaii’s Long Road to Victory, 108, p. 1).   
Over the course of twenty years, advocates for the cause in Hawaii replicated 
Oregon’s campaign playbook, which provided for funding and marketing expertise, 
media training, strategic planning and grassroots organizing by local and state leaders, to 
pass legislation allowing for physician assisted suicide (The Inside Story of Hawaii’s 
Long Road to Victory, 108, p. 2).  The herculean effort made by the organizers and 
proponents of physician assisted suicide legislation and the time and money spent on the 
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effort dwarfed the movement in any other state. 
Governor David Ige signed the “Our Care, Our Choice Act” into law on April 5, 
2018, twenty years after the first physician-assisted suicide legislation was introduced  in 
the Hawaii legislature.  “Hawaii’s citizens will now have the same compassionate end-of-
life option that residents of Oregon, Washington, Vermont, California, Colorado and 
Washington, D.C. enjoy” (The Inside Story of Hawaii’s Long Road to Victory, 108, p. 8). 
To address the issue of assisted suicide by continuing with a process where each 
state must invest between 12 and 25 years in a legislative undertaking which culminates 
with the passing of virtually the same laws of the other states, if in fact the legislative 
process is successful, seems to be a waste of time, effort and money.  To those state 
citizens wishing to add this option to their end-of-life choices, this arduous process seems 
nonsensical, uncompassionate and inhumane.  
To state the obvious, for any state to go through the process of passing a law 
allowing for assisted suicide is a very long and arduous process.  This entire process 
would be simplified, and the time invested would be shortened considerably if a federal 
statute dealing with assisted suicide as proposed in Part E herein were promulgated.           
Research Question 2 
What major similarities and differences are there in the current assisted suicide 
laws in the six countries other than the United States selected for this study? 
This question was proposed in order to discover how other countries in the world 
that allow for assisted suicide have dealt with the issue and how their laws compare to 
those in existence in the jurisdictions of the United States.  Table 4 in Chapter 4 lists six 
countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and The Netherlands) 
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other than the United States with laws allowing for assisted suicide.   
There was an expectation that these laws would be less restrictive than the laws in 
the jurisdictions of the United States, and they were, but there were also a few surprises 
found in the contents of these laws even with the afore-mentioned expectation.  The first 
surprise was that in two of the countries there is no residency requirement (Belgium and 
Switzerland). Secondly, in three of the countries there is no requirement of an 
“expectation of death” (Belgium, Switzerland and The Netherlands).  The third surprise 
dealt with the “age” of those who may request assistance in dying.  In Luxembourg and 
The Netherlands it is permissible for a 16- year-old to request assistance in dying and in 
Switzerland, there is not set age, which leaves the distinct possibility for those younger 
than 16 to request assistance in dying as long as they are “suffering intolerably.”                
Research Question 3 
Are there universal language elements in the assisted suicide laws of the 20 
jurisdictions and in the six countries other than the United States selected for this study? 
Chapter 4 details not only the qualitative methodology followed to discover the 
universal language elements in the assisted suicide laws, but thoroughly examines ten 
universal language elements found as well.  This research question was proposed in order 
to complete the first major part of this dissertation, which covers the laws in existence in 
United States jurisdictions and the six other countries selected for this study that allow for 
assisted suicide. 
The most important and significant reason for discovering, analyzing and 
understanding the common elements of the laws in the jurisdictions that allow for 
assisted suicide is to provide some of the important information necessary to formulate 
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and propose a public policy healthcare model allowing for assisted suicide on a national 
level.  These common elements explain and provide the basic groundwork for laws that 
have been successful, not only in being passed, but in withstanding litigation by 
opponents to assisted suicide.   
The discovery and analysis of these common elements also places the laws in a 
historical societal context as far as any political or geopolitical movements.  The 
acceptance of these common elements by the citizenry and by the authorities in different 
jurisdictions over time and at certain flash-points in history allowed for an understanding 
of what has been a successful constant as to the issue of assisted suicide. 
 In addition, this common element discovery approach allowed for the discovery 
and an understanding of why there were some customary differences between the laws in 
the United States jurisdictions and the six countries other than the United States.  A 
specific finding and an uncommon element discovered was the approach taken by the 
jurisdictions in the United States relative to age (18) versus the qualifier mandated in the 
six countries (in some countries, emancipated or as young as 12). 
This analysis was tantamount to preparing the most appropriate tenets that should 
be included in the federal statute proposed herein, which may be the best national 
approach for dealing with the issue of assisted suicide.    
Part B—Research Question 4   
Litigation—the necessity of a “perfect storm” case in the Supreme Court 
Over the past 45 years, how do the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases using the doctrines of equal protection and substantive due 
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process as applied to assisted suicide laws reflect public opinion of the citizenry of the 
United States as reported in opinion polls? 
Court cases from several states and from the federal court system were researched 
and discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 4.  Since there has not been a case heard by the 
Supreme Court of the United States concerning the issue of assisted suicide since 1997, it 
was very important to identify and examine how the courts have dealt with other socially 
relevant issues over the past 45 years by using the doctrines of equal protection and 
substantive due process in the Fourteenth Amendment and looking at the public’s opinion 
on these issues. 
The answer to this question uncovered, among other important discoveries, the 
ever-present historical ebb and flow of important societal issues such as assisted suicide 
that are constants in our diverse society.  Looking at these Supreme Court rulings and 
analyzing the recorded public opinion to these issues produced a confluent connectivity 
that shows how certain important societal issues are pushed to the fore-front and often 
ruled upon by the highest court in the land.   
Another significant reason for using this question and discovering the answer was 
to try to ascertain whether the Supreme Court, with its current make-up of justices, is 
ready to hear the issue and how they might rule.  Predicting and forecasting judicial 
opinions can be described as being foolish.  However, the height of “foolishness” in this 
case would be an attempt to predict what the Court will do without being aware of 
societal opinions on the issue and showing a lack of respect for the voiced societal norms 
on the subject matter.  The answer to this question also sets a directional tone for moving 
forward with a recommendation that is in line with the current societal majority opinion 
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on the issue of assisted suicide.                     
This question also laid the foundation to formulate an in-depth answer to the 
second major directional approach followed over the past 25 years dealing with the issue 
of assisted suicide, state and federal litigation.  The litigation approach used to deal with 
the issue of assisted suicide has not solved this highly relevant social issue, but instead 
has done nothing but further confuse the citizenry of the country, complicate the issue 
with multi-dimensional legal opinions, half of which have been overturned, and provided 
little if any relief for those individuals who would like some assistance in dying.   
The fact that the Supreme Court has not heard an assisted suicide case since 1997 
(Washington and Vacco), as afore-stated, is a testament to the fact that the “perfect 
storm” case has not evolved and been presented to the Court with sufficient factual 
content and an acceptable jurisdictional base.  Not having the opportunity to present a 
case dealing with an important social issue such as assisted suicide is the same as ruling 
against the issue simply by this form of avoidance.  To say that this course of action has 
not been successful in providing realistic and humane guidance for the citizenry of the 
nation is an understatement.        
As explained in Chapters 2 and 4, the historical litigation approach to the issue of 
assisted suicide has created a labyrinth-like conundrum that is as complicated and 
convoluted as any other socially-relevant issue addressed by the courts in the past 45 
years.  However, some of the main points explained in those two chapters bear repeating.   
In 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Roe v. Wade ruled 
that a woman’s choice to an abortion was protected by the privacy rights guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Roe v. Wade, 1973, p. 113).  The 
 155 
 
purpose of this dissertation is not to debate the issue of abortion.  But understanding how 
the Supreme Court approached the issue of abortion in 1973 from a Fourteenth 
Amendment perspective is tantamount to understanding one of the primary judicial issues 
underlying physician-assisted suicide as revealed by the legal lens of study approach.          
 It is important to note some specific facts from the case, as well as part of the 
Court’s interpretation of applicable legal principles on which the case turned.  Also of 
significance is the fact that the Court relied heavily on the precedent setting case of 
Griswold v. Connecticut, a 1965 Supreme Court case ruling that held, “A right to privacy 
can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights and this prevents states 
from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal” (Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 1965, p. 479).  In Roe v. Wade, after looking at the law’s historical lack of 
recognition of the rights of a fetus (stare decisis), the Court concluded that the word 
“person,” as used in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, did not include the unborn 
(Roe v. Wade, 1973, p. 115).   
In 1973, most Americans preferred that women be able to have abortions in the 
early stages of pregnancy, free of government interference, which is how the Court ruled 
in Roe v. Wade (History.com Staff, 2009, p. 1).  But to rule in this manner, the Court 
needed to further expand the Fourteenth Amendment “right to privacy” to include a right 
to abortion (during the first trimester of pregnancy) that did not exist prior to 1973, 
except as narrowly defined and applied in the contraception case of Griswold v. 
Connecticut.  The majority ruling of the Court was made by seven justices.  Only two 
justices dissented and filed such opinions, Justices White and Rehnquist.  Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the framers of the 14th Amendment did not intend for it to protect 
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a right to privacy, a right which they (the framers) did not recognize, and that they 
definitely did not intend for it to protect a woman’s decision to have an abortion.  Justice 
Rehnquist further argued that the original right to privacy is that which is protected by the 
4th Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures (Roe v. Wade, 1973, p. 
134).                          
Perhaps the past 45 years has moved us closer to a Roe v. Wade “perfect storm” 
case relative to assisted suicide.  But the question is, “How many more years of litigation 
will it take for an assisted suicide case to make it to the Supreme Court thus giving the 
majority of the Justices the opportunity to expand and apply the 14th Amendment rights 
discussed herein to this extremely important social issue?”  Since 1973, the Supreme 
Court has taken these rights and applied them to other abortion cases, criminal law, 
education, busing, student assignment to schools, employment, civil rights, “do not 
resuscitate” requests, withdrawal of medication in certain medical situations, requests 
made in Living Wills, medical school admissions, age discrimination, same-sex marriage, 
gay rights, immigration, and very soon, freedom of expression & religion (Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, LTD) and possibly transgender rights (Grimm). 
An additional point must be made when explaining the intricacies within the 
judicial arena when waiting for some form of finality from the highest court in the land.  
Many times, litigants continue to plead their cases in other jurisdictions.  In May 2018, 
the California law permitting physicians to prescribe life-ending drugs to terminally ill 
patients was overturned by a judge who ruled that the law was passed unconstitutionally 
(Neuman, 2018).  Judge Daniel Ottolia of the Riverside Superior Court did not challenge 
the legality of the nearly three-year-old law but said California lawmakers should not 
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have passed it during a special session on health care funding (Neuman, 2018).  Stephen 
G. Larson, lead counsel for a group of doctors who sued in 2016 to stop the law, said, 
“The act itself was rushed through the special session of the Legislature and does not 
have any of the safeguards one would expect to see in a law like this” (Neuman, 2018).  
Even though the judge’s ruling dealt with “how the law was passed,” opponents once 
again were provided a forum to argue that the law could lead to coercion and abuse of 
terminally ill patients.  Proponents were able to reiterate their argument that the law 
“provides dignity to terminally ill patients by affording them more control over the end of 
their lives” (Neuman, 2018).   
Legal experts say that this means the California law has been overturned–for now 
(Symons, 2018).  Experts also say that it is unlikely that the decision will affect assisted 
suicide in California in the long term.  Even if the appeals court upholds Ottolia’s 
decision, the state Legislature could pass a similar law, perhaps with additional 
safeguards.  The law has strong support in the Legislature and among the public.  A 2015 
survey conducted by UC Berkeley found that 76% of Californians supported allowing 
terminally patients to take their own lives (Symons, 2018).  But the main point which 
should be taken from this example is that the legal maneuvering will continue until the 
Supreme Court finalizes the issue on a national level.                      
On July 9, 1868, Louisiana and South Carolina voted to ratify the Fourteenth 
amendment, after they had rejected it a year earlier (Rojas, 2011, p. 1).  The votes made 
the 14th Amendment officially part of the Constitution.  This July 9th (2018) will be the 
150th anniversary of this occasion.  Could this be the year that a “perfect storm” case 
involving assisted suicide reaches the Supreme Court?  Could the ruling in this “perfect 
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storm” case allow an individual living in any state the right to add assisted suicide to their 
end-of-life options list, and chose this option without fear of prosecution or having to go 
through exhaustive and protracted civil litigation? 
The answer, as explained in the previous chapters, illustrates that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Fourteenth Amendment cases involving the rights of equal 
protection, privacy and substantive due process are in lock-step with the opinions of the 
majority of Americans.  The opinion polls claim that the majority of Americans believe 
in an allowance for physician-assisted suicide.  Since assisted suicide is an issue of 
upmost societal importance, why should an inordinate amount of time have to pass for 
the Court to recognize that the majority of Americans favor assisted suicide being an end-
of-life option choice?    
Part C—Status Quo 
There are also those lawmakers, so-called experts and medical pundits who deal 
with the issue of assisted suicide by ignoring it and hoping it will go away or at least run 
out of steam (Ubel, 2013).  This approach represents the third major foundational 
direction to the assisted suicide issue that was discovered in this study, maintaining the 
status quo.  This approach has not helped in any way, but in fact has hindered the 
movement in dealing with the issue.   
The reasons for this attitude or the desire not to deal with the issue are many, but 
the assistance given through Hospice programs and “comfort care” initiatives seem to be 
sufficient for the purveyors of the status quo.  An example of “how death with dignity 
should work” via comfort care follows.     
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Barbara Bush, the wife of former President George H.W. Bush, died on April 17, 
2018.  Even though it was not her intention, her announcement that she was seeking 
“comfort care” shined a new light and stirred an old debate on what it means to stop 
trying to fight a terminal illness (Bailey & Aleccia, 2018, p. 1).   
“Comfort care” usually refers to palliative care, which focuses on managing a 
patient’s symptoms by keeping them comfortable and retaining their dignity (Radulovic, 
2018, p. 1).  For heart patients (Mrs. Bush suffered from congestive heart failure and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease), “comfort care” usually means opting not to use a 
breathing machine or CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation).  However, patients do 
continue to receive medical treatment, including morphine to ease shortness of breath and 
diuretics to remove excess fluid from the lungs (Radulovic, 2018, p. 2).  
Opponents of assisted suicide use Mrs. Bush’s approach to dying (her personal 
form of comfort care) as an example of why nothing needs to be done about making 
provisions for assisted suicide on a national basis as an end-of-life option because the 
status quo is working just fine.  The fallacy in this line of thinking is that Mrs. Bush’s 
high level of “comfort care” is only available to a minute percentage of the entire 
population.  Her resources, insurance, money, living arrangements, medical assistance 
and family support for this type of comfort care are available to so few that this choice is 
not a viable option.   
Hospice care is available to all Medicare Part A and Medicaid recipients (How is 
Hospice Care Paid For?, 2018).  However, the level of care under these two programs 
cannot compare to the level of “comfort care” provided to Mrs. Bush because of her 
station in life.  This is not meant as a criticism to Mrs. Bush or her family.  It is simply 
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the reality of living in the upper strata of society.  The same opponents of assisted suicide 
claiming that her “comfort care” approach to dying is why the status quo works use the 
established Hospice program approach as an example of why no changes are necessary.       
However, the main point concerning Mrs. Bush’s end-of-life option is that it was 
her choice, not the government’s.  Choosing the end-of-life option of assisted suicide 
should be an alternative for all terminally/seriously ill competent adults, just as “comfort 
care” was for Mrs. Bush. 
Part D—Research Question 5 
Current state of affairs, directional paths ignored and not taken, and where we may be 
going relative to the issue of assisted suicide   
A. Does evidence in case law support Rohr’s “regime value/constitutionally-
directed” theory or Toobin’s more recently formulated theory that justices of the Supreme 
Court are increasingly motivated not by the Constitution but by politics and personal 
ideology when deciding Fourteenth Amendment cases?  Can both theories co-exist and 
not be in conflict? 
B. What does the answer to part A suggest about the future of assisted suicide 
laws in the United Sates?   
Chapters 2 and 4 detail the past 45 years of state and federal litigation concerning 
the assisted suicide issue and other important socially relevant issues.  In doing so, it was 
not surprising that the various court opinions offered were as different as the judges and 
justices who wrote them.  However, some main points of contention bear not only 
repeating, but further explanation in order to place in proper context where the assisted 
suicide issue stands, where the issue may be going, how public administrators will be 
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directed on dealing with the issue and how the highest court in the land will have a final 
say in the matter and what may be motivating the justices to take a certain directional 
approach.       
An extremely important issue, which has remained under the judicial radar as far 
as the issue of assisted suicide is concerned, was raised by the late Justice Antonin G. 
Scalia in the 1990 Supreme Court case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health.  His concurring opinion clearly stated that “the federal courts have no business in 
this field (assisted suicide)” (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1990, 
p. 293).   A critical snippet from his opinion follows: 
While I agree with the Court's analysis today, and therefore join in its opinion, I 
would have preferred that we announce, clearly and promptly, that the federal 
courts have no business in this field; that American law has always accorded the 
State the power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide – including suicide by 
refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life; that the 
point at which life becomes “worthless,” and the point at which the means 
necessary to preserve it become “extraordinary” or “inappropriate,” are neither set 
forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better 
than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City 
telephone directory; and hence, that even when it is demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence that a patient no longer wishes certain measures to be taken 
to preserve her life, it is up to the citizens of Missouri to decide, through their 
elected representatives, whether that wish will be honored. 
 (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 1990, p. 294) 
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Besides the states’ rights issue expounded upon by Scalia, there are three 
additional main points to his argument that should be re-emphasized: 
a. Instead of relying on precedent (stare decisis), the Supreme Court has been 
confusing the enterprise of legislating with the enterprise of ruling on the law.  
b. The Justices, as ordinary human beings, are incapable of deciding the point at 
which an individual’s life becomes “worthless” and the point at which the means 
necessary to preserve it become “extraordinary” or “inappropriate.” 
c. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not an unconditional 
protection against all deprivations of liberty, including substantive restrictions.  
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in his concurring opinion in the Cruzan case has been 
reinforced by the majority opinion in the Murphy v. NCAA et al case.  Even 
though the Murphy case was a Tenth Amendment state’s rights case and not a 
Fourteenth Amendment rights case, the Court’s decision in the case followed 
Scalia’s thinking that the federal government has no business in mandating how 
states should deal with the issue of gambling.  The Court’s 6-3 decision overruled 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, saying a 1995 federal law violated the state’s 
(New Jersey) Tenth Amendment right to allow gambling on sports.   
The Murphy case and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Cruzan are presented 
to emphasize the fact that the current Supreme Court may use this type of contemporary 
precedent to decide that the issue of “a right to assisted suicide” should be left to each 
individual state to decide.  To put it another way, this directional approach by the court to 
the issue of gambling provides a legal opportunity and platform for the Court to not deal 
with the issue of assisted suicide.  Since the 10th Amendment to the Constitution helps 
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define the concept of federalism (the constitutional division of power between U.S. state 
governments and the federal government of the United States), the Supreme Court could 
easily rule that the issue of assisted suicide should be reserved to each state (and therefore 
to its citizenry).  Instead of dealing with the issue of assisted suicide on a federal level, as 
the Court has done with so many socially relevant issue cases, the justices could choose 
this Tenth Amendment path (as it did in Murphy), thus leaving it up to each state, and the 
proponents and opponents of assisted suicide in each state, to continue the time-
consuming, expensive and litigation laden battle over assisted suicide.       
In many of its rulings on socially relevant issues, the Supreme Court has extended 
the Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal protection and substantive due process beyond 
what the framers originally intended.  However, if a majority of the Justices on the 
current Supreme Court adopt Scalia’s approach from his concurring opinion in Cruzan 
and/or apply the Tenth Amendment argument in Murphy, the issue of assisted suicide 
will be relegated back to the slow, expensive and exasperating approach of each 
individual state dealing with assisted suicide.  
On the state side of the ledger, in 2009, Justice James C. Nelson of the Supreme 
Court of Montana in the case of Baxter v. Montana, wrote an opinion that perhaps stated 
the best legal and practical reasoning for allowing individuals the right to physician aid in 
dying.  Unfortunately, his opinion was never adopted by most of the judges and justices 
in the federal court system.   
Justice Nelson stated in his twenty four-page concurring opinion that “physician 
aid in dying” is protected by the Montana Constitution “as a matter of privacy and as a 
matter of individual dignity” (Baxter v. Montana, 2009, p. 477).  The first part of Justice 
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Nelson’s analysis dealt with the issue of “public policy” and whether physician aid in 
dying is against it.  He opined that physician aid in dying was not against public policy, 
as the majority opinion in the case stated.   
But the most important part of Justice Nelson’s opinion was based both on 
constitutional and practical grounds.  He started by saying that the Baxter case (aid in 
dying so as to die with dignity) was “most fundamentally and quintessentially a matter of 
human dignity” (Baxter v. Montana, 2009, p. 480).  His position was that the Baxter case 
was not about the “right to die.”  “The notion that there is such a ‘right’ is patently 
absurd, if not downright silly.  No constitution, no statute, no legislation, and no court can 
grant an individual the ‘right to die.’  Nor can they take such a right away” (Baxter v. 
Montana, 2009, p. 481).  Justice Nelson also stated, “The only “right” guaranteed to him 
in any of these decisions is the right to preserve his personal autonomy and his individual 
dignity, as he sees fit, in face of an ultimate destiny that no power on earth can prevent” 
(Baxter v. Montana, 2009, p. 481). 
Justice Nelson listed seven “nonexclusive reasons” for his approach to the issue of 
assisted suicide and why he uses certain terminology in explaining his legal opinion 
(Baxter v. Montana, 2009, p. 481).  Each reason is important, but the first two especially 
bear mentioning;   
First, the amount of physical, emotional, spiritual and mental suffering that one is 
willing or able to endure is uniquely and solely a matter of individual constitution, 
conscience and personal autonomy.  Second, “suffering” in this expansive sense 
may implicate a person’s uniquely personal perception of his “quality of life.”  
This perception may be informed by, among other things, one’s level of suffering, 
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one’s loss of personal autonomy, one’s ability to make choices about his situation, 
one’s ability to communicate, one’s perceived loss of value to self and others, 
one’s ability to care for his personal needs and hygiene, one’s loss of dignity, 
one’s financial situation and concern over the economic burdens of prolonged 
illness, and one’s level of tolerance for the invasion of personal privacy and 
individual dignity that palliative treatment necessarily involves. 
(Baxter v. Montana, 2009, p. 488)  
Justice Nelson’s concurring opinion provides a portion of the answer to research 
question 5 as to the legal concept of precedent, but it also supports the new paradigm of 
individualized ideological-thinking pronounced by Toobin (2007).  In addition, it gives 
Rohr’s legion of public administrators appropriate guidance in looking at a state 
constitution to interpret and explain the precedents set in previous cases and why the 
ruling (opinion) should be followed.  This way, public administrators will be following 
the “constitutional direction” as mandated in their oaths of office and as directed by Rohr 
(1986).         
Also, if there is a new directional, politically-motivated revolution of 
individualized ideological-directed thinking paradigm to follow, Justice Nelson’s 
concurring opinion could represent the approach of the new paradigm if adopted by the 
Supreme Court.  But if the Supreme Court follows its own precedent as to the issue of 
assisted suicide, chooses to follow the Tenth Amendment thinking espoused in Murphy 
and/or opts not to include the issue of assisted suicide in its expansive approach to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, this extremely important current social issue will remain 
unresolved and in conflict on a national level.       
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As far back as 1986, an appellate court judge in California seemed to look far into 
the future through some type of legal looking glass relative to the issue of assisted 
suicide.  Justice J. Compton of the Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate 
District, in the case of Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur) wrote a concurring opinion 
that reads as if it is written to solve the conundrum of assisted suicide in 2018.   
Petitioner Elizabeth Bouvia was a patient in a public hospital and sought the 
removal from her body of a nasogastric tube inserted and maintained against her will and 
without her consent by physicians who so placed it for the purpose of keeping her alive 
through involuntary forced feeding.  Elizabeth was a 28-year-old woman who since her 
birth had been afflicted with and suffered from severe cerebral palsy. She was 
quadriplegic (Bouvia v. Superior Court of California, 1986, p. 1128). 
 Justice Compton wrote a lengthy concurring opinion which held that all tubes 
should be removed from the patient (Bouvia), thus allowing her to end her life.  The main 
focus in his opinion was the “integral part of our right to control our own destinies and 
freedom of choice.” 
Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that she 
prefers death to continued existence in her helpless and, to her, intolerable 
condition.  I believe she has an absolute right to effectuate that decision.  
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies so 
long as the rights of others are not affected. That right should, in my opinion, 
include the ability to enlist assistance from others, including the medical 
profession, in making death as painless and quick as possible.   
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If there is ever a time when we ought to be able to get the “government off our 
backs” it is when we face death–either by choice or otherwise.  
(Bouvia v. Superior Court of California, 1986, p. 1147) 
The court in which Justice Compton presided was an appellate court in the state of 
California court system, not a circuit court of appeals in the federal system.  As 
previously stated, the trial court in California had originally ruled against the Petitioner 
(Elizabeth Bouvia); therefore, she filed a writ of mandamus (a prayer for an order 
commanding an inferior tribunal or individual to perform, or refrain from performing, a 
particular act, the performance or omission of which is required by law) in the state 
appellate court seeking the relief from the trial court’s ruling.  The Respondents in the 
case, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (the trial court) and Harry Glenchur 
(Hospital Administrator), did not appear and were unrepresented at the court hearing.  
This fact demonstrates the position of the defendants, in that they did not want to object 
on the appellate court record or stand in the way of the relief being sought by the 
Petitioner.  The precedent (stare decisis) set by this appellate court decision only had to 
be followed by state trial courts under the jurisdiction of the second appellate division in 
California.  No other trial court or appellate court in the state of California, nor any 
federal court in California or any other state had to follow this decision.   
If Justice Compton’s ruling had been in the federal court system and had become 
the law (because of precedent/stare decisis) on a national basis, it could have saved many 
individuals countless hours of pain and agony in facing their own choice about dying.  It 
could have also saved untold millions of dollars in litigation costs and expenses relative 
to this most important private and personal decision about dying. 
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Before moving on to Part E of Chapter 5, which expounds upon the proposed new 
public policy law for dealing with the issue of assisted suicide, three more findings from 
Chapters II and IV need to be recapitulated for the purposes of answering research 
question number 5.   
In Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch’s 2006 book, The Future of Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia, and as previously stated in Chapter 2 herein, he forewarned his 
readers in the first sentence on page 1 that “Whether or not to permit assistance in suicide 
and euthanasia is among the most contentious legal and public policy questions in 
America today” (Gorsuch, 2006, p. 1).  His stance and opinion as to the issue of assisted 
suicide is clearly expressed in Chapters 9 and 10, where he outlines “the second purpose 
of the book, that being an extensive argument for retaining current laws banning assisted 
suicide and euthanasia based on the idea that all human beings are intrinsically valuable 
and the intentional taking of human life by private persons is always wrong” (Gorsuch, 
2006, pp. 4-5). 
Justice Gorsuch first gives a complete and thorough examination of the issues of 
assisted suicide and euthanasia in the first eight chapters of his book using mostly a legal 
lens of study approach as he expounds upon, among other broad topics, the history of the 
issues going back to the days of Socrates and Plato (400 BC), the legal history of the 
issues in the United States beginning with the Supreme Court case of Marbury v. 
Madison in 1803 and continuing with case rulings dealing with assisted suicide and the 
Fourteenth Amendment up to 2005, the principles of autonomy, the law of unintended 
consequences, the utilitarian case for assisted suicide and the libertarian case for assisted 
suicide. Justice Gorsuch, in what he describes as a march “toward a consistent end-of-life 
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ethic,” leaves only a very slight crack in the door of his “taking of human life by private 
persons is always wrong” position (as espoused on page 5) as he discusses what to do 
when a competent individual or a parent or guardian of a minor asks that either medical 
treatment be terminated or medical treatment be refused (Gorsuch 2006, p. 181).  That 
slight crack in the door is based upon his examination of 15 medical cases (including 
Bouvia, see above) and then concluding with the directive that the medical profession and 
the States should continue to approach these cases on an individual basis.             
Justice Gorsuch’s stance and opinion help answer both parts of research question 
5.  Case law is present and will continue to direct public administrators in their principles 
of policy when dealing with the issue of assisted suicide.  His foundational legal 
constitutional directive to public administrators on this very important public policy issue 
is that “taking of human life by private persons is always wrong.”  As to cases dealing 
with competent individuals and parents or guardians of minors as described herein above, 
the public administrator must follow the mandates, whatever they may be, on a case by 
case basis. 
Gorsuch’s personal ideology, as espoused in Chapters 9 and 10, apparently 
provides his most important motivation in dealing with the issue of assisted suicide and 
shows that his position on the future of assisted suicide laws in the United States is that 
the issue should be left up to the states, and the states should not allow assisted suicide 
other than in extremely narrowly defined individual cases. 
The second finding to be re-emphasized from Chapters 2 and 4 centers directly 
around Toobin’s theory that justices of the Supreme Court are increasingly motivated not 
by the Constitution but by politics and personal ideology.  Seven key legal opinions 
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already discussed at length in the previous mentioned chapters were Roe v. Wade (1973), 
Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington 1996), Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
(1992), Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990), Vacco v. Quill 
(1997), Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).  Roe v. Wade was 
decided in 1973 by the Supreme Court and dealt with the issue of abortion.  It is a 
freedom of choice case which the justices neatly fit into their Fourteenth Amendment 
reasoning.  It is an outlier, both as to date (1973) and subject matter as far as the issue of 
assisted suicide is concerned, but not as to public opinion as previously discussed.  
However, as to the ideologically-directed thinking of judges and justices, it signaled the 
beginning not of Toobin’s theory per se, but as a decisive directional shift in the legal 
paradigm as to his theory. 
Beginning in 1990, in the case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health, a majority of the justices separately declared that a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition.  This type of 
reasoning was a precursor to Judge Barbara Rothstein’s decision in Compassion in Dying 
v. State of Washington in 1994.  Judge Rothstein clearly and unabashedly opined and 
therefore began the drumbeat for the diatribes which would follow by using personal 
ideology (and the precedent of  Planned Parenthood v. Casey in her decision) in saying 
that “assisted suicide is a right guaranteed by the Constitution because there is a liberty to 
define one’s own concept of existences, of meaning, of the universe and the mystery of 
life” even though none of those words can be found in the document itself (Compassion 
in Dying v. State of Washington, 1994, p. 1450). 
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Even though the justices voted unanimously in Vacco v. Quill not to allow 
assisted suicide, several of them wrote concurring opinions putting forth reasons and 
directions for why laws about assisted suicide may be changing in the future.  For 
example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor suggested that “states should remain free to 
balance the interests of terminally ill patients and the interests of society,” much as 
Justice Scalia had stated in Cruzan (Vacco v. Quill, 1997, p. 736).    
Although the cases of Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 
were not assisted suicide cases, the Justices reversed precedent and the Court’s own 
historical approach to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
overturning a sodomy conviction (Lawrence) and granting the right to same-sex marriage 
(Obergefell) by “relying on its own understanding of the nature of liberty” (Myers, 2016, 
p. 397).  The rulings were also in line with the majority of the public’s opinion as to the 
actions of consenting adults and same-sex marriage.        
Toobin’s theory was propounded in 2007 in his book The Nine as stated in 
Chapters 2 and 4.  Since 2007, Toobin’s theory that Justices of the Supreme Court are 
increasingly motivated not by the Constitution but by politics and personal ideology 
when deciding 14th Amendment cases seems to be coming into full realization right 
before our very eyes.  However, in looking back to 1973 and Roe v. Wade or at the very 
least to 1990 and Cruzan or 1994 and Compassion in Dying, it does seem that Toobin’s 
theory has been in the making for a while.                      
The third finding from Chapters 2 and 4 which needs to be briefly re-stated is that 
the research and information contained in Chapters 2 and 4 show ample evidence that the 
theories of Rohr and Toobin propounded in research question 5 can co-exist. 
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  The future conundrum for Rohr’s theory has already been stated.  What happens 
if public administrators choose not to follow the edicts of the various courts (especially 
the Supreme Court) and decline to follow the decades old mandate of Rohr that their 
regime values (principles of policy) should be constitutionally-directed because they 
disagree with the ruling or the politician they work for tells them to disregard it?  What 
immediately comes to mind is the conflict currently playing out within the realm of the 
issue of immigration:  federal policy and federal law on one side and the adversarial 
directions taken by “sanctuary cities” on the other.  Could the same happen concerning 
the issue of assisted suicide if and when the Supreme Court decides to rule on the matter?       
In answering research question 5, two surprising issues were discovered.  The first 
issue is that no one had put forth Toobin’s theory before 2006.  The important cases 
researched and analyzed show that judges and Justices have been “creating” law for years 
from their own personal ideology.  The second surprise is that no one has put forth the 
latest conundrum that may be facing some public administrators, that being a directive 
from their superiors not to follow certain judicial opinions and therefore not be 
constitutionally-directed in their principles of policy by the “rule of case law.”  The 
“sanctuary cities” example in the previous paragraph immediately comes to mind, as do 
some of the choices made by “street level bureaucrats” (police, teachers, case workers) 
not to enforce common marijuana possession laws because these laws are not a priority to 
their own individual goals, caseloads or positions.       
The direction the courts will go in concerning the future of assisted suicide laws 
in the United States, as well as what impact the personal ideology of the judges and 
justices will have, is anyone’s guess.  The inability of individuals to choose assisted 
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suicide as an end-of-life option is sufficient reasoning for advocates to support the idea of 
a federal statute supporting this proposal. 
Part E—A proposed federal law following constitutional principles and based on 
common sense, compassion and dignity   
Making states face the issue of assisted suicide on an individual basis, waiting for 
the “perfect storm” case to land in front of the Supreme Court, or allowing the status quo 
to prevail will do nothing but waste more money and time relative to the issue of assisted 
suicide.  The best approach to this issue on a national basis is the promulgation of a 
federal law that allows for assisted suicide for those wishing to choose this end-of -life 
option.  The law would include an option by the states to add parameters to the statutory 
law, as long as they are not too restrictive or constricting.   
Others may suggest taking the constitutional amendment route in order to deal 
with the issue of assisted suicide.  This route would likely be unsuccessful since there 
have been 11,539 proposals for constitutional amendments made since 1789 (currently 
about 100 per legislative session) and a major part of the amendment procedure calls for 
the proposal to be ratified by three-fourths of the states (in this case, 38 of 50 states) and 
only 27 have been ratified (Rifkin, 2017, p. 3).   
A federal statute similar to the following example would allow for healthcare 
professionals to assist individuals who request aid-in-dying in any state and also grant the 
states the ability to add mandates to the process, as long as the mandates are not too 
restrictive upon the individual requesting the aid-in-dying or the process. 
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Proposed Federal Statute 
Section: Title 42 – The Public Health and Welfare 
Formal Number: Chapter 117A - 2018-3446489-263-2667277466 
Name of Statute:  Assisted Right-to-Die with Aid from a Healthcare Professional  
Section 1 - Findings and purpose:  
  (a) Findings 
       Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Federal Government provides financial support for the provision of and 
payment for health care services, including those for futile medical procedures at 
end-of-life, as well as for advocacy activities to protect the rights of individuals. 
(2) It has become lawful in areas of the United States to furnish assistance and 
services in support of aid-in-dying, known as assisted suicide support, when an 
individual has been determined to be terminally ill with limited life expectancy. 
  (b) Purpose 
(1) It is, therefore, the principal purpose of the chapter to provide a pathway to 
create a uniform policy that will allow any citizen of the United States to have 
control over end of life decisions, as long as those decisions are made in counsel 
with a physician, who will state in writing that the person is terminally ill or 
irreparably injured with no hope for recovery.          
Section 2 – Allowance for assisted suicide  
  (a) Allowance 
(1) Any and all citizens of the United States, residing in any State in the United 
States, and who have been determined by a two physicians to be terminally ill 
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with a life expectancy of six months or less, may voluntarily choose to end their 
own lives by way of assisted suicide using medication prescribed by a healthcare 
professional. 
(2) This federal law shall nullify and/or override any State law disallowing 
assisted suicide and/or punishing any healthcare individual who assists in ending 
an individual’s life. 
Section 3 – Allowance for States to add compliance policies to end-of-life procedure: 
(1) Any State may add mandates or compliance policies to this law and create 
regulatory policy, but said mandates and compliance policies may not be in 
conflict with other federal health care laws or policies (such as Medicare and 
Medicaid), and said mandates, policies and regulations must not interfere with 
the individual’s right to request and receive aid in dying. 
(2) Recommendations for mandates or compliance policies may include the 
following: 
(a) A minimum age for the person making the request 
(b) Definition of illness (such as severe, terminal, unbearable, 
irremediable or incurable) 
(c) Definition for the physician assisting in the end-of-life process and 
procedure 
   (d) Type and number of requests (oral or written) 
   (e) Number of meetings with healthcare professional 
   (f) Counseling requirement  
   (g) Record keeping (before and after procedure) 
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Section 4 – Effective Date 
(1) The provisions of this Act take effect upon its enactment (October 1, 2018). 
END OF PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 
 
It is understood that this approach of using a federal statute to deal with the issue 
of assisted suicide on a national level will not be an easy legal road to travel.  It is also 
understood that any statute and the terminology contained therein will be bombarded with 
lawsuits, suggestions, changes, suggested revisions and the like.   
However, there is legal precedent for this approach. This statutory process is 
referred to by many as an “informal amendment” to the Constitution (Constitutional 
Amendments, 2010. p. 1).  Sometimes the U. S. Constitution changes because society, 
judges and lawmakers reinterpret it over time.  An older example is the circumstantial 
societal change which took place when the movement to expand voting rights in federal 
elections from “only land-holding white males” to all males in the burgeoning middle 
class at the peak of the Industrial Revolution in the 1800s.  Society as a whole became 
very focused on expanding rights for the middle and working classes. This eventually led 
to the right to vote being extended to more and more of the middle and working class 
males because of the societal focus on universal male suffrage, causing the Constitution 
to informally change (Amending the Constitution, 2012, p. 5).   
A second method is judicial review.  When the Supreme Court decides if a law is 
constitutional, this somewhat controversial process creates another “informal 
amendment” to the Constitution (Marbury v. Madison, 1803, p. 137).  “Informal 
amendment” means that the Constitution does not specifically list these forms of 
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amending the Constitution, but because of a change in society or because of judicial 
review, the rule of law changes “de facto” (in fact, or in effect, whether by right or not). 
These methods depend on interpretations of what the Constitution says and on 
interpretive understanding of the underlying intent (Amending the Constitution, 2012, p. 
6). 
The federal statute approach would propel the issue immediately to the Supreme 
Court if any state filed a lawsuit trying to nullify the proposed law since the Supreme 
Court has original jurisdiction over cases involving states and the federal government 
(Federal Judicial Center, 2010, p. 1).               
This recommendation may be the legal path with the best chance of success to end 
the confusion and extremely negative discord over the issue of assisted suicide.  This 
policy simply proposes a dignified, compassionate and common sense approach to a 
public policy healthcare model allowing assisted suicide decisions to be made voluntarily 
by competent adults without fear of prosecution and/or the exhaustive use of protracted 
litigation.        
Thomas Paine, political activist & theorist, philosopher and revolutionary, was 
quoted as saying, “Nothing, they say is more certain than death, and nothing more 
uncertain than the time of dying” (Thomas Paine-Quotes, 2012).  We do not have a 
choice as to whether we are going to die.  But as so eloquently opined by Justice 
Compton in 1986, by Justice Nelson in 2009, and by several other jurists over the past 30 
plus years, shouldn’t we have a choice in selecting the time and the place to die?     
 
 
 
 178 
 
Limitations of study 
Although past knowledge and discernible legal facts clearly emphasized “the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law” (Union 
Pacific Railway Company, 1891), the diametrically opposite points of view and opinions 
of legal experts were underestimated at the beginning of this dissertation.  This fact per se 
did not limit the study, but it is a fact that should be recognized when conducting 
comprehensive research for any socially relevant issue such as assisted suicide.  
Challenges in any policy evaluation study include the constantly shifting sands of 
public opinion, continual movements of lawmakers and public administrators, and state 
and federal court rulings.  These are not true limitations of the study, but significant 
issues that need to be considered and updated before completion. 
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APPENDIX  A 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
  
  Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
  Section 2 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
 Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, 
or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants 
of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or 
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis 
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of 
age in such State. 
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Section 3 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress 
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
  Section 4 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in 
aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss 
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 
held illegal and void. 
  Section 5 
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
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APPENDIX B 
State of Oregon Statute 
THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 
OREGON REVISED STATUTES 
 
 
(General Provisions)  
(Section 1)  
Note: The division headings, subdivision headings and lead-lines for 127.800 to 127.890, 
127.895 and 127.897 were enacted as part of Ballot Measure 16 (1994) and were not 
provided by Legislative Counsel.  
127.800 §1.01. Definitions. The following words and phrases, whenever used in ORS 
127.800 to 127.897, have the following meanings:  
(1) “Adult” means an individual who is 18 years of age or older.  
(2) “Attending physician” means the physician who has primary responsibility for the care 
of the patient and treatment of the patient’s terminal disease.  
(3) “Capable” means that in the opinion of a court or in the opinion of the patient’s 
attending physician or consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, a patient has the 
ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care providers, including 
communication through persons familiar with the patient’s manner of communicating if 
those persons are available.  
(4) “Consulting physician” means a physician who is qualified by specialty or experience 
to make a professional diagnosis and prognosis regarding the patient’s disease.  
(5) “Counseling” means one or more consultations as necessary between a state licensed 
psychiatrist or psychologist and a patient for the purpose of determining that the patient is 
capable and not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression 
causing impaired judgment.  
(6) “Health care provider” means a person licensed, certified or otherwise authorized or 
permitted by the law of this state to administer health care or dispense medication in the 
ordinary course of business or practice of a profession, and includes a health care facility.  
(7) “Informed decision” means a decision by a qualified patient, to request and obtain a 
prescription to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner, that is based on an 
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appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully informed by the attending physician 
of:  
(a) His or her medical diagnosis;  
(b) His or her prognosis;  
(c) The potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed;  
(d) The probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed; and  
(e) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care and 
pain control.  
(8) “Medically confirmed” means the medical opinion of the attending physician has been 
confirmed by a consulting physician who has examined the patient and the patient’s 
relevant medical records.  
(9) “Patient” means a person who is under the care of a physician.  
(10) “Physician” means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy licensed to practice medicine 
by the Board of Medical Examiners for the State of Oregon.  
(11) “Qualified patient” means a capable adult who is a resident of Oregon and has 
satisfied the requirements of ORS 127.800 to 127.897 in order to obtain a prescription for 
medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.  
(12) "”terminal disease” means an incurable and irreversible disease that has been 
medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within 
six months. [1995 c.3 §1.01; 1999 c.423 §1]  
(Written Request for Medication to End One’s Life in a Humane and Dignified Manner)  
 
(Section 2)  
127.805 §2.01. Who may initiate a written request for medication.  
(1) An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the 
attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and 
who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for 
medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner in 
accordance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897.  
(2) No person shall qualify under the provisions of ORS 127.800 to 127.897 solely because 
of age or disability. [1995 c.3 §2.01; 1999 c.423 §2]  
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127.810 §2.02. Form of the written request. (1) A valid request for medication under ORS 
127.800 to 127.897 shall be in substantially the form described in ORS 127.897, signed 
and dated by the patient and witnessed by at least two individuals who, in the presence of 
the patient, attest that to the best of their knowledge and belief the patient is capable, acting 
voluntarily, and is not being coerced to sign the request.  
(2) One of the witnesses shall be a person who is not:  
(a) A relative of the patient by blood, marriage or adoption;  
(b) A person who at the time the request is signed would be entitled to any portion of the 
estate of the qualified patient upon death under any will or by operation of law; or  
(c) An owner, operator or employee of a health care facility where the qualified patient is 
receiving medical treatment or is a resident.  
(3) The patient’s attending physician at the time the request is signed shall not be a 
witness.  
(4) If the patient is a patient in a long term care facility at the time the written request is 
made, one of the witnesses shall be an individual designated by the facility and having the 
qualifications specified by the Department of Human Services by rule. [1995 c.3 §2.02]  
(Safeguards)  
 
(Section 3)  
127.815 §3.01. Attending physician responsibilities.  
(1) The attending physician shall:  
(a) Make the initial determination of whether a patient has a terminal disease, is capable, 
and has made the request voluntarily;  
(b) Request that the patient demonstrate Oregon residency pursuant to ORS 127.860;  
(c) To ensure that the patient is making an informed decision, inform the patient of:  
(A) His or her medical diagnosis;  
(B) His or her prognosis;  
(C) The potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed;  
(D) The probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed; and  
(E) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care and 
pain control;  
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(d) Refer the patient to a consulting physician for medical confirmation of the diagnosis, 
and for a determination that the patient is capable and acting voluntarily;  
(e) Refer the patient for counseling if appropriate pursuant to ORS 127.825;  
(f) Recommend that the patient notify next of kin;  
(g) Counsel the patient about the importance of having another person present when the 
patient takes the medication prescribed pursuant to ORS 127.800 to 127.897 and of not 
taking the medication in a public place;  
(h) Inform the patient that he or she has an opportunity to rescind the request at any time 
and in any manner, and offer the patient an opportunity to rescind at the end of the 15 day 
waiting period pursuant to ORS 127.840;  
(i) Verify, immediately prior to writing the prescription for medication under ORS 127.800 
to 127.897, that the patient is making an informed decision;  
(j) Fulfill the medical record documentation requirements of ORS 127.855;  
(k) Ensure that all appropriate steps are carried out in accordance with ORS 127.800 to 
127.897 prior to writing a prescription for medication to enable a qualified patient to end 
his or her life in a humane and dignified manner; and  
(L)(A) Dispense medications directly, including ancillary medications intended to facilitate 
the desired effect to minimize the patient’s discomfort, provided the attending physician is 
registered as a dispensing physician with the Board of Medical Examiners, has a current 
Drug Enforcement Administration certificate and complies with any applicable 
administrative rule; or  
(B) With the patient’s written consent:  
(i) Contact a pharmacist and inform the pharmacist of the prescription; and  
(ii) Deliver the written prescription personally or by mail to the pharmacist, who will 
dispense the medications to either the patient, the attending physician or an expressly 
identified agent of the patient.  
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the attending physician may sign the 
patient’s death certificate. [1995 c.3 §3.01; 1999 c.423 §3]  
127.820 §3.02. Consulting physician confirmation.  
Before a patient is qualified under ORS 127.800 to 127.897, a consulting physician shall 
examine the patient and his or her relevant medical records and confirm, in writing, the 
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attending physician’s diagnosis that the patient is suffering from a terminal disease, and 
verify that the patient is capable, is acting voluntarily and has made an informed decision. 
[1995 c.3 §3.02]  
127.825 §3.03. Counseling referral. If in the opinion of the attending physician or the 
consulting physician a patient may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological 
disorder or depression causing impaired judgment, either physician shall refer the patient 
for counseling. No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner 
shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling determines that the patient is 
not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired 
judgment. [1995 c.3 §3.03; 1999 c.423 §4]  
127.830 §3.04. Informed decision.  
No person shall receive a prescription for medication to end his or her life in a humane and 
dignified manner unless he or she has made an informed decision as defined in ORS 
127.800 (7). Immediately prior to writing a prescription for medication under ORS 
127.800 to 127.897, the attending physician shall verify that the patient is making an 
informed decision. [1995 c.3 §3.04]  
127.835 §3.05. Family notification.  
The attending physician shall recommend that the patient notify the next of kin of his or 
her request for medication pursuant to ORS 127.800 to 127.897. A patient who declines or 
is unable to notify next of kin shall not have his or her request denied for that reason. [1995 
c.3 §3.05; 1999 c.423 §6]  
127.840 §3.06. Written and oral requests.  
In order to receive a prescription for medication to end his or her life in a humane and 
dignified manner, a qualified patient shall have made an oral request and a written request, 
and reiterate the oral request to his or her attending physician no less than fifteen (15) days 
after making the initial oral request. At the time the qualified patient makes his or her 
second oral request, the attending physician shall offer the patient an opportunity to rescind 
the request. [1995 c.3 §3.06]  
127.845 §3.07. Right to rescind request.  
A patient may rescind his or her request at any time and in any manner without regard to 
his or her mental state. No prescription for medication under ORS 127.800 to 127.897 may 
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be written without the attending physician offering the qualified patient an opportunity to 
rescind the request. [1995 c.3 §3.07]  
127.850 §3.08. Waiting periods.  
No less than fifteen (15) days shall elapse between the patient’s initial oral request and the 
writing of a prescription under ORS 127.800 to 127.897. No less than 48 hours shall elapse 
between the patient’s written request and the writing of a prescription under ORS 127.800 
to 127.897. [1995 c.3 §3.08]  
127.855 §3.09. Medical record documentation requirements.  
The following shall be documented or filed in the patient’s medical record:  
(1) All oral requests by a patient for medication to end his or her life in a humane and 
dignified manner;  
(2) All written requests by a patient for medication to end his or her life in a humane and 
dignified manner;  
(3) The attending physician’s diagnosis and prognosis, determination that the patient is 
capable, acting voluntarily and has made an informed decision;  
(4) The consulting physician’s diagnosis and prognosis, and verification that the patient is 
capable, acting voluntarily and has made an informed decision;  
(5) A report of the outcome and determinations made during counseling, if performed;  
(6) The attending physician’s offer to the patient to rescind his or her request at the time of 
the patient’s second oral request pursuant to ORS 127.840; and  
(7) A note by the attending physician indicating that all requirements under ORS 127.800 
to 127.897 have been met and indicating the steps taken to carry out the request, including 
a notation of the medication prescribed. [1995 c.3 §3.09]  
127.860 §3.10. Residency requirement.  
Only requests made by Oregon residents under ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall be granted. 
Factors demonstrating Oregon residency include but are not limited to:  
(1) Possession of an Oregon driver license;  
(2) Registration to vote in Oregon;  
(3) Evidence that the person owns or leases property in Oregon; or  
(4) Filing of an Oregon tax return for the most recent tax year. [1995 c.3 §3.10; 1999 c.423 
§8]  
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127.865 §3.11. Reporting requirements.  
(1)(a) The Department of Human Services shall annually review a sample of records 
maintained pursuant to ORS 127.800 to 127.897.  
(b) The department shall require any health care provider upon dispensing medication 
pursuant to ORS 127.800 to 127.897 to file a copy of the dispensing record with the 
department.  
(2) The department shall make rules to facilitate the collection of information regarding 
compliance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897. Except as otherwise required by law, the 
information collected shall not be a public record and may not be made available for 
inspection by the public.  
(3) The department shall generate and make available to the public an annual statistical 
report of information collected under subsection (2) of this section. [1995 c.3 §3.11; 1999 
c.423 §9; 2001 c.104 §40]  
127.870 §3.12. Effect on construction of wills, contracts and statutes.  
(1) No provision in a contract, will or other agreement, whether written or oral, to the 
extent the provision would affect whether a person may make or rescind a request for 
medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner, shall be valid.  
(2) No obligation owing under any currently existing contract shall be conditioned or 
affected by the making or rescinding of a request, by a person, for medication to end his or 
her life in a humane and dignified manner. [1995 c.3 §3.12]  
127.875 §3.13. Insurance or annuity policies.  
The sale, procurement, or issuance of any life, health, or accident insurance or annuity 
policy or the rate charged for any policy shall not be conditioned upon or affected by the 
making or rescinding of a request, by a person, for medication to end his or her life in a 
humane and dignified manner. Neither shall a qualified patient’s act of ingesting 
medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner have an effect upon a 
life, health, or accident insurance or annuity policy. [1995 c.3 §3.13]  
127.880 §3.14. Construction of Act.  
Nothing in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall be construed to authorize a physician or any 
other person to end a patient’s life by lethal injection, mercy killing or active euthanasia. 
Actions taken in accordance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall not, for any purpose, 
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constitute suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the law. [1995 c.3 
§3.14]  
 
(Immunities and Liabilities)  
(Section 4)  
127.885 §4.01.  
Immunities; basis for prohibiting health care provider from participation; notification; 
permissible sanctions. Except as provided in ORS 127.890:  
(1) No person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability or professional disciplinary 
action for participating in good faith compliance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897. This 
includes being present when a qualified patient takes the prescribed medication to end his 
or her life in a humane and dignified manner.  
(2) No professional organization or association, or health care provider, may subject a 
person to censure, discipline, suspension, loss of license, loss of privileges, loss of 
membership or other penalty for participating or refusing to participate in good faith 
compliance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897.  
(3) No request by a patient for or provision by an attending physician of medication in 
good faith compliance with the provisions of ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall constitute 
neglect for any purpose of law or provide the sole basis for the appointment of a guardian 
or conservator.  
(4) No health care provider shall be under any duty, whether by contract, by statute or by 
any other legal requirement to participate in the provision to a qualified patient of 
medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner. If a health care 
provider is unable or unwilling to carry out a patient’s request under ORS 127.800 to 
127.897, and the patient transfers his or her care to a new health care provider, the prior 
health care provider shall transfer, upon request, a copy of the patient’s relevant medical 
records to the new health care provider.  
(5)(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a health care provider may prohibit 
another health care provider from participating in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 on the premises 
of the prohibiting provider if the prohibiting provider has notified the health care provider 
of the prohibiting provider’s policy regarding participating in ORS 127.800 to 127.897. 
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Nothing in this paragraph prevents a health care provider from providing health care 
services to a patient that do not constitute participation in ORS 127.800 to 127.897.  
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) to (4) of this section, a health care 
provider may subject another health care provider to the sanctions stated in this paragraph 
if the sanctioning health care provider has notified the sanctioned provider prior to 
participation in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 that it prohibits participation in ORS 127.800 to 
127.897:  
(A) Loss of privileges, loss of membership or other sanction provided pursuant to the 
medical staff bylaws, policies and procedures of the sanctioning health care provider if the 
sanctioned provider is a member of the sanctioning provider’s medical staff and 
participates in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 while on the health care facility premises, as 
defined in ORS 442.015, of the sanctioning health care provider, but not including the 
private medical office of a physician or other provider;  
(B) Termination of lease or other property contract or other nonmonetary remedies 
provided by lease contract, not including loss or restriction of medical staff privileges or 
exclusion from a provider panel, if the sanctioned provider participates in ORS 127.800 to 
127.897 while on the premises of the sanctioning health care provider or on property that is 
owned by or under the direct control of the sanctioning health care provider; or  
(C) Termination of contract or other nonmonetary remedies provided by contract if the 
sanctioned provider participates in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 while acting in the course and 
scope of the sanctioned provider’s capacity as an employee or independent  
contractor of the sanctioning health care provider. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be 
construed to prevent:  
(i) A health care provider from participating in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 while acting 
outside the course and scope of the provider’s capacity as an employee or independent 
contractor; or  
(ii) A patient from contracting with his or her attending physician and consulting physician 
to act outside the course and scope of the provider’s capacity as an employee or 
independent contractor of the sanctioning health care provider.  
(c) A health care provider that imposes sanctions pursuant to paragraph (b) of this 
subsection must follow all due process and other procedures the sanctioning health care 
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provider may have that are related to the imposition of sanctions on another health care 
provider.  
(d) For purposes of this subsection:  
(A) “Notify” means a separate statement in writing to the health care provider specifically 
informing the health care provider prior to the provider’s participation in ORS 127.800 to 
127.897 of the sanctioning health care provider’s policy about participation in activities 
covered by ORS 127.800 to 127.897.  
(B) “Participate in ORS 127.800 to 127.897” means to perform the duties of an attending 
physician pursuant to ORS 127.815, the consulting physician function pursuant to ORS 
127.820 or the counseling function pursuant to ORS 127.825. “Participate in ORS 127.800 
to 127.897” does not include:  
(i) Making an initial determination that a patient has a terminal disease and informing the 
patient of the medical prognosis;  
(ii) Providing information about the Oregon Death with Dignity Act to a patient upon the 
request of the patient;  
(iii) Providing a patient, upon the request of the patient, with a referral to another 
physician; or  
(iv) A patient contracting with his or her attending physician and consulting physician to 
act outside of the course and scope of the provider’s capacity as an employee or 
independent contractor of the sanctioning health care provider.  
(6) Suspension or termination of staff membership or privileges under subsection (5) of 
this section is not reportable under ORS 441.820. Action taken pursuant to ORS 127.810, 
127.815, 127.820 or 127.825 shall not be the sole basis for a report of unprofessional or 
dishonorable conduct under ORS 677.415 (2) or (3).  
(7) No provision of ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall be construed to allow a lower standard 
of care for patients in the community where the patient is treated or a similar community. 
[1995 c.3 §4.01; 1999 c.423 §10]  
Note: As originally enacted by the people, the lead line to section 4.01 read “Immunities.” 
The remainder of the lead line was added by editorial action.  
127.890 §4.02. Liabilities.  
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(1) A person who without authorization of the patient willfully alters or forges a request for 
medication or conceals or destroys a rescission of that request with the intent or effect of 
causing the patient’s death shall be guilty of a Class A felony.  
(2) A person who coerces or exerts undue influence on a patient to request medication for 
the purpose of ending the patient’s life, or to destroy a rescission of such a request, shall be 
guilty of a Class A felony.  
(3) Nothing in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 limits further liability for civil damages resulting 
from other negligent conduct or intentional misconduct by any person.  
(4) The penalties in ORS 127.800 to 127.897 do not preclude criminal penalties applicable 
under other law for conduct which is inconsistent with the provisions of ORS 127.800 to 
127.897. [1995 c.3 §4.02]  
127.892 Claims by governmental entity for costs incurred. Any governmental entity that 
incurs costs resulting from a person terminating his or her life pursuant to the provisions of 
ORS 127.800 to 127.897 in a public place shall have a claim against the estate of the 
person to recover such costs and reasonable attorney fees related to enforcing the claim. 
[1999 c.423 §5a]  
(Severability)  
 
(Section 5)  
127.895 §5.01. Severability.  
Any section of ORS 127.800 to 127.897 being held invalid as to any person or 
circumstance shall not affect the application of any other section of ORS 127.800 to 
127.897 which can be given full effect without the invalid section or application. [1995 c.3 
§5.01]  
 
(Form of the Request)  
(Section 6)  
127.897 §6.01. Form of the request.  
A request for a medication as authorized by ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall be in 
substantially the following form:  
REQUEST FOR MEDICATION  
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TO END MY LIFE IN A HUMANE  
AND DIGNIFIED MANNER  
I, ______________________, am an adult of sound mind.  
I am suffering from _________, which my attending physician has determined is a 
terminal disease and which has been medically confirmed by a consulting physician.  
I have been fully informed of my diagnosis, prognosis, the nature of medication to be 
prescribed and potential associated risks, the expected result, and the feasible alternatives, 
including comfort care, hospice care and pain control.  
I request that my attending physician prescribe medication that will end my life in a 
humane and dignified manner.  
 
INITIAL ONE:  
______ I have informed my family of my decision and taken their opinions into 
consideration.  
______ I have decided not to inform my family of my decision.  
______ I have no family to inform of my decision.  
I understand that I have the right to rescind this request at any time.  
I understand the full import of this request and I expect to die when I take the medication 
to be prescribed. I further understand that although most deaths occur within three hours, 
my death may take longer and my physician has counseled me about this possibility.  
I make this request voluntarily and without reservation, and I accept full moral 
responsibility for my actions.  
Signed: _______________  
Dated: _______________  
 
DECLARATION OF WITNESSES  
We declare that the person signing this request:  
(a) Is personally known to us or has provided proof of identity;  
(b) Signed this request in our presence;  
(c) Appears to be of sound mind and not under duress, fraud or undue influence;  
(d) Is not a patient for whom either of us is attending physician.  
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______________Witness 1/Date  
______________Witness 2/Date  
NOTE: One witness shall not be a relative (by blood, marriage or adoption) of the person 
signing this request, shall not be entitled to any portion of the person’s estate upon death 
and shall not own, operate or be employed at a health care facility where the person is a 
patient or resident. If the patient is an inpatient at a health care facility, one of the 
witnesses shall be an individual designated by the facility.  
[1995 c.3 §6.01; 1999 c.423 §11]  
 
PENALTIES  
127.990: [Formerly part of 97.990; repealed by 1993 c.767 §29]  
127.995 Penalties. (1) It shall be a Class A felony for a person without authorization of the 
principal to willfully alter, forge, conceal or destroy an instrument, the reinstatement or 
revocation of an instrument or any other evidence or document reflecting the principal’s 
desires and interests, with the intent and effect of causing a withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining procedures or of artificially administered nutrition and hydration which 
hastens the death of the principal.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) of this section, it shall be a Class A misdemeanor 
for a person without authorization of the principal to willfully alter, forge, conceal or 
destroy an instrument, the reinstatement or revocation of an instrument, or any other 
evidence or document reflecting the principal’s desires and interests with the intent or 
effect of affecting a health care decision. [Formerly 127.585] 
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APPENDIX C 
State of California Statute 
 
Assembly Bill No. 15 
 
CHAPTER 1 
An act to add and repeal Part 1.85 (commencing with Section 443) of 
Division 1 of the Health and Safety Code, relating to end of life. 
[Approved by Governor October 5, 2015. Filed with 
Secretary of State October 5, 2015.] 
 
AB 15, End of life. 
 
Existing law authorizes an adult to give an individual health care 
instruction and to appoint an attorney to make health care decisions for that 
individual in the event of his or her incapacity pursuant to a power of 
attorney for health care. 
 
This bill, until January 1, 2026, would enact the End of Life Option Act 
authorizing an adult who meets certain qualifications, and who has been 
determined by his or her attending physician to be suffering from a terminal 
disease, as defined, to make a request for a drug prescribed pursuant to these 
provisions for the purpose of ending his or her life. The bill would establish 
the procedures for making these requests. The bill would also establish 
specified forms to request an aid-in-dying drug, under specified 
circumstances, an interpreter declaration to be signed subject to penalty of 
perjury, thereby creating a crime and imposing a state-mandated local 
program, and a final attestation for an aid-in-dying drug. This bill would 
require specified information to be documented in the individual’s medical 
record, including, among other things, all oral and written requests for an 
aid-in-dying drug. 
 
This bill would prohibit a provision in a contract, will, or other agreement 
from being conditioned upon, or affected by, a person making or rescinding 
a request for the above-described drug. The bill would prohibit the sale, 
procurement, or issuance of any life, health, or annuity policy, health care 
service plan contract, or health benefit plan, or the rate charged for any 
policy or plan contract, from being conditioned upon or affected by the 
request. The bill would prohibit an insurance carrier from providing any 
information in communications made to an individual about the availability 
of an aid-in-dying drug absent a request by the individual or his or her 
attending physician at the behest of the individual. The bill would also 
prohibit any communication from containing both the denial of treatment 
and information as to the availability of aid-in-dying drug coverage. 
 
This bill would provide a person, except as provided, immunity from civil 
or criminal liability solely because the person was present when the qualified 
individual self-administered the drug, or the person assisted the qualified 
individual by preparing the aid-in-dying drug so long as the person did not 
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 assist with the ingestion of the drug, and would specify that the immunities 
and prohibitions on sanctions of a health care provider are solely reserved 
for conduct of a health care provider provided for by the bill. The bill would 
make participation in activities authorized pursuant to its provisions 
voluntary, and would make health care providers immune from liability for 
refusing to engage in activities authorized pursuant to its provisions. The 
bill would also authorize a health care provider to prohibit its employees, 
independent contractors, or other persons or entities, including other health 
care providers, from participating in activities under the act while on the 
premises owned or under the management or direct control of that prohibiting 
health care provider, or while acting within the course and scope of any 
employment by, or contract with, the prohibiting health care provider. 
 
This bill would make it a felony to knowingly alter or forge a request for 
drugs to end an individual’s life without his or her authorization or to conceal 
or destroy a withdrawal or rescission of a request for a drug, if it is done 
with the intent or effect of causing the individual’s death. The bill would 
make it a felony to knowingly coerce or exert undue influence on an 
individual to request a drug for the purpose of ending his or her life, to 
destroy a withdrawal or rescission of a request, or to administer an 
aid-in-dying drug to an individual without their knowledge or consent. By 
creating a new crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program. 
The bill would provide that nothing in its provisions is to be construed to 
authorize ending a patient’s life by lethal injection, mercy killing, or active 
euthanasia, and would provide that action taken in accordance with the act 
shall not constitute, among other things, suicide or homicide. 
 
This bill would require physicians to submit specified forms and 
information to the State Department of Public Health after writing a 
prescription for an aid-in-dying drug and after the death of an individual 
who requested an aid-in-dying drug. The bill would authorize the Medical 
Board of California to update those forms and would require the State 
Department of Public Health to publish the forms on its Internet Web site. 
The bill would require the department to annually review a sample of certain 
information and records, make a statistical report of the information 
collected, and post that report to its Internet Web site. 
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the 
right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public 
officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest 
protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest. 
 
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect. 
 
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies 
and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory 
provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement. 
 
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for 
a specified reason. 
 
Ch. 1 — 2  
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
SECTION 1. Part 1.85 (commencing with Section 443) is added to 
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Division 1 of the Health and Safety Code, to read: 
PART 1.85. END OF LIFE OPTION ACT 
443. This part shall be known and may be cited as the End of Life Option 
Act. 
443.1. As used in this part, the following definitions shall apply: 
(a) “Adult” means an individual 18 years of age or older. 
(b) “Aid-in-dying drug” means a drug determined and prescribed by a 
physician for a qualified individual, which the qualified individual may 
choose to self-administer to bring about his or her death due to a terminal 
disease. 
(c) “Attending physician” means the physician who has primary 
responsibility for the health care of an individual and treatment of the 
individual’s terminal disease. 
(d) “Attending physician checklist and compliance form” means a form, 
as described in Section 443.22, identifying each and every requirement that 
must be fulfilled by an attending physician to be in good faith compliance 
with this part should the attending physician choose to participate. 
(e) “Capacity to make medical decisions” means that, in the opinion of 
an individual’s attending physician, consulting physician, psychiatrist, or 
psychologist, pursuant to Section 4609 of the Probate Code, the individual 
has the ability to understand the nature and consequences of a health care 
decision, the ability to understand its significant benefits, risks, and 
alternatives, and the ability to make and communicate an informed decision 
to health care providers. 
(f) “Consulting physician” means a physician who is independent from 
the attending physician and who is qualified by specialty or experience to 
make a professional diagnosis and prognosis regarding an individual’s 
terminal disease. 
(g) “Department” means the State Department of Public Health. 
(h) “Health care provider” or “provider of health care” means any person 
licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) 
of the Business and Professions Code; any person licensed pursuant to the 
Osteopathic Initiative Act or the Chiropractic Initiative Act; any person 
certified pursuant to Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of this 
code; and any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility licensed pursuant 
to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of this code. 
(i) “Informed decision” means a decision by an individual with a terminal 
disease to request and obtain a prescription for a drug that the individual 
may self-administer to end the individual’s life, that is based on an 
understanding and acknowledgment of the relevant facts, and that is made 
after being fully informed by the attending physician of all of the following: 
 
Ch. 1 — 3  
(1) The individual’s medical diagnosis and prognosis. 
(2) The potential risks associated with taking the drug to be prescribed. 
(3) The probable result of taking the drug to be prescribed. 
(4) The possibility that the individual may choose not to obtain the drug 
or may obtain the drug but may decide not to ingest it. 
(5) The feasible alternatives or additional treatment opportunities, 
including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care, palliative care, and 
pain control. 
(j) “Medically confirmed” means the medical diagnosis and prognosis 
of the attending physician has been confirmed by a consulting physician 
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who has examined the individual and the individual’s relevant medical 
records. 
(k) “Mental health specialist assessment” means one or more consultations 
between an individual and a mental health specialist for the purpose of 
determining that the individual has the capacity to make medical decisions 
and is not suffering from impaired judgment due to a mental disorder. 
(l) “Mental health specialist” means a psychiatrist or a licensed 
psychologist. 
(m) “Physician” means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy currently 
licensed to practice medicine in this state. 
(n) “Public place” means any street, alley, park, public building, any 
place of business or assembly open to or frequented by the public, and any 
other place that is open to the public view, or to which the public has access. 
(o) “Qualified individual” means an adult who has the capacity to make 
medical decisions, is a resident of California, and has satisfied the 
requirements of this part in order to obtain a prescription for a drug to end 
his or her life. 
(p) “Self-administer” means a qualified individual’s affirmative, 
conscious, and physical act of administering and ingesting the aid-in-dying 
drug to bring about his or her own death. 
(q) “Terminal disease” means an incurable and irreversible disease that 
has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, 
result in death within six months. 
443.2. (a) An individual who is an adult with the capacity to make 
medical decisions and with a terminal disease may make a request to receive 
a prescription for an aid-in-dying drug if all of the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
(1) The individual’s attending physician has diagnosed the individual 
with a terminal disease. 
(2) The individual has voluntarily expressed the wish to receive a 
prescription for an aid-in-dying drug. 
(3) The individual is a resident of California and is able to establish 
residency through any of the following means: 
(A) Possession of a California driver license or other identification issued 
by the State of California. 
(B) Registration to vote in California. 
(C) Evidence that the person owns or leases property in California. 
 
Ch. 1 — 4  
(D) Filing of a California tax return for the most recent tax year. 
(4) The individual documents his or her request pursuant to the 
requirements set forth in Section 443.3. 
(5) The individual has the physical and mental ability to self-administer 
the aid-in-dying drug. 
(b) A person shall not be considered a “qualified individual” under the 
provisions of this part solely because of age or disability. 
(c) A request for a prescription for an aid-in-dying drug under this part 
shall be made solely and directly by the individual diagnosed with the 
terminal disease and shall not be made on behalf of the patient, including, 
but not limited to, through a power of attorney, an advance health care 
directive, a conservator, health care agent, surrogate, or any other legally 
recognized health care decisionmaker. 
443.3. (a) An individual seeking to obtain a prescription for an 
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aid-in-dying drug pursuant to this part shall submit two oral requests, a 
minimum of 15 days apart, and a written request to his or her attending 
physician. The attending physician shall directly, and not through a designee, 
receive all three requests required pursuant to this section. 
(b) A valid written request for an aid-in-dying drug under subdivision 
(a) shall meet all of the following conditions: 
(1) The request shall be in the form described in Section 443.11. 
(2) The request shall be signed and dated, in the presence of two 
witnesses, by the individual seeking the aid-in-dying drug. 
(3) The request shall be witnessed by at least two other adult persons 
who, in the presence of the individual, shall attest that to the best of their 
knowledge and belief the individual is all of the following: 
(A) An individual who is personally known to them or has provided 
proof of identity. 
(B) An individual who voluntarily signed this request in their presence. 
(C) An individual whom they believe to be of sound mind and not under 
duress, fraud, or undue influence. 
(D) Not an individual for whom either of them is the attending physician, 
consulting physician, or mental health specialist. 
(c) Only one of the two witnesses at the time the written request is signed 
may: 
(1) Be related to the qualified individual by blood, marriage, registered 
domestic partnership, or adoption or be entitled to a portion of the 
individual’s estate upon death. 
(2) Own, operate, or be employed at a health care facility where the 
individual is receiving medical treatment or resides. 
(d) The attending physician, consulting physician, or mental health 
specialist of the individual shall not be one of the witnesses required pursuant 
to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b). 
443.4. (a) An individual may at any time withdraw or rescind his or her 
request for an aid-in-dying drug, or decide not to ingest an aid-in-dying 
drug, without regard to the individual’s mental state. 
 
Ch. 1 -- 5  
(b) A prescription for an aid-in-dying drug provided under this part may 
not be written without the attending physician directly, and not through a 
designee, offering the individual an opportunity to withdraw or rescind the 
request. 
443.5. (a) Before prescribing an aid-in-dying drug, the attending 
physician shall do all of the following: 
(1) Make the initial determination of all of the following: 
(A) (i) Whether the requesting adult has the capacity to make medical 
decisions. 
(ii) If there are indications of a mental disorder, the physician shall refer 
the individual for a mental health specialist assessment. 
(iii) If a mental health specialist assessment referral is made, no 
aid-in-dying drugs shall be prescribed until the mental health specialist 
determines that the individual has the capacity to make medical decisions 
and is not suffering from impaired judgment due to a mental disorder. 
(B) Whether the requesting adult has a terminal disease. 
(C) Whether the requesting adult has voluntarily made the request for 
an aid-in-dying drug pursuant to Sections 443.2 and 443.3. 
(D) Whether the requesting adult is a qualified individual pursuant to 
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subdivision (o) of Section 443.1. 
(2) Confirm that the individual is making an informed decision by 
discussing with him or her all of the following: 
(A) His or her medical diagnosis and prognosis. 
(B) The potential risks associated with ingesting the requested 
aid-in-dying drug. 
(C) The probable result of ingesting the aid-in-dying drug. 
(D) The possibility that he or she may choose to obtain the aid-in-dying 
drug but not take it. 
(E) The feasible alternatives or additional treatment options, including, 
but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care, palliative care, and pain 
control. 
(3) Refer the individual to a consulting physician for medical confirmation 
of the diagnosis and prognosis, and for a determination that the individual 
has the capacity to make medical decisions and has complied with the 
provisions of this part. 
(4) Confirm that the qualified individual’s request does not arise from 
coercion or undue influence by another person by discussing with the 
qualified individual, outside of the presence of any other persons, except 
for an interpreter as required pursuant to this part, whether or not the 
qualified individual is feeling coerced or unduly influenced by another 
person. 
(5) Counsel the qualified individual about the importance of all of the 
following: 
(A) Having another person present when he or she ingests the aid-in-dying 
drug prescribed pursuant to this part. 
(B) Not ingesting the aid-in-dying drug in a public place. 
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(C) Notifying the next of kin of his or her request for an aid-in-dying 
drug. A qualified individual who declines or is unable to notify next of kin 
shall not have his or her request denied for that reason. 
(D) Participating in a hospice program. 
(E) Maintaining the aid-in-dying drug in a safe and secure location until 
the time that the qualified individual will ingest it. 
(6) Inform the individual that he or she may withdraw or rescind the 
request for an aid-in-dying drug at any time and in any manner. 
(7) Offer the individual an opportunity to withdraw or rescind the request 
for an aid-in-dying drug before prescribing the aid-in-dying drug. 
(8) Verify, immediately before writing the prescription for an aid-in-dying 
drug, that the qualified individual is making an informed decision. 
(9) Confirm that all requirements are met and all appropriate steps are 
carried out in accordance with this part before writing a prescription for an 
aid-in-dying drug. 
(10) Fulfill the record documentation required under Sections 443.8 and 
443.19. 
(11) Complete the attending physician checklist and compliance form, 
as described in Section 443.22, include it and the consulting physician 
compliance form in the individual’s medical record, and submit both forms 
to the State Department of Public Health. 
(12) Give the qualified individual the final attestation form, with the 
instruction that the form be filled out and executed by the qualified individual 
within 48 hours prior to the qualified individual choosing to self-administer 
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the aid-in-dying drug. 
(b) If the conditions set forth in subdivision (a) are satisfied, the attending 
physician may deliver the aid-in-dying drug in any of the following ways: 
(1) Dispensing the aid-in-dying drug directly, including ancillary 
medication intended to minimize the qualified individual’s discomfort, if 
the attending physician meets all of the following criteria: 
(A) Is authorized to dispense medicine under California law. 
(B) Has a current United States Drug Enforcement Administration 
(USDEA) certificate. 
(C) Complies with any applicable administrative rule or regulation. 
(2) With the qualified individual’s written consent, contacting a 
pharmacist, informing the pharmacist of the prescriptions, and delivering 
the written prescriptions personally, by mail, or electronically to the 
pharmacist, who may dispense the drug to the qualified individual, the 
attending physician, or a person expressly designated by the qualified 
individual and with the designation delivered to the pharmacist in writing 
or verbally. 
(c) Delivery of the dispensed drug to the qualified individual, the 
attending physician, or a person expressly designated by the qualified 
individual may be made by personal delivery, or, with a signature required 
on delivery, by United Parcel Service, United States Postal Service, Federal 
Express, or by messenger service. 
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443.6. Before a qualified individual obtains an aid-in-dying drug from 
the attending physician, the consulting physician shall perform all of the 
following: 
(a) Examine the individual and his or her relevant medical records. 
(b) Confirm in writing the attending physician’s diagnosis and prognosis. 
(c) Determine that the individual has the capacity to make medical 
decisions, is acting voluntarily, and has made an informed decision. 
(d) If there are indications of a mental disorder, refer the individual for 
a mental health specialist assessment. 
(e) Fulfill the record documentation required under this part. 
(f) Submit the compliance form to the attending physician. 
443.7. Upon referral from the attending or consulting physician pursuant 
to this part, the mental health specialist shall: 
(a) Examine the qualified individual and his or her relevant medical 
records. 
(b) Determine that the individual has the mental capacity to make medical 
decisions, act voluntarily, and make an informed decision. 
(c) Determine that the individual is not suffering from impaired judgment 
due to a mental disorder. 
(d) Fulfill the record documentation requirements of this part. 
443.8. All of the following shall be documented in the individual’s 
medical record: 
(a) All oral requests for aid-in-dying drugs. 
(b) All written requests for aid-in-dying drugs. 
(c) The attending physician’s diagnosis and prognosis, and the 
determination that a qualified individual has the capacity to make medical 
decisions, is acting voluntarily, and has made an informed decision, or that 
the attending physician has determined that the individual is not a qualified 
individual. 
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(d) The consulting physician’s diagnosis and prognosis, and verification 
that the qualified individual has the capacity to make medical decisions, is 
acting voluntarily, and has made an informed decision, or that the consulting 
physician has determined that the individual is not a qualified individual. 
(e) A report of the outcome and determinations made during a mental 
health specialist’s assessment, if performed. 
(f) The attending physician’s offer to the qualified individual to withdraw 
or rescind his or her request at the time of the individual’s second oral 
request. 
(g) A note by the attending physician indicating that all requirements 
under Sections 443.5 and 443.6 have been met and indicating the steps taken 
to carry out the request, including a notation of the aid-in-dying drug 
prescribed. 
443.9. (a) Within 30 calendar days of writing a prescription for an 
aid-in-dying drug, the attending physician shall submit to the State 
Department of Public Health a copy of the qualifying patient’s written 
request, the attending physician checklist and compliance form, and the 
consulting physician compliance form. 
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(b) Within 30 calendar days following the qualified individual’s death 
from ingesting the aid-in-dying drug, or any other cause, the attending 
physician shall submit the attending physician followup form to the State 
Department of Public Health. 
443.10. A qualified individual may not receive a prescription for an 
aid-in-dying drug pursuant to this part unless he or she has made an informed 
decision. Immediately before writing a prescription for an aid-in-dying drug 
under this part, the attending physician shall verify that the individual is 
making an informed decision. 
443.11. (a) A request for an aid-in-dying drug as authorized by this part 
shall be in the following form: 
 
REQUEST FOR AN AID-IN-DYING DRUG TO END MY LIFE IN A 
HUMANE AND DIGNIFIED MANNER I, ......................................................, 
am an adult of sound mind and a resident of the State of California. 
I am suffering from ................, which my attending physician has determined 
is in its terminal phase and which has been medically confirmed. 
I have been fully informed of my diagnosis and prognosis, the nature of the 
aid-in-dying drug to be prescribed and potential associated risks, the expected 
result, and the feasible alternatives or additional treatment options, including 
comfort care, hospice care, palliative care, and pain control. 
I request that my attending physician prescribe an aid-in-dying drug that will 
end my life in a humane and dignified manner if I choose to take it, and I 
authorize my attending physician to contact any pharmacist about my request. 
INITIAL ONE: 
............ I have informed one or more members of my family of my decision 
and taken their opinions into consideration. 
............ I have decided not to inform my family of my decision. 
............ I have no family to inform of my decision. 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw or rescind this request at any 
time. 
I understand the full import of this request and I expect to die if I take the 
aid-in-dying drug to be prescribed. My attending physician has counseled me 
about the possibility that my death may not be immediately upon the 
consumption of the drug. 
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I make this request voluntarily, without reservation, and without being coerced. 
Signed:.............................................. 
Dated:............................................... 
 
DECLARATION OF WITNESSES 
We declare that the person signing this request: 
(a) is personally known to us or has provided proof of identity; 
(b) voluntarily signed this request in our presence; 
(c) is an individual whom we believe to be of sound mind and not under duress, 
fraud, or undue influence; and 
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(d) is not an individual for whom either of us is the attending physician, 
consulting physician, or mental health specialist. 
............................Witness 1/Date 
............................Witness 2/Date 
 
NOTE: Only one of the two witnesses may be a relative (by blood, marriage, 
registered domestic partnership, or adoption) of the person signing this request 
or be entitled to a portion of the person’s estate upon death. Only one of the 
two witnesses may own, operate, or be employed at a health care facility where 
the person is a patient or resident. 
(b) (1) The written language of the request shall be written in the same 
translated language as any conversations, consultations, or interpreted 
conversations or consultations between a patient and his or her attending 
or consulting physicians. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the written request may be prepared 
in English even when the conversations or consultations or interpreted 
conversations or consultations were conducted in a language other than 
English if the English language form includes an attached interpreter’s 
declaration that is signed under penalty of perjury. The interpreter’s 
declaration shall state words to the effect that: 
 
I, (INSERT NAME OF INTERPRETER), am fluent in English and (INSERT 
TARGET LANGUAGE). 
On (insert date) at approximately (insert time), I read the “Request for an 
Aid-In-Dying Drug to End My Life” to (insert name of individual/patient) in 
(insert target language). 
Mr./Ms. (insert name of patient/qualified individual) affirmed to me that he/she 
understood the content of this form and affirmed his/her desire to sign this 
form under his/her own power and volition and that the request to sign the 
form followed consultations with an attending and consulting physician. 
I declare that I am fluent in English and (insert target language) and further 
declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed at (insert city, county, and state) on this (insert day of month) of 
(insert month), (insert year). 
X______Interpreter signature 
X______Interpreter printed name 
X______Interpreter address 
(3) An interpreter whose services are provided pursuant to paragraph (2) 
shall not be related to the qualified individual by blood, marriage, registered 
domestic partnership, or adoption or be entitled to a portion of the person’s 
estate upon death. An interpreter whose services are provided pursuant to 
paragraph (2) shall meet the standards promulgated by the California 
Healthcare Interpreting Association or the National Council on Interpreting 
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in Health Care or other standards deemed acceptable by the department for 
health care providers in California. 
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(c) The final attestation form given by the attending physician to the 
qualified individual at the time the attending physician writes the prescription 
shall appear in the following form: 
FINAL ATTESTATION FOR AN AID-IN-DYING DRUG TO END MY 
LIFE IN A HUMANE AND DIGNIFIED MANNER I, 
......................................................, am an adult of sound mind and a resident 
of the State of California. 
I am suffering from ................, which my attending physician has determined 
is in its terminal phase and which has been medically confirmed. 
I have been fully informed of my diagnosis and prognosis, the nature of the 
aid-in-dying drug to be prescribed and potential associated risks, the expected 
result, and the feasible alternatives or additional treatment options, including 
comfort care, hospice care, palliative care, and pain control. 
I have received the aid-in-dying drug and am fully aware that this aid-in-dying 
drug will end my life in a humane and dignified manner. 
INITIAL ONE: 
............ I have informed one or more members of my family of my decision 
and taken their opinions into consideration. 
............ I have decided not to inform my family of my decision. 
............ I have no family to inform of my decision. 
My attending physician has counseled me about the possibility that my death 
may not be immediately upon the consumption of the drug. 
I make this decision to ingest the aid-in-dying drug to end my life in a humane 
and dignified manner. I understand I still may choose not to ingest the drug 
and by signing this form I am under no obligation to ingest the drug. I 
understand I may rescind this request at any time. 
Signed:.............................................. 
Dated:............................................... 
Time:................................................. 
(1) Within 48 hours prior to the individual self-administering the 
aid-in-dying drug, the individual shall complete the final attestation form. 
If aid-in-dying medication is not returned or relinquished upon the patient’s 
death as required in Section 443.20, the completed form shall be delivered 
 by the individual’s health care provider, family member, or other 
representative to the attending physician to be included in the patient’s 
medical record. 
(2) Upon receiving the final attestation form the attending physician shall 
add this form to the medical records of the qualified individual. 
443.12. (a) A provision in a contract, will, or other agreement executed 
on or after January 1, 2016, whether written or oral, to the extent the 
provision would affect whether a person may make, withdraw, or rescind 
a request for an aid-in-dying drug is not valid. 
(b) An obligation owing under any contract executed on or after January 
1, 2016, may not be conditioned or affected by a qualified individual making, 
withdrawing, or rescinding a request for an aid-in-dying drug. 
443.13. (a) (1) The sale, procurement, or issuance of a life, health, or 
annuity policy, health care service plan contract, or health benefit plan, or 
the rate charged for a policy or plan contract may not be conditioned upon 
or affected by a person making or rescinding a request for an aid-in-dying 
drug. 
(2) Pursuant to Section 443.18, death resulting from the 
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self-administration of an aid-in-dying drug is not suicide, and therefore 
health and insurance coverage shall not be exempted on that basis. 
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, a qualified individual’s act of 
self-administering an aid-in-dying drug shall not have an effect upon a life, 
health, or annuity policy other than that of a natural death from the 
underlying disease. 
(c) An insurance carrier shall not provide any information in 
communications made to an individual about the availability of an 
aid-in-dying drug absent a request by the individual or his or her attending 
physician at the behest of the individual. Any communication shall not 
include both the denial of treatment and information as to the availability 
of aid-in-dying drug coverage. For the purposes of this subdivision, 
“insurance carrier” means a health care service plan as defined in Section 
1345 of this code or a carrier of health insurance as defined in Section 106 
of the Insurance Code. 
443.14. (a) Notwithstanding any other law, a person shall not be subject 
to civil or criminal liability solely because the person was present when the 
qualified individual self-administers the prescribed aid-in-dying drug. A 
person who is present may, without civil or criminal liability, assist the 
qualified individual by preparing the aid-in-dying drug so long as the person 
does not assist the qualified person in ingesting the aid-in-dying drug. 
(b) A health care provider or professional organization or association 
shall not subject an individual to censure, discipline, suspension, loss of 
license, loss of privileges, loss of membership, or other penalty for 
participating in good faith compliance with this part or for refusing to 
participate in accordance with subdivision (e). 
(c) Notwithstanding any other law, a health care provider shall not be 
subject to civil, criminal, administrative, disciplinary, employment, 
credentialing, professional discipline, contractual liability, or medical staff 
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action, sanction, or penalty or other liability for participating in this part, 
including, but not limited to, determining the diagnosis or prognosis of an 
individual, determining the capacity of an individual for purposes of 
qualifying for the act, providing information to an individual regarding this 
part, and providing a referral to a physician who participates in this part. 
Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to limit the application of, or 
provide immunity from, Section 443.16 or 443.17. 
(d) (1) A request by a qualified individual to an attending physician to 
provide an aid-in-dying drug in good faith compliance with the provisions 
of this part shall not provide the sole basis for the appointment of a guardian 
or conservator. 
(2) No actions taken in compliance with the provisions of this part shall 
constitute or provide the basis for any claim of neglect or elder abuse for 
any purpose of law. 
(e) (1) Participation in activities authorized pursuant to this part shall 
be voluntary. Notwithstanding Sections 442 to 442.7, inclusive, a person 
or entity that elects, for reasons of conscience, morality, or ethics, not to 
engage in activities authorized pursuant to this part is not required to take 
any action in support of an individual’s decision under this part. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other law, a health care provider is not subject 
to civil, criminal, administrative, disciplinary, employment, credentialing, 
professional discipline, contractual liability, or medical staff action, sanction, 
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or penalty or other liability for refusing to participate in activities authorized 
under this part, including, but not limited to, refusing to inform a patient 
regarding his or her rights under this part, and not referring an individual 
to a physician who participates in activities authorized under this part. 
(3) If a health care provider is unable or unwilling to carry out a qualified 
individual’s request under this part and the qualified individual transfers 
care to a new health care provider, the individual may request a copy of his 
or her medical records pursuant to law. 
443.15. (a) Subject to subdivision (b), notwithstanding any other law, 
a health care provider may prohibit its employees, independent contractors, 
or other persons or entities, including other health care providers, from 
participating in activities under this part while on premises owned or under 
the management or direct control of that prohibiting health care provider 
or while acting within the course and scope of any employment by, or 
contract with, the prohibiting health care provider. 
(b) A health care provider that elects to prohibit its employees, 
independent contractors, or other persons or entities, including health care 
providers, from participating in activities under this part, as described in 
subdivision (a), shall first give notice of the policy prohibiting participation 
under this part to the individual or entity. A health care provider that fails 
to provide notice to an individual or entity in compliance with this 
subdivision shall not be entitled to enforce such a policy against that 
individual or entity. 
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(c) Subject to compliance with subdivision (b), the prohibiting health 
care provider may take action, including, but not limited to, the following, 
as applicable, against any individual or entity that violates this policy: 
(1) Loss of privileges, loss of membership, or other action authorized by 
the bylaws or rules and regulations of the medical staff. 
(2) Suspension, loss of employment, or other action authorized by the 
policies and practices of the prohibiting health care provider. 
(3) Termination of any lease or other contract between the prohibiting 
health care provider and the individual or entity that violates the policy. 
(4) Imposition of any other nonmonetary remedy provided for in any 
lease or contract between the prohibiting health care provider and the 
individual or entity in violation of the policy. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent, or to allow a 
prohibiting health care provider to prohibit, any other health care provider, 
employee, independent contractor, or other person or entity from any of the 
following: 
(1) Participating, or entering into an agreement to participate, in activities 
under this part, while on premises that are not owned or under the 
management or direct control of the prohibiting provider or while acting 
outside the course and scope of the participant’s duties as an employee of, 
or an independent contractor for, the prohibiting health care provider. 
(2) Participating, or entering into an agreement to participate, in activities 
under this part as an attending physician or consulting physician while on 
premises that are not owned or under the management or direct control of 
the prohibiting provider. 
(e) In taking actions pursuant to subdivision (c), a health care provider 
shall comply with all procedures required by law, its own policies or 
procedures, and any contract with the individual or entity in violation of the 
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policy, as applicable. 
(f) For purposes of this section: 
(1) “Notice” means a separate statement in writing advising of the 
prohibiting health care provider policy with respect to participating in 
activities under this part. 
(2) “Participating, or entering into an agreement to participate, in activities 
under this part” means doing or entering into an agreement to do any one 
or more of the following: 
(A) Performing the duties of an attending physician as specified in Section 
443.5. 
(B) Performing the duties of a consulting physician as specified in Section 
443.6. 
(C) Performing the duties of a mental health specialist, in the circumstance 
that a referral to one is made. 
(D) Delivering the prescription for, dispensing, or delivering the dispensed 
aid-in-dying drug pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of, and 
subdivision (c) of, Section 443.5. 
(E) Being present when the qualified individual takes the aid-in-dying 
drug prescribed pursuant to this part. 
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(3) “Participating, or entering into an agreement to participate, in activities 
under this part” does not include doing, or entering into an agreement to 
do, any of the following: 
(A) Diagnosing whether a patient has a terminal disease, informing the 
patient of the medical prognosis, or determining whether a patient has the 
capacity to make decisions. 
(B) Providing information to a patient about this part. 
(C) Providing a patient, upon the patient’s request, with a referral to 
another health care provider for the purposes of participating in the activities 
authorized by this part. 
(g) Any action taken by a prohibiting provider pursuant to this section 
shall not be reportable under Sections 800 to 809.9, inclusive, of the Business 
and Professions Code. The fact that a health care provider participates in 
activities under this part shall not be the sole basis for a complaint or report 
by another health care provider of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct 
under Sections 800 to 809.9, inclusive, of the Business and Professions 
Code. 
(h) Nothing in this part shall prevent a health care provider from providing 
an individual with health care services that do not constitute participation 
in this part. 
443.16. (a) A health care provider may not be sanctioned for any of the 
following: 
(1) Making an initial determination pursuant to the standard of care that 
an individual has a terminal disease and informing him or her of the medical 
prognosis. 
(2) Providing information about the End of Life Option Act to a patient 
upon the request of the individual. 
(3) Providing an individual, upon request, with a referral to another 
physician. 
(b) A health care provider that prohibits activities under this part in 
accordance with Section 443.15 shall not sanction an individual health care 
provider for contracting with a qualified individual to engage in activities 
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authorized by this part if the individual health care provider is acting outside 
of the course and scope of his or her capacity as an employee or independent 
contractor of the prohibiting health care provider. 
(c) Notwithstanding any contrary provision in this section, the immunities 
and prohibitions on sanctions of a health care provider are solely reserved 
for actions of a health care provider taken pursuant to this part. 
Notwithstanding any contrary provision in this part, health care providers 
may be sanctioned by their licensing board or agency for conduct and actions 
constituting unprofessional conduct, including failure to comply in good 
faith with this part. 
443.17. (a) Knowingly altering or forging a request for an aid-in-dying 
drug to end an individual’s life without his or her authorization or concealing 
or destroying a withdrawal or rescission of a request for an aid-in-dying 
drug is punishable as a felony if the act is done with the intent or effect of 
causing the individual’s death. 
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(b) Knowingly coercing or exerting undue influence on an individual to 
request or ingest an aid-in-dying drug for the purpose of ending his or her 
life or to destroy a withdrawal or rescission of a request, or to administer 
an aid-in-dying drug to an individual without his or her knowledge or 
consent, is punishable as a felony. 
(c) For purposes of this section, “knowingly” has the meaning provided 
in Section 7 of the Penal Code. 
(d) The attending physician, consulting physician, or mental health 
specialist shall not be related to the individual by blood, marriage, registered 
domestic partnership, or adoption, or be entitled to a portion of the 
individual’s estate upon death. 
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit civil liability. 
(f) The penalties in this section do not preclude criminal penalties 
applicable under any law for conduct inconsistent with the provisions of 
this section. 
443.18. Nothing in this part may be construed to authorize a physician 
or any other person to end an individual’s life by lethal injection, mercy 
killing, or active euthanasia. Actions taken in accordance with this part shall 
not, for any purposes, constitute suicide, assisted suicide, homicide, or elder 
abuse under the law. 
443.19. (a) The State Department of Public Health shall collect and 
review the information submitted pursuant to Section 443.9. The information 
collected shall be confidential and shall be collected in a manner that protects 
the privacy of the patient, the patient’s family, and any medical provider or 
pharmacist involved with the patient under the provisions of this part. The 
information shall not be disclosed, discoverable, or compelled to be produced 
in any civil, criminal, administrative, or other proceeding. 
(b) On or before July 1, 2017, and each year thereafter, based on the 
information collected in the previous year, the department shall create a 
report with the information collected from the attending physician follow-up 
form and post that report to its Internet Web site. The report shall include, 
but not be limited to, all of the following based on the information that is 
provided to the department and on the department’s access to vital statistics: 
(1) The number of people for whom an aid-in-dying prescription was 
written. 
(2) The number of known individuals who died each year for whom 
aid-in-dying prescriptions were written, and the cause of death of those 
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individuals. 
(3) For the period commencing January 1, 2016, to and including the 
previous year, cumulatively, the total number of aid-in-dying prescriptions 
written, the number of people who died due to use of aid-in-dying drugs, 
and the number of those people who died who were enrolled in hospice or 
other palliative care programs at the time of death. 
(4) The number of known deaths in California from using aid-in-dying 
drugs per 10,000 deaths in California. 
(5) The number of physicians who wrote prescriptions for aid-in-dying 
drugs. 
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(6) Of people who died due to using an aid-in-dying drug, demographic 
percentages organized by the following characteristics: 
(A) Age at death. 
(B) Education level. 
(C) Race. 
(D) Sex. 
(E) Type of insurance, including whether or not they had insurance. 
(F) Underlying illness. 
(c) The State Department of Public Health shall make available the 
attending physician checklist and compliance form, the consulting physician 
compliance form, and the attending physician follow-up form, as described 
in Section 443.22, by posting them on its Internet Web site. 
443.20. A person who has custody or control of any unused aid-in-dying 
drugs prescribed pursuant to this part after the death of the patient shall 
personally deliver the unused aid-in-dying drugs for disposal by delivering 
it to the nearest qualified facility that properly disposes of controlled 
substances, or if none is available, shall dispose of it by lawful means in 
accordance with guidelines promulgated by the California State Board of 
Pharmacy or a federal Drug Enforcement Administration approved take-back 
program. 
443.21. Any governmental entity that incurs costs resulting from a 
qualified individual terminating his or her life pursuant to the provisions of 
this part in a public place shall have a claim against the estate of the qualified 
individual to recover those costs and reasonable attorney fees related to 
enforcing the claim. 
443.215. This part shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2026, and 
as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted 
before January 1, 2026, deletes or extends that date. 
443.22. (a) The Medical Board of California may update the attending 
physician checklist and compliance form, the consulting physician 
compliance form, and the attending physician follow-up form, based on those 
provided in subdivision (b). Upon completion, the State Department of 
Public Health shall publish the updated forms on its Internet Web site. 
(b) Unless and until updated by the Medical Board of California pursuant 
to this section, the attending physician checklist and compliance form, the 
consulting physician compliance form, and the attending physician follow-up 
form shall be in the following form: 
(6) Of people who died due to using an aid-in-dying drug, demographic 
percentages organized by the following characteristics: 
 
 
 233 
 
(A) Age at death. 
(B) Education level. 
(C) Race. 
(D) Sex. 
(E) Type of insurance, including whether or not they had insurance. 
(F) Underlying illness. 
(c) The State Department of Public Health shall make available the 
attending physician checklist and compliance form, the consulting physician 
compliance form, and the attending physician follow-up form, as described 
in Section 443.22, by posting them on its Internet Web site. 
443.20. A person who has custody or control of any unused aid-in-dying 
drugs prescribed pursuant to this part after the death of the patient shall 
personally deliver the unused aid-in-dying drugs for disposal by delivering 
it to the nearest qualified facility that properly disposes of controlled 
substances, or if none is available, shall dispose of it by lawful means in 
accordance with guidelines promulgated by the California State Board of 
Pharmacy or a federal Drug Enforcement Administration approved take-back 
program. 
443.21. Any governmental entity that incurs costs resulting from a 
qualified individual terminating his or her life pursuant to the provisions of 
this part in a public place shall have a claim against the estate of the qualified 
individual to recover those costs and reasonable attorney fees related to 
enforcing the claim. 
443.215. This part shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2026, and 
as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted 
before January 1, 2026, deletes or extends that date. 
443.22. (a) The Medical Board of California may update the attending 
physician checklist and compliance form, the consulting physician 
compliance form, and the attending physician follow-up form, based on those 
provided in subdivision (b). Upon completion, the State Department of 
Public Health shall publish the updated forms on its Internet Web site. 
(b) Unless and until updated by the Medical Board of California pursuant 
to this section, the attending physician checklist and compliance form, the 
consulting physician compliance form, and the attending physician follow-up 
form shall be in the following form: 
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 SEC. 2. The Legislature finds and declares that Section 1 of this act, 
which adds Section 443.19 to the Health and Safety Code, imposes a 
limitation on the public’s right of access to the meetings of public bodies 
or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 
3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional 
provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the 
interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest: 
(a) Any limitation to public access to personally identifiable patient data 
collected pursuant to Section 443.19 of the Health and Safety Code as 
proposed to be added by this act is necessary to protect the privacy rights 
of the patient and his or her family. 
(b) The interests in protecting the privacy rights of the patient and his or 
her family in this situation strongly outweigh the public interest in having 
access to personally identifiable data relating to services. 
(c) The statistical report to be made available to the public pursuant to 
subdivision (b) of Section 443.19 of the Health and Safety Code is sufficient 
to satisfy the public’s right to access. 
SEC. 3. The provisions of this part are severable. If any provision of 
this part or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other 
provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application. 
SEC. 4. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 
of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because the only costs that 
may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because 
this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, 
or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of 
Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime 
within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California 
Constitution. 
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APPENDIX E 
State of Hawai’i Statute 
TITLE 19 – HEALTH - Revised Statutes 2017 
327E. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (Modified) 
https://law.justia.com/codes/hawaii/2017/title-19/chapter-327e/ 
 
 
327E-1 Short title. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-1 2017  
[§327E-1] Short title.  
This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (Modified). [L 1999, 
c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-2 Definitions. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-2 (2017)  
§327E-2 Definitions.  
Whenever used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires: 
“Advance health-care directive” means an individual instruction or a power of attorney for 
health care. 
“Agent” means an individual designated in a power of attorney for health care to make a 
health-care decision for the individual granting the power. 
“Best interest” means that the benefits to the individual resulting from a treatment 
outweigh the burdens to the individual resulting from that treatment and shall include: 
(1) The effect of the treatment on the physical, emotional, and cognitive functions of the 
patient; 
(2) The degree of physical pain or discomfort caused to the individual by the treatment or 
the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment; 
(3) The degree to which the individual's medical condition, the treatment, or the 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment, results in a severe and continuing impairment; 
(4) The effect of the treatment on the life expectancy of the patient; 
(5) The prognosis of the patient for recovery, with and without the treatment; 
(6) The risks, side effects, and benefits of the treatment or the withholding of treatment; 
and 
 257 
 
(7) The religious beliefs and basic values of the individual receiving treatment, to the 
extent that these may assist the surrogate decision-maker in determining benefits and 
“Capacity” means an individual’s ability to understand the significant benefits, risks, and 
alternatives to proposed health care and to make and communicate a health-care decision. 
“Emancipated minor” means a person under eighteen years of age who is totally self-
supporting. 
“Guardian” means a judicially appointed guardian having authority to make a health-care 
decision for an individual. 
“Health care” means any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or 
otherwise affect an individual’s physical or mental condition, including: 
(1) Selection and discharge of health-care providers and institutions; 
(2) Approval or disapproval of diagnostic tests, surgical procedures, programs of 
medication, and orders not to resuscitate; and 
(3) Direction to provide, withhold, or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration; provided 
that withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition or hydration is in accord with generally 
accepted health care standards applicable to health-care providers or institutions. 
“Health-care decision”" means a decision made by an individual or the individual’s agent, 
guardian, or surrogate, regarding the individual’s health care. 
“Health-care institution” means an institution, facility, or agency licensed, certified, or 
otherwise authorized or permitted by law to provide health care in the ordinary course of 
business. 
“Health-care provider” means an individual licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized or 
permitted by law to provide health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a 
profession. 
“Individual instruction” means an individual’s direction concerning a health-care decision 
for the individual. 
“Interested persons” means the patient’s spouse, unless legally separated or estranged, a 
reciprocal beneficiary, any adult child, either parent of the patient, an adult sibling or adult 
grandchild of the patient, or any adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the 
patient and who is familiar with the patient’s personal values. 
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“Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, 
association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or 
instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
“Physician” means an individual authorized to practice medicine or osteopathy under 
chapter 453. 
“Power of attorney for health care” means the designation of an agent to make health-care 
decisions for the individual granting the power. 
“Primary physician” means a physician designated by an individual or the individual’s 
agent, guardian, or surrogate, to have primary responsibility for the individual’s health care 
or, in the absence of a designation or if the designated physician is not reasonably 
available, a physician who undertakes the responsibility. 
“Reasonably available” means able to be contacted with a level of diligence appropriate to 
the seriousness and urgency of a patient’s health care needs, and willing and able to act in a 
timely manner considering the urgency of the patient’s health care needs. 
“State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, or a territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
“Supervising health-care provider” means the primary physician or the physician’s 
designee, or the health-care provider or the provider’s designee who has undertaken 
primary responsibility for an individual’s health care. 
“Surrogate” means an individual, other than a patient’s agent or guardian, authorized under 
this chapter to make a health-care decision for the patient. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1; am L 
2004, c 161, §3; am L 2009, c 11, §40] 
 
327E-3 Advance health-care directives. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-3 (2017)  
§327E-3 Advance health-care directives.  
(a) An adult or emancipated minor may give an individual instruction. The instruction may 
be oral or written. The instruction may be limited to take effect only if a specified 
condition arises. 
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(b) An adult or emancipated minor may execute a power of attorney for health care, which 
may authorize the agent to make any health-care decision the principal could have made 
while having capacity. The power remains in effect notwithstanding the principal's later 
incapacity and may include individual instructions. Unless related to the principal by 
blood, marriage, or adoption, an agent may not be an owner, operator, or employee of the 
health-care institution at which the principal is receiving care. The power shall be in 
writing, contain the date of its execution, be signed by the principal, and be witnessed by 
one of the following methods: 
(1) Signed by at least two individuals, each of whom witnessed either the signing of the 
instrument by the principal or the principal’s acknowledgment of the signature of the 
instrument; or 
(2) Acknowledged before a notary public at any place within this State. 
(c) A witness for a power of attorney for health care shall not be: 
(1) A health-care provider; 
(2) An employee of a health-care provider or facility; or 
(3) The agent. 
(d) At least one of the individuals used as a witness for a power of attorney for health care 
shall be someone who is neither: 
(1) Related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption; nor 
(2) Entitled to any portion of the estate of the principal upon the principal's death under 
any will or codicil thereto of the principal existing at the time of execution of the power of 
attorney for health care or by operation of law then existing. 
(e) Unless otherwise specified in a power of attorney for health care, the authority of an 
agent becomes effective only upon a determination that the principal lacks capacity, and 
ceases to be effective upon a determination that the principal has recovered capacity. 
(f) Unless otherwise specified in a written advance health-care directive, a determination 
that an individual lacks or has recovered capacity, or that another condition exists that 
affects an individual instruction or the authority of an agent, shall be made by the primary 
physician. 
(g) An agent shall make a health-care decision in accordance with the principal’s 
individual instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the agent. 
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Otherwise, the agent shall make the decision in accordance with the agent's determination 
of the principal's best interest. In determining the principal's best interest, the agent shall 
consider the principal's personal values to the extent known to the agent. 
(h) A health-care decision made by an agent for a principal shall be effective without 
judicial approval. 
(i) A written advance health-care directive may include the individual's nomination of a 
guardian. 
(j) An advance health-care directive shall be valid for purposes of this chapter if it 
complies with this chapter, or if it was executed in compliance with the laws of the state 
where it was executed. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1; am L 2004, c 161, §36] 
 
327E-4 Revocation of advance health-care directive. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-4 2017  
[§327E-4] Revocation of advance health-care directive.  
(a) An individual may revoke the designation of an agent only by a signed writing or by 
personally informing the supervising health-care provider. 
(b) An individual may revoke all or part of an advance health-care directive, other than the 
designation of an agent, at any time and in any manner that communicates an intent to 
revoke. 
(c) A health-care provider, agent, guardian, or surrogate who is informed of a revocation 
shall promptly communicate the fact of the revocation to the supervising health-care 
provider and to any health-care institution at which the patient is receiving care. 
(d) A decree of annulment, divorce, dissolution of marriage, or legal separation revokes a 
previous designation of a spouse as agent unless otherwise specified in the decree or in a 
power of attorney for health care. 
(e) An advance health-care directive that conflicts with an earlier advance health-care 
directive revokes the earlier directive to the extent of the conflict. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-5 Health-care decisions; surrogates. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-5 (2017)  
[§327E-5] Health-care decisions; surrogates.  
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(a) A patient may designate or disqualify any individual to act as a surrogate by personally 
informing the supervising health-care provider. In the absence of such a designation, or if 
the designee is not reasonably available, a surrogate may be appointed to make a health-
care decision for the patient. 
(b) A surrogate may make a health-care decision for a patient who is an adult or 
emancipated minor if the patient has been determined by the primary physician to lack 
capacity and no agent or guardian has been appointed or the agent or guardian is not 
reasonably available. Upon a determination that a patient lacks decisional capacity to 
provide informed consent to or refusal of medical treatment, the primary physician or the 
physician’s designee shall make reasonable efforts to notify the patient of the patient’s lack 
of capacity. The primary physician, or the physician's designee, shall make reasonable 
efforts to locate as many interested persons as practicable, and the primary physician may 
rely on such individuals to notify other family members or interested persons. 
(c) Upon locating interested persons, the primary physician, or the physician's designee, 
shall inform such persons of the patient’s lack of decisional capacity and that a surrogate 
decision-maker should be selected for the patient. 
(d) Interested persons shall make reasonable efforts to reach a consensus as to who among 
them shall make health-care decisions on behalf of the patient. The person selected to act 
as the patient’s surrogate should be the person who has a close relationship with the patient 
and who is the most likely to be currently informed of the patient’s wishes regarding 
health-care decisions. If any of the interested persons disagrees with the selection or the 
decision of the surrogate, or, if after reasonable efforts the interested persons are unable to 
reach a consensus as to who should act as the surrogate decision-maker, then any of the 
interested persons may seek guardianship of the patient by initiating guardianship 
proceedings pursuant to chapter 551. Only interested persons involved in the discussions to 
choose a surrogate may initiate such proceedings with regard to the patient. 
(e) If any interested person, the guardian, or primary physician believes the patient has 
regained decisional capacity, the primary physician shall reexamine the patient and 
determine whether or not the patient has regained decisional capacity and shall enter a 
decision and the basis for such decision into the patient's medical record and shall notify 
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the patient, the surrogate decision-maker, and the person who initiated the redetermination 
of decisional capacity. 
(f) A surrogate who has been designated by the patient may make health-care decisions for 
the patient that the patient could make on the patient’s own behalf. 
(g) A surrogate who has not been designated by the patient may make all health-care 
decisions for the patient that the patient could make on the patient’s own behalf, except 
that artificial nutrition and hydration may be withheld or withdrawn for a patient upon a 
decision of the surrogate only when the primary physician and a second independent 
physician certify in the patient’s medical records that the provision or continuation of 
artificial nutrition or hydration is merely prolonging the act of dying and the patient is 
highly unlikely to have any neurological response in the future. 
The surrogate who has not been designated by the patient shall make health-care decisions 
for the patient based on the wishes of the patient, or, if the wishes of the patient are 
unknown or unclear, on the patient's best interest. 
The decision of a surrogate who has not been designated by the patient regarding whether 
life-sustaining procedures should be provided, withheld, or withdrawn shall not be based, 
in whole or in part, on either a patient’s preexisting, long-term mental or physical 
disability, or a patient’s economic status. A surrogate who has not been designated by the 
patient shall inform the patient, to the extent possible, of the proposed procedure and the 
fact that someone else is authorized to make a decision regarding that procedure. 
(h) A health-care decision made by a surrogate for a patient is effective without judicial 
approval. 
(i) A supervising health-care provider shall require a surrogate to provide a written 
declaration under the penalty of false swearing stating facts and circumstances reasonably 
sufficient to establish the claimed authority. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-6 Decisions by guardian. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-6 (2017)  
§327E-6 Decisions by guardian.  
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(a) A guardian shall comply with the ward’s individual instructions and shall not revoke 
the ward’s pre-incapacity advance health-care directive unless expressly authorized by a 
court. 
(b) Absent a court order to the contrary, a health-care decision of a guardian appointed 
pursuant to chapter 560 takes precedence over that of an agent. 
(c) A health-care decision made by a guardian for the ward is effective without judicial 
approval. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1; am L 2004, c 161, §4] 
 
327E-7 Obligations of health-care provider. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-7 (2017)  
[§327E-7] Obligations of health-care provider.  
(a) Before implementing a health-care decision made for a patient, a supervising health-
care provider, if possible, shall promptly communicate to the patient the decision made and 
the identity of the person making the decision. 
(b) A supervising health-care provider who knows of the existence of an advance health-
care directive, a revocation of an advance health-care directive, or a designation or 
disqualification of a surrogate, shall promptly record its existence in the patient’s health-
care record and, if it is in writing, shall request a copy and if one is furnished shall arrange 
for its maintenance in the health-care record. 
(c) A supervising health-care provider who makes or is informed of a determination that a 
patient lacks or has recovered capacity, or that another condition exists which affects an 
individual instruction or the authority of an agent, guardian, or surrogate, shall promptly 
record the determination in the patient's health-care record and communicate the 
determination to the patient, if possible, and to any person then authorized to make health-
care decisions for the patient. 
(d) Except as provided in subsections (e) and (f), a health-care provider or institution 
providing care to a patient shall: 
(1) Comply with an individual instruction of the patient and with a reasonable 
interpretation of that instruction made by a person then authorized to make health-care 
decisions for the patient; and 
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(2) Comply with a health-care decision for the patient made by a person then authorized to 
make health-care decisions for the patient to the same extent as if the decision had been 
made by the patient while having capacity. 
(e) A health-care provider may decline to comply with an individual instruction or health-
care decision for reasons of conscience. A health-care institution may decline to comply 
with an individual instruction or health-care decision if the instruction or decision is 
contrary to a policy of the institution which is expressly based on reasons of conscience 
and if the policy was timely communicated to the patient or to a person then authorized to 
make health-care decisions for the patient. 
(f) A health-care provider or institution may decline to comply with an individual 
instruction or health-care decision that requires medically ineffective health care or health 
care contrary to generally accepted health-care standards applicable to the health-care 
provider or institution. 
(g) A health-care provider or institution that declines to comply with an individual 
instruction or health-care decision shall: 
(1) Promptly so inform the patient, if possible, and any person then authorized to make 
health-care decisions for the patient; 
(2) Provide continuing care to the patient until a transfer can be effected; and 
(3) Unless the patient or person then authorized to make health-care decisions for the 
patient refuses assistance, immediately make all reasonable efforts to assist in the transfer 
of the patient to another health-care provider or institution that is willing to comply with 
the instruction or decision. 
(h) A health-care provider or institution may not require or prohibit the execution or 
revocation of [an] advance health-care directive as a condition for providing health care. [L 
1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-8 Health-care information. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-8 (2017)  
[§327E-8] Health-care information.  
Unless otherwise specified in an advance health-care directive, a person then authorized to 
make health-care decisions for a patient has the same rights as the patient to request, 
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receive, examine, copy, and consent to the disclosure of medical or any other health-care 
information. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-9 Immunities. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-9 (2017)  
[§327E-9] Immunities.  
(a) A health-care provider or institution acting in good faith and in accordance with 
generally accepted health-care standards applicable to the health-care provider or 
institution shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability or to discipline for 
unprofessional conduct for: 
(1) Complying with a health-care decision of a person apparently having authority to make 
a health-care decision for a patient, including a decision to withhold or withdraw health 
care; 
(2) Declining to comply with a health-care decision of a person based on a belief that the 
person then lacked authority; or 
(3) Complying with an advance health-care directive and assuming that the directive was 
valid when made and has not been revoked or terminated. 
(b) An individual acting as agent, guardian, or surrogate under this chapter shall not be 
subject to civil or criminal liability or to discipline for unprofessional conduct for health-
care decisions made in good faith. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-10 Statutory damages. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-10 (2017)  
[§327E-10] Statutory damages.  
(a) A health-care provider or institution that intentionally violates this chapter shall be 
subject to liability to the individual or the individual’s estate for damages of $500 or actual 
damages resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees. 
(b) A person who intentionally falsifies, forges, conceals, defaces, or obliterates an 
individual's advance health-care directive or a revocation of an advance health-care 
directive without the individual's consent, or who coerces or fraudulently induces an 
individual to give, revoke, or not to give an advance health-care directive, shall be subject 
 266 
 
to liability to that individual for damages of $2,500 or actual damages resulting from the 
action, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney’s fees. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-11 Capacity. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section E-11 (2017)  
[§327E-11] Capacity.  
(a) This chapter does not affect the right of an individual to make health-care decisions 
while having capacity to do so. 
(b) An individual is presumed to have capacity to make a health-care decision, to give or 
revoke an advance health-care directive, and to designate or disqualify a surrogate. [L 
1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-12 Effect of copy. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev State Section 327E-12 (2017)  
[§327E-12] Effect of copy.  
A copy of a written advance health-care directive, revocation of an advance health-care 
directive, or designation or disqualification of a surrogate has the same effect as the 
original. [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-13 Effect of this chapter. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-13 (2017)  
§327E-13 Effect of this chapter.  
(a) This chapter shall not create a presumption concerning the intention of an individual 
who has not made or who has revoked an advance health-care directive. 
(b) Death resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of health care in accordance with 
this chapter shall not for any purpose constitute a suicide or homicide or legally impair or 
invalidate a policy of insurance or an annuity providing a death benefit, notwithstanding 
any term of the policy or annuity to the contrary. 
(c) This chapter shall not authorize mercy killing, assisted suicide, euthanasia, or the 
provision, withholding, or withdrawal of health care, to the extent prohibited by other 
statutes of this State. 
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(d) This chapter shall not authorize or require a health-care provider or institution to 
provide health care contrary to generally accepted health-care standards applicable to the 
health-care provider or institution. 
(e) This chapter shall not authorize an agent or surrogate to consent to the admission of an 
individual to a psychiatric facility as defined in chapter 334, unless the individual’s written 
advance health-care directive expressly so provides. 
(f) This chapter shall not affect other statutes of this State governing treatment for mental 
illness of an individual involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility. [L 1999, c 169, pt 
of §1; am L 2000, c 42, §1] 
 
327E-14 Judicial relief. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-14 (2017)  
[§327E-14] Judicial relief.  
On petition of a patient, the patient’s agent, guardian, or surrogate, or a health-care 
provider or institution involved with the patient's care, any court of competent jurisdiction 
may enjoin or direct a health-care decision or order other equitable relief. A proceeding 
under this section shall be governed by part 3 of article V of chapter 560. [L 1999, c 169, 
pt of §1] 
 
327E-15 Uniformity of application and construction. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-15 (2017)  
[§327E-15] Uniformity of application and construction.  
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it. [L 
1999, c 169, pt of §1] 
 
327E-16 Optional form. 
Universal Citation: HI Rev Stat Section 327E-16 (2017)  
§327E-16 Optional form.  
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The following sample form may be used to create an advance health-care directive. This 
form may be duplicated. This form may be modified to suit the needs of the person, or a 
completely different form may be used that contains the substance of the following form. 
"ADVANCE HEALTH-CARE DIRECTIVE 
Explanation 
You have the right to give instructions about your own health care. You also have the right 
to name someone else to make health-care decisions for you. This form lets you do either 
or both of these things. It also lets you express your wishes regarding the designation of 
your health-care provider. If you use this form, you may complete or modify all or any part 
of it. You are free to use a different form. 
Part 1 of this form is a power of attorney for health care. Part 1 lets you name another 
individual as agent to make health-care decisions for you if you become incapable of 
making your own decisions or if you want someone else to make those decisions for you 
now even though you are still capable. You may name an alternate agent to act for you if 
your first choice is not willing, able, or reasonably available to make decisions for you. 
Unless related to you, your agent may not be an owner, operator, or employee of a health-
care institution where you are receiving care. 
Unless the form you sign limits the authority of your agent, your agent may make all 
health-care decisions for you. This form has a place for you to limit the authority of your 
agent. You need not limit the authority of your agent if you wish to rely on your agent for 
all health-care decisions that may have to be made. If you choose not to limit the authority 
of your agent, your agent will have the right to: 
(1) Consent or refuse consent to any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, 
diagnose, or otherwise affect a physical or mental condition; 
(2) Select or discharge health-care providers and institutions; 
(3) Approve or disapprove diagnostic tests, surgical procedures, programs of medication, 
and orders not to resuscitate; and 
(4) Direct the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration 
and all other forms of health care. 
Part 2 of this form lets you give specific instructions about any aspect of your health care. 
Choices are provided for you to express your wishes regarding the provision, withholding, 
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or withdrawal of treatment to keep you alive, including the provision of artificial nutrition 
and hydration, as well as the provision of pain relief medication. Space is provided for you 
to add to the choices you have made or for you to write out any additional wishes. 
Part 4 of this form lets you designate a physician to have primary responsibility for your 
health care. 
After completing this form, sign and date the form at the end and have the form witnessed 
by one of the two alternative methods listed below. Give a copy of the signed and 
completed form to your physician, to any other health-care providers you may have, to any 
health-care institution at which you are receiving care, and to any health-care agents you 
have named. You should talk to the person you have named as agent to make sure that he 
or she understands your wishes and is willing to take the responsibility. 
You have the right to revoke this advance health-care directive or replace this form at any 
time. 
 
PART 1 
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS 
(1) DESIGNATION OF AGENT: I designate the following individual as my agent to 
make health-care decisions for me: 
__________________________  
(name of individual you choose as agent) 
__________________________  
(address) (city) (state) (zip code) 
__________________________  
(home phone) (work phone) 
OPTIONAL: If I revoke my agent’s authority or if my agent is not willing, able, or 
reasonably available to make a health-care decision for me, I designate as my first alternate 
agent: 
__________________________  
(name of individual you choose as first alternate agent) 
__________________________  
(address) (city) (state) (zip code) 
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__________________________  
(home phone) (work phone) 
OPTIONAL: If I revoke the authority of my agent and first alternate agent or if neither is 
willing, able, or reasonably available to make a health-care decision for me, I designate as 
my second alternate agent: 
__________________________  
(name of individual you choose as second alternate agent) 
__________________________  
(address) (city) (state) (zip code) 
__________________________  
(home phone) (work phone) 
(2) AGENT'S AUTHORITY: My agent is authorized to make all health-care decisions for 
me, including decisions to provide, withhold, or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration, 
and all other forms of health care to keep me alive, except as I state here: 
__________________________  
__________________________  
__________________________  
(Add additional sheets if needed.) 
(3) WHEN AGENT'S AUTHORITY BECOMES EFFECTIVE: My agent’s authority 
becomes effective when my primary physician determines that I am unable to make my 
own health-care decisions unless I mark the following box. If I mark this box [ ], my 
agent's authority to make health-care decisions for me takes effect immediately. 
(4) AGENT'S OBLIGATION: My agent shall make health-care decisions for me in 
accordance with this power of attorney for health care, any instructions I give in Part 2 of 
this form, and my other wishes to the extent known to my agent. To the extent my wishes 
are unknown, my agent shall make health-care decisions for me in accordance with what 
my agent determines to be in my best interest. In determining my best interest, my agent 
shall consider my personal values to the extent known to my agent. 
(5) NOMINATION OF GUARDIAN: If a guardian needs to be appointed for me by a 
court, I nominate the agent designated in this form. If that agent is not willing, able, or 
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reasonably available to act as guardian, I nominate the alternate agents whom I have 
named, in the order designated. 
 
PART 2 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR HEALTH CARE 
If you are satisfied to allow your agent to determine what is best for you in making end-of-
life decisions, you need not fill out this part of the form. If you do fill out this part of the 
form, you may strike any wording you do not want. 
(6) END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS: I direct that my health-care providers and others involved 
in my care provide, withhold, or withdraw treatment in accordance with the choice I have 
marked below: (Check only one box.) 
[ ] (a) Choice Not To Prolong Life 
I do not want my life to be prolonged if (i) I have an incurable and irreversible condition 
that will result in my death within a relatively short time, (ii) I become unconscious and, to 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty, I will not regain consciousness, or (iii) the likely 
risks and burdens of treatment would outweigh the expected benefits, OR  
[ ] (b) Choice To Prolong Life 
I want my life to be prolonged as long as possible within the limits of generally accepted 
health-care standards. 
(7) ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION: Artificial nutrition and hydration 
must be provided, withheld or withdrawn in accordance with the choice I have made in 
paragraph (6) unless I mark the following box. If I mark this box [ ], artificial nutrition and 
hydration must be provided regardless of my condition and regardless of the choice I have 
made in paragraph (6). 
(8) RELIEF FROM PAIN: If I mark this box [ ], I direct that treatment to alleviate pain or 
discomfort should be provided to me even if it hastens my death. 
(9) OTHER WISHES: (If you do not agree with any of the optional choices above and 
wish to write your own, or if you wish to add to the instructions you have given above, you 
may do so here.) I direct that: 
__________________________  
__________________________  
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(Add additional sheets if needed.) 
 
PART 3 
DONATION OF ORGANS AT DEATH 
(OPTIONAL) 
(10) Upon my death: (mark applicable box)  
[ ] (a) I give any needed organs, tissues, or parts, 
OR 
[ ] (b) I give the following organs, tissues, or parts only 
_____________________  
[ ] (c) My gift is for the following purposes (strike any of the following you do not want) 
(i) Transplant 
(ii) Therapy 
(iii) Research 
(iv) Education 
 
PART 4 
PRIMARY PHYSICIAN 
(OPTIONAL) 
(11) I designate the following physician as my primary physician: 
__________________________  
(name of physician) 
__________________________  
(address) (city) (state) (zip code) 
__________________________  
(phone) 
OPTIONAL: If the physician I have designated above is not willing, able, or reasonably 
available to act as my primary physician, I designate the following physician as my 
primary physician: 
__________________________  
(name of physician) 
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__________________________  
(address) (city) (state) (zip code) 
__________________________  
(phone) 
(12) EFFECT OF COPY: A copy of this form has the same effect as the original. 
(13) SIGNATURES: Sign and date the form here: 
________________________  
(date) (sign your name) 
________________________  
(address) (print your name) 
________________________  
(city) (state) 
(14) WITNESSES: This power of attorney will not be valid for making health-care 
decisions unless it is either (a) signed by two qualified adult witnesses who are personally 
known to you and who are present when you sign or acknowledge your signature; or (b) 
acknowledged before a notary public in the State. 
 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 1 
Witness 
I declare under penalty of false swearing pursuant to section 710-1062, Hawaii Revised 
Statutes, that the principal is personally known to me, that the principal signed or 
acknowledged this power of attorney in my presence, that the principal appears to be of 
sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue influence, that I am not the person 
appointed as agent by this document, and that I am not a health-care provider, nor an 
employee of a health-care provider or facility. I am not related to the principal by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, and to the best of my knowledge, I am not entitled to any part of the 
estate of the principal upon the death of the principal under a will now existing or by 
operation of law. 
________________________  
(date) (signature of witness) 
________________________  
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(address) (printed name of witness) 
________________________  
(city) (state) 
Witness 
I declare under penalty of false swearing pursuant to section 710-1062, Hawaii Revised 
Statutes, that the principal is personally known to me, that the principal signed or 
acknowledged this power of attorney in my presence, that the principal appears to be of 
sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue influence, that I am not the person 
appointed as agent by this document, and that I am not a health-care provider, nor an 
employee of a health-care provider or facility. 
________________________  
(date) (signature of witness) 
________________________  
(address) (printed name of witness) 
________________________  
(city) (state) 
 
ALTERNATIVE NO. 2 
State of Hawaii 
County of ________________ 
 On this _____________ day of _______________, in the year _______, before me, 
__________________  (insert name of notary public) appeared _________________, 
personally known to me (or proved to me on  the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the 
person whose name is subscribed to this instrument, and  acknowledged that he or she 
executed it. 
 Notary Seal 
 ____________________________ 
 (Signature of Notary Public)” 
 [L 1999, c 169, pt of §1; am L 2004, c 161, §36] 
Revision Note 
 Paragraphs re-designated pursuant to §23G-15(1). 
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APPENDIX F 
State of Vermont Statute 
 
 Title 18: Health 
 Chapter 113: Patient Choice at End of Life   
 § 5281. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) “Bona fide physician-patient relationship” means a treating or consulting 
relationship in the course of which a physician has completed a full assessment of the 
patient’s medical history and current medical condition, including a personal physical 
examination. 
(2) “Capable” means that a patient has the ability to make and communicate health 
care decisions to a physician, including communication through persons familiar with the 
patient’s manner of communicating if those persons are available. 
(3) “Health care facility” shall have the same meaning as in section 9432 of this 
title. 
(4) “Health care provider” means a person, partnership, corporation, facility, or 
institution, licensed or certified or authorized by law to administer health care or dispense 
medication in the ordinary course of business or practice of a profession. 
(5) “Impaired judgment” means that a person does not sufficiently understand or 
appreciate the relevant facts necessary to make an informed decision. 
(6) “Interested person” means: 
(A) the patient’s physician; 
(B) a person who knows that he or she is a relative of the patient by blood, civil 
marriage, civil union, or adoption; 
(C) a person who knows that he or she would be entitled upon the patient’s 
death to any portion of the estate or assets of the patient under any will or trust, by 
operation of law, or by contract; or 
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(D) an owner, operator, or employee of a health care facility, nursing home, or 
residential care facility where the patient is receiving medical treatment or is a resident. 
(7) “Palliative care” shall have the same definition as in section 2 of this title. 
(8) “Patient” means a person who is 18 years of age or older, a resident of 
Vermont, and under the care of a physician. 
(9) “Physician” means an individual licensed to practice medicine under 26 V.S.A. 
Chapter 23 or 33. 
(10) “Terminal condition” means an incurable and irreversible disease which 
would, within reasonable medical judgment, result in death within six months. (Added 
2013, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 20, 2013.) 
 § 5282. Right to information 
The rights of a patient under section 1871 of this title to be informed of all available 
options related to terminal care and under 12 V.S.A. § 1909(d) to receive answers to any 
specific question about the foreseeable risks and benefits of medication without the 
physician’s withholding any requested information exist regardless of the purpose of the 
inquiry or the nature of the information. A physician who engages in discussions with a 
patient related to such risks and benefits in the circumstances described in this chapter 
shall not be construed to be assisting in or contributing to a patient's independent decision 
to self-administer a lethal dose of medication, and such discussions shall not be used to 
establish civil or criminal liability or professional disciplinary action. (Added 2013, No. 
39, § 1, eff. May 20, 2013.) 
 § 5283. Requirements for prescription and documentation; immunity 
(a) A physician shall not be subject to any civil or criminal liability or professional 
disciplinary action if the physician prescribes to a patient with a terminal condition 
medication to be self-administered for the purpose of hastening the patient’s death and 
the physician affirms by documenting in the patient’s medical record that all of the 
following occurred: 
(1) The patient made an oral request to the physician in the physician’s physical 
presence for medication to be self-administered for the purpose of hastening the patient’s 
death. 
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(2) No fewer than 15 days after the first oral request, the patient made a second oral 
request to the physician in the physician’s physical presence for medication to be self-
administered for the purpose of hastening the patient’s death. 
(3) At the time of the second oral request, the physician offered the patient an 
opportunity to rescind the request. 
(4) The patient made a written request for medication to be self-administered for 
the purpose of hastening the patient’s death that was signed by the patient in the presence 
of two or more witnesses who were not interested persons, who were at least 18 years of 
age, and who signed and affirmed that the patient appeared to understand the nature of 
the document and to be free from duress or undue influence at the time the request was 
signed. 
(5) The physician determined that the patient: 
(A) was suffering a terminal condition, based on the physician’s physical 
examination of the patient and review of the patient's relevant medical records; 
(B) was capable; 
(C) was making an informed decision; 
(D) had made a voluntary request for medication to hasten his or her death; and 
(E) was a Vermont resident. 
(6) The physician informed the patient in person, both verbally and in writing, of 
all the following: 
(A) the patient’s medical diagnosis; 
(B) the patient’s prognosis, including an acknowledgement that the physician's 
prediction of the patient’s life expectancy was an estimate based on the physician’s best 
medical judgment and was not a guarantee of the actual time remaining in the patient’s 
life, and that the patient could live longer than the time predicted; 
(C) the range of treatment options appropriate for the patient and the patient’s 
diagnosis; 
(D) if the patient was not enrolled in hospice care, all feasible end-of-life 
services, including palliative care, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control; 
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(E) the range of possible results, including potential risks associated with taking 
the medication to be prescribed; and 
(F) the probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed. 
(7) The physician referred the patient to a second physician for medical 
confirmation of the diagnosis, prognosis, and a determination that the patient was 
capable, was acting voluntarily, and had made an informed decision. 
(8) The physician either verified that the patient did not have impaired judgment or 
referred the patient for an evaluation by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social 
worker licensed in Vermont for confirmation that the patient was capable and did not 
have impaired judgment. 
(9) If applicable, the physician consulted with the patient’s primary care physician 
with the patient’s consent. 
(10) The physician informed the patient that the patient may rescind the request at 
any time and in any manner and offered the patient an opportunity to rescind after the 
patient's second oral request. 
(11) The physician ensured that all required steps were carried out in accordance 
with this section and confirmed, immediately prior to writing the prescription for 
medication, that the patient was making an informed decision. 
(12) The physician wrote the prescription no fewer than 48 hours after the last to 
occur of the following events: 
(A) the patient’s written request for medication to hasten his or her death; 
(B) the patient’s second oral request; or 
(C) the physician’s offering the patient an opportunity to rescind the request. 
(13) The physician either: 
(A) dispensed the medication directly, provided that at the time the physician 
dispensed the medication, he or she was licensed to dispense medication in Vermont, had 
a current Drug Enforcement Administration certificate, and complied with any applicable 
administrative rules; or 
(B) with the patient’s written consent: 
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(i) contacted a pharmacist and informed the pharmacist of the prescription; 
and 
(ii) delivered the written prescription personally or by mail or facsimile to the 
pharmacist, who dispensed the medication to the patient, the physician, or an expressly 
identified agent of the patient. 
(14) The physician recorded and filed the following in the patient’s medical record: 
(A) the date, time, and wording of all oral requests of the patient for medication 
to hasten his or her death; 
(B) all written requests by the patient for medication to hasten his or her death; 
(C) the physician’s diagnosis, prognosis, and basis for the determination that the 
patient was capable, was acting voluntarily, and had made an informed decision; 
(D) the second physician’s diagnosis, prognosis, and verification that the patient 
was capable, was acting voluntarily, and had made an informed decision; 
(E) the physician’s attestation that the patient was enrolled in hospice care at the 
time of the patient’s oral and written requests for medication to hasten his or her death or 
that the physician informed the patient of all feasible end-of-life services; 
(F) the physician’s verification that the patient either did not have impaired 
judgment or that the physician referred the patient for an evaluation and the person 
conducting the evaluation has determined that the patient did not have impaired 
judgment; 
(G) a report of the outcome and determinations made during any evaluation 
which the patient may have received; 
(H) the date, time, and wording of the physician’s offer to the patient to rescind 
the request for medication at the time of the patient’s second oral request; and 
(I) a note by the physician indicating that all requirements under this section 
were satisfied and describing all of the steps taken to carry out the request, including a 
notation of the medication  prescribed. 
(15) After writing the prescription, the physician promptly filed a report with the 
Department of Health documenting completion of all of the requirements under this 
section. 
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(b) This section shall not be construed to limit civil or criminal liability for gross 
negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct. (Added 2013, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 
20, 2013.) 
 § 5284. No duty to aid 
A patient with a terminal condition who self-administers a lethal dose of medication shall 
not be considered to be a person exposed to grave physical harm under 12 V.S.A. § 519, 
and no person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability solely for being present when a 
patient with a terminal condition self-administers a lethal dose of medication or for not 
acting to prevent the patient from self-administering a lethal dose of medication. (Added 
2013, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 20, 2013.) 
 § 5285. Limitations on actions 
(a) A physician, nurse, pharmacist, or other person shall not be under any duty, by law 
or contract, to participate in the provision of a lethal dose of medication to a patient. 
(b) A health care facility or health care provider shall not subject a physician, nurse, 
pharmacist, or other person to discipline, suspension, loss of license, loss of privileges, 
or other penalty for actions taken in good faith reliance on the provisions of this 
chapter or refusals to act under this chapter. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in this section and sections 5283, 5289, and 5290 of 
this title, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit liability for civil damages 
resulting from negligent conduct or intentional misconduct by any person. (Added 
2013, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 20, 2013.) 
§ 5286. Health care facility exception 
A health care facility may prohibit a physician from writing a prescription for a dose of 
medication intended to be lethal for a patient who is a resident in its facility and intends 
to use the medication on the facility’s premises, provided the facility has notified the 
physician in writing of its policy with regard to the prescriptions. Notwithstanding 
subsection 5285(b) of this title, any physician who violates a policy established by a 
health care facility under this section may be subject to sanctions otherwise allowable 
under law or contract. (Added 2013, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 20, 2013.) 
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§ 5287. Insurance policies; prohibitions 
(a) A person and his or her beneficiaries shall not be denied benefits under a life 
insurance policy, as defined in 8 V.S.A. § 3301, for actions taken in accordance with this 
chapter. 
(b) The sale, procurement, or issue of any medical malpractice insurance policy or the 
rate charged for the policy shall not be conditioned upon or affected by whether the 
physician is willing or unwilling to participate in the provisions of this chapter. (Added 
2013, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 20, 2013.) 
 § 5288. No effect on palliative sedation 
This chapter shall not limit or otherwise affect the provision, administration, or receipt of 
palliative sedation consistent with accepted medical standards. (Added 2013, No. 39, § 1, 
eff. May 20, 2013.) 
 § 5289, 5290. Repealed. 2015, No. 27, § 1, effective May 20, 2015. 
 § 5291. Safe disposal of unused medications 
The Department of Health shall adopt rules providing for the safe disposal of unused 
medications prescribed under this chapter. (Added 2013, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 20, 2013.) 
 § 5292. Statutory construction 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize a physician or any other person to 
end a patient’s life by lethal injection, mercy killing, or active euthanasia. Action taken in 
accordance with this chapter shall not be construed for any purpose to constitute suicide, 
assisted suicide, mercy killing, or homicide under the law. This section shall not be 
construed to conflict with section 1553 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub.L. No. 111-148, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub.L. No. 111-152. (Added 2013, No. 39, § 1, eff. May 20, 2013.) 
  § 5293. Reporting requirements 
(a) The Department of Health shall adopt rules pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 to 
facilitate the collection of information regarding compliance with this chapter, including 
identifying patients who filled prescriptions written pursuant to this chapter. Except as 
otherwise required by law, information regarding compliance shall be confidential and 
shall be exempt from public inspection and copying under the Public Records Act. 
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(b) Beginning in 2018, the Department of Health shall generate and make available to the 
public a biennial statistical report of the information collected pursuant to subsection (a) 
 of this section, as long as releasing  information complies with the federal 
Health  Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191. (Added 
 2015,  No. 27, § 2, eff. May 20, 2015.) 
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Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
 
¶1 The State of Montana appeals from the Order of the First Judicial District Court  
granting summary judgment in favor of Robert Baxter, Stephen Speckart, M.D., C. Paul  
Loehnen, M.D., Lar Autio, M.D., George Risi, Jr., M.D., and Compassion & Choices; and  
from the District Court’s decision that a competent, terminally ill patient has a right to die  
with dignity under Article II, Sections 4 and 10 of the Montana Constitution, which 
 includes protection of the patient’s physician from prosecution under the homicide statutes.  
We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
 
 ¶2  We rephrase the following issues on appeal: 
 
¶3 I. Whether the District Court erred in its decision that competent, terminally ill patients have 
 a constitutional right to die with dignity, which protects physicians who provide aid in dying  
from prosecution under the homicide statutes. 
 
 ¶4   II.  Whether Mr. Baxter is entitled to attorney fees. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶5 This appeal originated with Robert Baxter, a retired truck driver from Billings who was 
terminally ill with lymphocytic leukemia with diffuse lymphadenopathy. At the time of the 
District Court’s decision, Mr. Baxter was being treated with multiple rounds of chemotherapy, 
which typically become less effective over time. As a result of the disease and treatment, Mr. 
Baxter suffered from a variety of debilitating symptoms, including infections, chronic fatigue 
and weakness, anemia, night sweats, nausea, massively swollen glands, significant ongoing 
digestive problems and generalized pain and   
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discomfort. The symptoms were expected to increase in frequency and intensity as the 
chemotherapy lost its effectiveness. There was no cure for Mr. Baxter’s disease and no prospect 
of recovery. Mr. Baxter wanted the option of ingesting a lethal dose of medication prescribed by 
his physician and self-administered at the time of Mr. Baxter’s own choosing. 
 
¶6 Mr. Baxter, four physicians, and Compassion & Choices, brought an action in District Court 
challenging the constitutionality of the application of Montana homicide statutes to physicians 
who provide aid in dying to mentally competent, terminally ill patients. The complaint alleged 
that patients have a right to die with dignity under the Montana Constitution Article II, Sections 
4 and 10, which address individual dignity and privacy. 
  
¶7 In December 2008, the District Court issued its Order and Decision, holding that the  
Montana constitutional rights of individual privacy and human dignity, together, encompass 
 the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to die with dignity. The District Court held that 
 a patient may use the assistance of his physician to obtain a prescription for a lethal dose 
 of medication. The patient would then decide whether to self-administer the dose and cause 
 his own death. The District Court further held that the patient’s right to die with dignity 
 includes protection of the patient’s physician from prosecution under the State’s  
homicide statutes. Lastly, the District Court awarded Mr. Baxter attorney fees. The State  
appeals. 
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 
¶8 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo using the same standards applied by 
the District Court under M. R. Civ. P. 56. Bud-Kal v. City of Kalispell, 2009 MT 93, ¶ 15, 350 
Mont. 25, 30, 204 P.3d 738, 743. Where there is a cross-motion for summary judgment, we 
review a district court’s decision to determine whether its conclusions were correct. Bud-Kal, ¶ 
15. We review an award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Buxbaum, 
2003 MT 97, ¶ 15, 315 Mont. 210, 216, 69 P.3d 663, 667. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
¶9 The parties in this appeal focus their arguments on the question of whether a right to die with 
dignity—including physician aid in dying—exists under the privacy and dignity provisions of  
the Montana Constitution. The District Court held that a competent, terminally ill patient has a 
right to die with dignity under Article II, Sections 4 and 10 of the Montana Constitution.  
Sections 4 and 10 address individual dignity and the right to privacy, respectively. The District 
Court further held that the right to die with dignity includes protecting the patient’s physician 
from prosecution under Montana homicide statutes. The District Court concluded that Montana 
homicide laws are unconstitutional as applied to a physician who aids a competent, terminally ill 
patient in dying. 
 
¶10 While we recognize the extensive briefing by the parties and amici on the constitutional 
issues, this Court is guided by the judicial principle that we should decline to rule on the 
constitutionality of a legislative act if we are able to decide the case without 
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reaching constitutional questions. State v. Adkins, 2009 MT 71, ¶ 12, 349 Mont. 444, 447, 204 
P.3d 1, 5; Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, ¶ 62, 338 Mont. 259, 279, 165 
P.3d 1079, 1093. Since both parties have recognized the possibility of a consent defense to a 
homicide charge under § 45-2-211(1), MCA, we focus our analysis on whether the issues 
presented can be resolved at the statutory, rather than the constitutional, level. 
 
¶11 We start with the proposition that suicide is not a crime under Montana law. In the aid in 
dying situation, the only person who might conceivably be prosecuted for criminal behavior is 
the physician who prescribes a lethal dose of medication. In that the claims of the plaintiff 
physicians are premised in significant part upon concerns that they could be prosecuted for 
extending aid in dying, we deem it appropriate to analyze their possible culpability for homicide 
by examining whether the consent of the patient to his physician’s aid in dying could constitute a 
statutory defense to a homicide charge against the physician. 
 
¶12 The consent statute would shield physicians from homicide liability if, with the patients’ 
consent, the physicians provide aid in dying to terminally ill, mentally competent adult patients. 
We first determine whether a statutory consent defense applies to physicians who provide aid in 
dying and, second, whether patient consent is rendered ineffective by § 45-2-211(2)(d), MCA, 
because permitting the conduct or resulting harm “is against public policy.” 
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 ¶13  Section 45-5-102(1), MCA, states that a person commits the offense of deliberate 
 
homicide if “the person purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human 
 
being . . . .”  Section 45-2-211(1), MCA, establishes consent as a defense, stating that the 
 
“consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof 
 
is a defense.”  Thus, if the State prosecutes a physician for providing aid in dying to a 
 
 mentally competent, terminally ill adult patient who consented to such aid, the physician 
  
 may be shielded from liability pursuant to the consent statute.  This consent defense,  
 
 however, is only effective if none of the statutory exceptions to consent applies.  Section 
 
45-2-211(2), MCA, codifies the four exceptions: 
 
Consent is ineffective if: (a) it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to 
authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; (b) it is given by a person who by 
reason of youth, mental disease or defect, or intoxication is unable to make a reasonable 
judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense; 
(c) it is induced by force, duress, or deception; or (d) it is against public policy to permit 
the conduct or the resulting harm, even though consented to. 
 
The first three statutory circumstances rendering consent ineffective require case-by-case 
 
factual determinations.  We therefore confine our analysis to the last exception and 
 
determine whether, under Montana law, consent to physician aid in dying is against 
 
public policy. For the reasons stated below, we find no indication in Montana law that 
 
physician aid in dying provided to terminally ill, mentally competent adult patients is 
 
against public policy. 
 
 ¶14  Section 45-2-211(2)(d), MCA, renders consent ineffective if “it is against public 
 
  policy to permit the conduct or the resulting harm, even though consented to.”  We 
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addressed the applicability of this provision in State v. Mackrill, 2008 MT 297, 345 Mont. 469, 
191 P.3d 451. This Court held that the consent of a victim is not a defense to the charge of 
aggravated assault under § 45-5-202(1), MCA. Mackrill, ¶ 33. The Mackrill decision, while not 
limiting the exception’s reach, applied the “against public policy” exception to situations in 
which violent, public altercations breach public peace and endanger others in the vicinity. 
Physician aid in dying, as analyzed below, does not fall within the scope of what this Court has 
thus far identified as “against public policy.” ¶15 The Mackrill case arose from a particularly 
violent altercation between Jason Mackrill and Robert Gluesing outside a Livingston bar. 
Mackrill, who had been drinking heavily, spent the better part of the evening disrupting other 
bar-goers, including Gluesing. When a bartender refused to serve Mackrill, Gluesing offered 
Mackrill a few dollars and encouraged him to go elsewhere. Mackrill became obstinate and 
refused to leave. When the bartender picked up the phone to call the police, Gluesing escorted 
Mackrill out of the bar. Once outside, Mackrill began punching Gluesing, including a “very  
solid shot” that caused Gluesing’s feet to come off the ground and the back of his head to hit the 
pavement. A witness called 9-1-1 and paramedics arrived on the scene. They found Gluesing 
unconscious and bleeding in the street. He was transported to the hospital and treated for head 
injuries, including a skull fracture. 
 
 ¶16  The State charged Mackrill with one count of aggravated assault, a felony under  
  
 § 45-5-202, MCA. He pleaded not guilty and filed a Notice of Affirmative Defenses, in  
 
 which he stated he would argue consent as a defense at trial. The jury found Mackrill  
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guilty. He then filed a post-trial motion claiming the State failed to introduce evidence upon 
which the jury could conclude Gluesing did not consent to the fight. After a hearing on the 
matter, the district court denied the motion. Mackrill appealed. This Court concluded that 
consent is not an effective defense against an assault charge under § 45-5-202(1), MCA. 
Mackrill, ¶ 33. 
 
¶17 The Mackrill decision is the only Montana case addressing the public policy exception to 
consent. It demonstrates one set of circumstances in which consent as a defense is rendered 
ineffective because permitting the conduct or resulting harm is “against public policy.” This 
“against public policy” exception to consent applies to conduct that disrupts public peace and 
physically endangers others. Clearly, under Mackrill, unruly, physical and public aggression 
between individuals falls within the parameters of the “against public policy” exception. The 
men were intoxicated, brawling in a public space, and endangering others in the process. 
 
¶18 A survey of courts that have considered this issue yields unanimous understanding that 
consent is rendered ineffective as “against public policy” in assault cases characterized by 
aggressive and combative acts that breach public peace and physically endanger others. 
 
¶19 The State of Washington is home to an unusual volume of these “public policy” exception 
cases. Washington courts have consistently held that the “public policy” exception applies only 
to brutish, irrational violence that endangers others. In State v. Dejarlais, the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that consent is not a defense to 
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violations of a domestic-violence protection order. 136 Wn. 2d 939, 942, 969 P.2d 90, 91 (Wash. 
1998). In State v. Hiott, the court determined that consent is not a defense to a game in which 
two people agreed to shoot BB guns at each other because it was a breach of the public peace. 97 
Wn. App. 825, 828, 987 P.2d 135, 137 (Wash. App. Div. 2 1999). In State v. Weber, the court 
held consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault between two incarcerated 
persons. 137 Wn. App. 852, 860, 155 P.3d 947, 951 (Wash. App. Div. 3 2007). The court noted 
there “is nothing redeeming or valuable in permitting fighting and every reason to dissuade it.” 
Weber, 155 P.3d at 951. 
 
¶20 In State v. Fransua, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that one person’s taunting 
invitation to “go ahead” and shoot him did not establish a valid consent defense for another 
person who took him up on the offer. 85 N.M. 173, 174, 510 P.2d 106, 107 (N.M. App. 1973). 
 In the Superior Court of New Jersey, a defendant claimed he was not guilty of assault and 
battery because he and his wife agreed that if she consumed alcohol he would physically assault 
her as punishment. State v. Brown, 143 N.J. Super. 571, 580, 364 A.2d 27, 32 (N.J. Super. L. 
Div. 1976). He argued consent as a defense after the state charged him with assault and battery. 
Brown, 364 A.2d at 28. The court held that failing to punish Brown “would seriously threaten  
the dignity, peace, health and security of our society.” Brown, 364 A.2d at 32. 
 
¶21 The above acts—including the Mackrill brawl—illustrate that sheer physical aggression that 
breaches public peace and endangers others is against public policy. In contrast, the act of a 
physician handing medicine to a terminally ill patient, and the 
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patient’s subsequent peaceful and private act of taking the medicine, are not comparable to the 
violent, peace-breaching conduct that this Court and others have found to violate public policy. 
 
¶22 The above cases address assaults in which the defendant alone performs a direct and violent 
act that causes harm. The bar brawler, prison fighter, BB gun-shooter, and domestic violence 
aggressor all committed violent acts that directly caused harm and breached the public peace. It 
is clear from these cases that courts deem consent ineffective when defendants directly commit 
blatantly aggressive, peace-breaching acts against another party. 
 
¶23 In contrast, a physician who aids a terminally ill patient in dying is not directly involved in 
the final decision or the final act. He or she only provides a means by which a terminally ill 
patient himself can give effect to his life-ending decision, or not, as the case may be. Each stage 
of the physician-patient interaction is private, civil, and compassionate. The physician and 
terminally ill patient work together to create a means by which the patient can be in control of 
 his own mortality. The patient’s subsequent private decision whether to take the medicine does 
not breach public peace or endanger others. 
 
¶24 Although the “against public policy” exception of § 45-2-211(2)(d), MCA, is not limited to 
violent breaches of the peace as discussed in the above cases, we see nothing in the case law 
facts or analysis suggesting that a patient’s private interaction with his 
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physician, and subsequent decision regarding whether to take medication provided by a 
physician, violate public policy. We thus turn to a review of Montana statutory law. 
 
¶25 We similarly find no indication in Montana statutes that physician aid in dying is against 
public policy. The Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (Terminally Ill Act) and the 
homicide statute’s narrow applicability to “another” human being, do not indicate that physician 
aid in dying is against public policy. 
 
¶26 Under § 45-5-102, MCA, a “person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if: 
 
(a) the person purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being . . . .” In 
physician aid in dying, the physician makes medication available for a terminally ill patient who 
requests it, and the patient would then choose whether to cause his own death by self-
administering the medicine. The terminally ill patient’s act of ingesting the medicine is not 
criminal. There is no language in the homicide statute indicating that killing “oneself,” as 
opposed to “another,” is a punishable offense, and there is no separate statute in Montana 
criminalizing suicide. There is thus no indication in the homicide statutes that physician aid in 
dying—in which a terminally ill patient elects and consents to taking possession of a quantity of 
medicine from a physician that, if he chooses to take it, will cause his own death—is against 
public policy. 
 
¶27 There is similarly no indication in the Terminally Ill Act that physician aid in dying is 
against public policy. The Terminally Ill Act, by its very subject matter, is an apt statutory 
starting point for understanding the legislature’s intent to give terminally ill patients—like Mr. 
Baxter—end-of-life autonomy, respect and assurance that their 
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life-ending wishes will be followed. The Terminally Ill Act expressly immunizes physicians 
from criminal and civil liability for following a patient’s directions to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment. Section 50-9-204, MCA. Indeed, the legislature has criminalized the  
failure to act according to the patient’s wishes. Section 50-9-206, MCA. Other parts of the 
Terminally Ill Act also resonate with this respect for the patient’s end-of-life preferences.  
Section 50-9-205, MCA, explicitly prohibits, “for any purpose,” calling the patient’s death a 
“suicide or homicide,” and § 50-9-501, MCA, charges the Montana Attorney General with 
creating a “declaration registry” and waging a statewide campaign to educate Montanans about 
end-of-life decisionmaking. The statute even establishes a specialized state fund account 
specifically for the registry and education program. Section 50-9-502(b), MCA. 
 
¶28 The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act very clearly provides that terminally ill patients are 
entitled to autonomous, end-of-life decisions, even if enforcement of those decisions involves 
direct acts by a physician. Furthermore, there is no indication in the Rights of the Terminally Ill 
Act that an additional means of giving effect to a patient’s decision—in which the patient, 
without any direct assistance, chooses the time of his own death—is against public policy. 
 
¶29 The Montana Legislature codified several means by which a patient’s life-ending request  
can be fulfilled. The Terminally Ill Act authorizes an individual “of sound mind and 18 years of 
age or older to execute at any time a declaration governing the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment.” Section 50-9-103, MCA. The 
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Terminally Ill  Act defines “life-sustaining  treatment”  as  any  medical  procedure  or 
 
intervention that “serves only to prolong the dying process.”  Section 50-9-102(9), MCA. 
 
The declaration is operative when it is communicated to the physician or registered nurse 
 
and the declarant is determined to be in a terminal condition and no longer able to 
 
vocalize his end-of-life wishes.  Section 50-9-105, MCA. 
 
 ¶30 The Terminally Ill Act, in short, confers on terminally ill patients a right to have 
 
their end-of-life wishes followed, even if it requires direct participation by a physician 
 
 through withdrawing or withholding treatment.  Section 50-9-103, MCA.  
 
Nothing in the statute indicates it is against public policy to honor those same wishes  
 
when the patient is conscious and able to vocalize and carry out the decision himself with  
 
self-administered medicine and no immediate or direct physician assistance. 
 
 ¶31 The Terminally Ill Act contains declaration forms a patient may use to legally 
 
 ensure his end-of-life instructions will be followed. The forms shed critical light on the 
 
end-of-life roles of terminally ill Montanans and their physicians, as envisioned and 
 
codified by the legislature.  The first declaration states: 
 
If I should have an incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administration of 
life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of my attending physician or attending 
advanced practice registered nurse, cause my death within a relatively short time and I 
am no longer able to make decisions regarding my medical treatment, I direct my 
attending physician or attending advanced practice registered nurse, pursuant to the 
Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, to withhold or withdraw treatment that only 
prolongs the process of dying and is not necessary to my comfort or to alleviate pain. 
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Section 50-9-103(2), MCA. The declaration language of § 50-9-103, MCA, not only highlights 
the legislature’s intent to provide terminally ill patients with various means to express (and have 
followed) their autonomous end-of-life preferences, but also authorizes physician involvement  
in both the terminal diagnosis and the act of withdrawing or withholding treatment. 
 
¶32 The legislature, in creating this legally-enforceable declaration, also immunized physicians 
and medical professionals who act in accordance with the patient’s wishes. The statute shields 
physicians from liability for following a patient’s instructions to stop life-sustaining treatment, 
 or refrain from treating him altogether. Section 50-9-204, MCA. The Dissent states that the 
Terminally Ill Act only allows the “taking away of, or refraining from giving” life-sustaining 
medical treatment. The Dissent’s definition of “withdraw” confirms that this “taking away” is, 
itself, a direct act by the physician. “Withdrawal” is “the act of taking back or away” something 
that was granted. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 2627 
(Philip Babcock Gove ed., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1971) (emphasis added). The “giving” is an  
act, as is the “taking away.” The Terminally Ill Act authorizes physicians to commit a direct act 
of withdrawing medical care, which hastens death. In contrast, the physician’s involvement in 
aid in dying consists solely of making the instrument of the “act” available to the terminally ill 
patient. The patient himself then chooses whether to commit the act that will bring about his 
 own death. The legislature codified public policy by expressly immunizing physicians who 
commit a direct act that gives effect to the life-ending wishes 
of a terminally ill patient.  Section 50-9-204, MCA.  There is no suggestion in the Act 
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that a lesser physician involvement (making available a lethal dose of medicine)—which 
 
is then vetted  by  a  terminally  ill  patient’s  intervening choice  and  subsequent  self- 
 
administered ingestion—is against public policy. 
 
¶33 The  Terminally  Ill Act explicitly shields  physicians from  criminal, civil or 
 
professional liability for the act of withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment 
 
from a terminally ill patient who requests it.  Section 50-9-204, MCA.1  The legislature 
 
devoted an entire section to codifying this immunity, ensuring that physicians and nurses 
 
will not be held liable for acting consistent with a terminally ill patient’s decision to die. 
 
Section 50-9-204, MCA, provides an extensive list of medical professionals and others 
 
exempt from prosecution: 
 
(a) a physician or advanced practice registered nurse who causes the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a qualified 
patient;  
(b) a person who participates in the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment under the direction or with the authorization of the 
physician or advanced practice registered nurse; (c) emergency medical 
services personnel who cause or participate in the withholding or withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment under the direction of or with the authorization of 
a physician or advanced practice registered nurse or who on receipt of reliable 
documentation follow a living will protocol . . . . 
 
Section 50-9-204, MCA (emphasis added).  The section also immunizes health care 
 
facilities, health care providers, and the patient’s designee.  Section 50-9-204(e), MCA.  
 
 
1 The Dissent has erred in its statement that the operative words in the Terminally Ill Act are 
those “permitting a patient” to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. Dissent, ¶ 107. 
The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act was created to address the situation in which patients  
cannot act on their own behalf and therefore must authorize others to act for them. The only 
individuals who act in this statute are non-patients—particularly, medical professionals—who 
follow the directions of a terminally ill patient and affirmatively withdraw or withhold treatment. 
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The Terminally Ill Act’s second enactment expands this immunity to include emergency medical 
service personnel. Section 50-9-204(c), MCA. The statute explicitly states that the above 
individuals are “not subject to civil or criminal liability or guilty of unprofessional conduct.” 
Section 50-9-204(1), MCA. This encompassing immunity for medical professionals reinforces 
the terminally ill patient’s right to enforce his decision without fear that those who give effect to 
his wishes will be prosecuted. 
 
¶34 Further, the legislature criminalized the failure to follow a patient’s end-of-life instructions. 
A physician “who willfully fails to record the determination of terminal condition or the terms  
of a declaration” is punishable by a maximum $500 fine, a maximum one year in jail, or both. 
Section 50-9-206(2), MCA. A person who “purposely conceals, cancels, defaces, or obliterates 
the declaration of another without the declarant’s consent” is punishable by the same. Section 
50-9-206(3), MCA. The statute’s message is clear: failure to give effect to a terminally ill 
patient’s life-ending declaration is a crime. 
 
¶35 Other parts of the Terminally Ill Act similarly reflect legislative respect for the patient’s end-
of-life autonomy and the physician’s legal obligation to comply with the patient’s declaration. 
Section 50-9-205, MCA, prohibits, for any purpose, treating the death as either “suicide or 
homicide.” The legislature, by prohibiting anyone from deeming the act a homicide or suicide, 
ensured that insurance companies cannot punish a terminally ill patient and his family for the 
patient’s choice to die. 
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¶36 The provision also lists behaviors not supported by the statute. Notably, physician aid in 
dying is not listed. Section 50-9-205(7), MCA, reads: “This chapter does not condone, authorize, 
or approve mercy killing or euthanasia.” Physician aid in dying is, by definition, neither of these. 
Euthanasia is the “intentional putting to death of a person with an incurable or painful disease 
intended as an act of mercy.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 678 (28th ed., Lippincott Williams 
& Wilkins 2006). The phrase “mercy killing” is the active term for euthanasia defined as “a 
mode of ending life in which the intent is to cause the patient’s death in a single act.” Stedman’s 
Medical Dictionary at 
 
678. Neither of these definitions is consent-based, and neither involves a patient’s  
679. autonomous decision to self-administer drugs that will cause his own death. 
 
¶37 The final part of the Terminally Ill Act orders the Montana Attorney General to “establish 
and maintain a health care declaration registry” in which declarations are stored and updated. 
Section 50-9-501, MCA. The provision also creates a health care declaration account in the state 
special revenue fund, which the Attorney General must use to “create and maintain the health 
care declaration registry” and to create an education and outreach program. Section 50-9-502(b), 
MCA. The program must pertain to “advance health care planning and end-of-life health care 
decision-making.” Section 50-9-505(1), MCA. The program must also “explain the need for 
readily available legal documents that express an individual’s health care wishes.” Section 50-9-
505(c), MCA. The registry requirement, outreach and education provisions, and state funding for 
both, indicate legislative intent to honor and promulgate the rights of terminally ill patients to 
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autonomously choose the direction of their end-of-life medical care. There is no indication in the 
statutes that another choice—physician aid in dying—is against this legislative ethos of honoring 
the end-of-life decisions of the terminally ill. 
 
¶38 There is no indication in the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act that physician aid in dying is 
against public policy. Indeed, the Act reflects legislative respect for the wishes of a patient  
facing incurable illness. The Act also indicates legislative regard and protection for a physician 
who honors his legal obligation to the patient. The Act immunizes a physician for following the 
patient’s declaration even if it requires the physician to directly unplug the patient’s ventilator or 
withhold medicine or medical treatment that is keeping the patient alive. Physician aid in dying, 
on the other hand, does not require such direct involvement by a physician. Rather, in physician 
aid in dying, the final death-causing act lies in the patient’s hands. In light of the long-standing, 
evolving and unequivocal recognition of the terminally ill patient’s right to self-determination at 
the end of life in Title 50, chapter 9, MCA, it would be incongruous to conclude that a 
physician’s indirect aid in dying is contrary to public policy. 
 
¶39 There are three central problems with the Dissent’s response. First, the Dissent applies § 45-
5-105, MCA—a statute that factually does not apply to Mr. Baxter’s appeal. This statute only 
applies if the suicide does not occur. Second, the Dissent massages the statute’s legislative 
history into makeshift legislation, which it then proffers as public policy. Such analysis directly 
violates this Court’s precedent regarding statutory interpretation. 
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¶40 The Dissent first cites § 45-5-105, MCA, stating that a person may be prosecuted for aiding 
or soliciting suicide only if the individual does not die. Dissent, ¶ 101. The statute’s plain 
meaning is clear. It is also inapplicable. The narrow scenario we have been asked to consider on 
appeal involves the situation in which a terminally ill patient affirmatively seeks a lethal dose of 
medicine and subsequently self-administers it, causing his own death. Section 45-5-105, MCA, 
unambiguously applies only when the suicide does not occur. 
 
¶41 Under this Court’s precedent, the inquiry stops there. We have repeatedly held that we will 
not interpret a statute beyond its plain language if the language is clear and unambiguous. Mont. 
Sports Shooting Ass’n v. State, 2008 MT 190, ¶ 11, 344 Mont. 1, 4, 185 P.3d 1003, 1006;  
State v. Letasky, 2007 MT 51, ¶ 11, 336 Mont. 178, 181, 152 P.3d 1288, 1290 (“We interpret a 
statute first by looking to the statute’s plain language, and if the language is clear and 
unambiguous, no further interpretation is required.”). Here, the legislature could not have 
provided clearer, more unambiguous language. If the person does not die, the statute is 
 triggered. If they do die, the statute is not triggered. The statute provides only one clear set of 
circumstances where a person may be prosecuted. There is simply nothing ambiguous about it. 
 
¶42 While conceding on the one hand that § 45-5-105, MCA, applies only when the suicide does 
not occur, the Dissent nonetheless unilaterally revises the statute, stating that “under Montana 
law, physicians who assist in a suicide are subject to criminal prosecution irrespective of  
whether the patient survives or dies.” Dissent, ¶ 102. This is 
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incorrect under the law. Not only does the language of the statute clearly and only address the 
scenario in which the “suicide does not occur” but the Commission comments themselves do not 
even provide enlightenment on the legislature’s intent regarding the language of the aid or 
soliciting suicide statute itself. Instead, the Commission comments speak of a different statute 
(and crime) altogether: Homicide. In fact, the comments analyze language, such as “agent of 
death,” that does not even appear in the aid or soliciting statute or anywhere else in the Montana 
code. The Dissent not only disregards this Court’s precedent regarding statutory interpretation, 
but it also grants the uncodified comments of eleven unelected individuals the weight of law. 
 
¶43 The Dissent argues that consent to physician aid in dying is against public policy simply 
because the conduct is defined as an offense under the criminal statutes. That reasoning is 
circular. The Dissent cannot obviate a separate consent statute by simply saying that all statutory 
crimes are by definition against public policy, therefore consent to that conduct is also against 
public policy. If that were the case, the legislature would not have felt compelled to enact a 
separate consent statute. By enacting this separate consent statute, the legislature obviously 
envisioned situations in which it is not against public policy for a victim to consent to conduct 
that would otherwise constitute an offense under the criminal statutes. 
 
¶44 Even if this Court were to extend consideration to § 45-5-105, MCA, as a generalized 
reflection of the legislature’s views on third party involvement in suicides, there remains no 
indication that the statute was ever intended to apply to the very narrow 
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set of circumstances in which a terminally ill patient himself seeks out a physician and asks the 
physician to provide him the means to end his own life. As the Dissent states, the original 
enactment addressed situations of a third party “encouraging” a suicide. Dissent, ¶ 99. The 
present version reflects the same focus in the “soliciting” language. The statute’s plain language 
addresses the situation in which a third party unilaterally solicits or aids another person. In 
physician aid in dying, the solicitation comes from the patient himself, not a third party 
physician. 
 
¶45 There is no indication that the 1973 Montana legislators contemplated the statute would 
apply to this specific situation in which a terminally ill patient seeks a means by which he can 
end his own incurable suffering. In fact, it was not until twelve years later in 1985, that the 
legislature enacted the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, which squarely addresses the modern 
complexities of physician- and technology-dependent end-of-life care provided to terminally ill 
Montanans. Since then, the legislature—as illustrated in the Terminally Ill Act analysis above—
has carefully cultivated a statutory scheme that gives terminally ill Montanans the right to 
autonomously choose what happens to them at the end of painful terminal illness. 
 
¶46 Finally, we determine whether the District Court erred in awarding Mr. Baxter attorney fees. 
Following entry of the District Court’s judgment on the constitutional claims, Mr. Baxter moved 
to amend under M. R. Civ. P. 59(g) to include an award of attorney fees as supplemental relief 
under § 27-8-313, MCA, and the private attorney general doctrine. The District Court awarded 
attorney fees to Mr. Baxter under the 
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private attorney general doctrine. We review a grant or denial of attorney fees for abuse of 
discretion. Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Buxbaum, 2003 MT 97, ¶ 15, 315 Mont. 210, 216, 69 P.3d 663, 
667. 
 
¶47 The private attorney general doctrine applies when the government fails to properly enforce 
interests which are significant to its citizens. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch.  
Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Commissioners, 1999 MT 263, ¶ 64, 296 Mont. 402, 421, 989 
P.2d 800, 811. The private attorney general doctrine, however, applies only when constitutional 
interests are vindicated. Am. Cancer Soc’y v. State, 2004 MT 376, ¶ 21, 325 Mont. 70, 78, 103 
P.3d 1085, 1091. Our holding today is statute-based. Therefore, without the vindication of 
constitutional interests, an award of fees under the private attorney general doctrine is not 
warranted. 
 
¶48 Although attorney fees may be appropriate “further relief” under § 27-8-313, MCA, “such 
fees are only appropriate if equitable considerations support the award.” United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2009 MT 269, ¶ 38, 352 Mont. 105, 118, 214 P.3d 1260, 1271. 
As in United National, the equitable considerations here do not support an award of attorney 
fees. Mr. Baxter is accompanied by other plaintiffs, including four physicians and Compassion 
 & Choices, a national nonprofit organization. The relief herein granted to the Plaintiffs is not 
incomplete or inequitable without the Montana taxpayers having to pay the attorney fees. 
 
¶49 In conclusion, we find nothing in Montana Supreme Court precedent or Montana statutes 
indicating that physician aid in dying is against public policy. The “against 
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public policy” exception to consent has been interpreted by this Court as applicable to violent 
breaches of the public peace. Physician aid in dying does not satisfy that definition. We also find 
nothing in the plain language of Montana statutes indicating that physician aid in dying is  
against public policy. In physician aid in dying, the patient— not the physician—commits the 
final death-causing act by self-administering a lethal dose of medicine. 
 
¶50 Furthermore, the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act indicates legislative respect for a 
patient’s autonomous right to decide if and how he will receive medical treatment at the end of 
his life. The Terminally Ill Act explicitly shields physicians from liability for acting in 
accordance with a patient’s end-of-life wishes, even if the physician must actively pull the plug 
on a patient’s ventilator or withhold treatment that will keep him alive. There is no statutory 
indication that lesser end-of-life physician involvement, in which the patient himself commits  
the final act, is against public policy. We therefore hold that under § 45-2-211, MCA, a 
terminally ill patient’s consent to physician aid in dying constitutes a statutory defense to a 
charge of homicide against the aiding physician when no other consent exceptions apply. 
 
¶51 The District Court’s ruling on the constitutional issues is vacated, although the court’s grant 
of summary judgment to Plaintiffs/Appellees is affirmed on the alternate statutory grounds set 
forth above. The award of attorney fees is reversed. 
 
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 
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We concur: 
 
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER  
/S/ JOHN WARNER 
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice John Warner concurs. 
 
¶52 I concur. 
 
¶53 The Court’s opinion today answers the statutory question: is it, as a matter of law, against 
the public policy of Montana for a physician to assist a mentally competent, terminally ill person 
to end their life? The answer provided is: “No, it is not, as a matter of law.” 
 
¶54 This Court correctly avoided the constitutional issue Baxter desires to present. No question 
brought before this Court is of greater delicacy than one that involves the power of the  
legislature to act. If it becomes indispensably necessary to the case to answer such a question, 
this Court must meet and decide it; but it is not the habit of the courts to decide questions of a 
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. See e.g. Ex parte 
Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.Va. 1833) (Marshall, Circuit Justice); Burton v. United 
States, 196 U.S. 283, 295, 25 S. Ct. 243, 245 (1905); State v. Kolb, 2009 MT 9, ¶ 13, 349 Mont. 
10, 200 P.3d 504; Common Cause of Montana v. Statutory Committee to Nominate Candidates 
for Commr. of Political Practices, 263 
 346 
 
 
Mont. 324, 329, 868 P.2d 604, 607 (1994); Wolfe v. State, Dept. of Labor and Industry, Board of 
Personnel Appeals, 255 Mont. 336, 339, 843 P.2d 338, 340 (1992). 
 
¶55 This Court has done its job and held that pursuant to § 45-2-211, MCA, a physician who 
assists a suicide, and who happens to be charged with a crime for doing so, may assert the 
defense of consent. I join the opinion, and not the thoughtful and thought provoking dissent, 
because the Legislature has not plainly stated that assisting a suicide is against public policy. 
This Court must not add such a provision by judicial fiat. Section 1-2-101, MCA. 
 
¶56 The logic of the Court’s opinion is not necessarily limited to physicians. In my view, the 
citizens of Montana have the right to have their legislature step up to the plate and squarely face 
the question presented by this case, do their job, and decide just what is the policy of Montana  
on this issue. 
 
¶57 As for the constitutional analysis requested by Baxter, I have found many times in my 
judicial career that Viscount Falkland is correct: when it is not necessary to make a decision, it is 
necessary to not make a decision. A question of constitutional law should not be anticipated in 
advance of the necessity of deciding it. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 
346-47, 56 S. Ct. 466, 483 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. 
Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S. Ct. 352, 355 (1885)). 
 
/S/ JOHN WARNER 
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Justice James C. Nelson, specially concurring. 
 
 ¶58  I have lived a good and a long life, and have no wish to leave this world 
prematurely. As death approaches from my disease, however, if my suffering becomes 
unbearable I want the legal option of being able to die in a peaceful and dignified 
manner by consuming medication prescribed by my doctor for that purpose. Because it 
will be my suffering, my life, and my death that will be involved, I seek the right and 
responsibility to make that critical choice for myself if circumstances lead me to do so. I 
feel strongly that this intensely personal and private decision should be left to me and my 
conscience – based on my most deeply held values and beliefs, and after consulting with 
my family and doctor – and that the government should not have the right to prohibit this 
choice by criminalizing the aid in dying procedure.1 
 
 ¶59  With the exception of the Court’s decision to vacate the District Court’s ruling on 
 
the constitutional issues, Opinion, ¶ 51, I otherwise join the Court’s Opinion.  For the 
 
reasons which follow, I agree with the Court’s analysis under the consent statute 
 
(§ 45-2-211, MCA), and I further conclude that physician aid in dying is protected by the 
 
Montana Constitution as a matter of privacy (Article II, Section 10) and as a matter of 
 
individual dignity (Article II, Section 4). 
 
I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
 
 ¶60  The Court and the Dissent offer two conflicting analyses of “public policy” under 
 
the consent statute.  See Opinion, ¶¶ 14-45; Dissent, ¶¶ 99-110.  In my view, the Court 
 
has the better argument.  As the Court points out, the consent statute plainly contemplates 
 
that it is not against public policy in certain situations for a victim to consent to conduct  
 
 
 
1 Aff. Robert Baxter ¶ 9 (June 28, 2008). Baxter (one of the plaintiffs-appellees in this 
case) died of leukemia on December 5, 2008—the same day the District Court issued its 
ruling in his favor, holding that under the Montana Constitution a mentally competent, 
incurably ill patient has the right to die with dignity by obtaining physician aid in dying. 
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that otherwise would constitute an offense under the criminal statutes. Opinion, ¶ 43. I agree  
with the Court that there is no indication in Montana caselaw or statutory law that physician aid 
in dying is against public policy. In this regard, the Dissent is incorrect in stating that the 
Legislature eliminated the consent defense for aiding suicide under  
 
§ 45-5-105, MCA. Dissent, ¶ 105. The Dissent points to nothing in the plain language of the 
consent statute standing for this proposition. Rather, the Dissent relies on the uncodified 1973 
Criminal Law Commission Comments to § 45-5-105, MCA. See 
 
Dissent, ¶¶ 101-103, 105. Of course, these Commission Comments do not carry the weight of 
law. Opinion, ¶ 42. Moreover, I do not find the presumed statements of public policy reflected in 
these 1973 Commission Comments to be of any persuasive value here. The Legislature has since 
codified a different public policy in the 1985 Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act—
specifically, that a mentally competent, incurably ill individual should have autonomy with 
regard to end-of-life decisions and should be afforded respect and assurance that her life-ending 
wishes will be honored, even if enforcement of the patient’s instructions involves a direct act by 
the physician (such as withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment) which in turn causes the 
patient’s death. See generally Opinion, ¶¶ 27-38; Title 50, chapter 9, MCA. 
 
¶61 Our decision today, therefore, provides a mentally competent, incurably ill individual with  
at least one avenue to end her mental and physical suffering with a physician’s assistance. Under 
the consent statute, it is not against public policy for the physician to provide the individual with 
the prescription for a life-ending substance to be 
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self-administered by the individual at her choice of time and place. As an obvious corollary to 
this, the individual retains the right to change her mind as her condition progresses for better or 
worse—i.e., the patient retains the absolute right to make the ultimate decision of whether to 
 take the life-ending substance. As such, in physician aid in dying the physician simply makes 
medication available to the patient who requests it and the patient ultimately chooses whether to 
cause her own death by self-administering the medicine—an act which itself is not criminal. 
Opinion, ¶¶ 26, 32. 
 
¶62 I accordingly agree with the Court’s analysis and conclusion that the patient’s consent to 
physician aid in dying constitutes a statutory defense to a charge of deliberate homicide against 
the aiding physician under § 45-5-102, MCA, where the patient takes the life-ending substance 
and ends her life. Opinion, ¶ 50. This same conclusion, of course, applies to a charge of aiding 
suicide under § 45-5-105, MCA, where the patient does not take the substance. In either event, 
the physician is not culpable. 
 
¶63 For these reasons, I concur in the Court’s Opinion—except, as noted, the decision to vacate 
the District Court’s ruling on the constitutional issues. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
¶64 Although the Court has chosen to decide this case on the narrow statutory ground suggested 
by the State of Montana (as an alternative approach) in its briefs on appeal, Opinion, ¶ 10, and 
although physician aid in dying is protected statutorily (as the Court holds under this alternative 
approach), physician aid in dying is also firmly protected by Montana’s Constitution. In this 
regard, I compliment District Court Judge Dorothy 
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McCarter for her well-written, compassionate, and courageous—indeed, visionary— 
interpretation of our Constitution. The parties have extensively briefed the constitutional issues, 
see Opinion, ¶ 10, and the Dissent touches on them as well, see Dissent, 
 
¶¶ 112-116. For these reasons, and because I so passionately believe that individual 
dignity is, in all likelihood, the most important—and yet, in our times, the most fragile— 
of all human rights protected by Montana’s Constitution, I proceed to explain what I 
believe the right of dignity means within the context of this case—one of the most 
important cases the courts of this state have ever considered. 
 
¶65 The District Court’s decision is grounded in both the right of individual dignity guaranteed 
by Article II, Section 4 and the right of individual privacy guaranteed by Article II, Section 10. 
Likewise, the Plaintiff-Appellee patients (Patients) and their amici present arguments under both 
provisions. With regard to Article II, Section 10, they persuasively demonstrate that under 
Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997), and Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 
296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364, physician aid in dying is protected by the right of individual 
privacy. Indeed, this Court held in 
 
Armstrong that “the personal autonomy component of this right broadly guarantees each 
individual the right to make medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and health in 
partnership with a chosen health care provider free from the interference of the government . . . 
.” Armstrong, ¶ 75. As noted, however, I believe that this case—aid in dying so as to die with 
dignity—is most fundamentally and quintessentially a matter of 
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human dignity. Accordingly, it is to that right that I direct my comments below. But before  
doing so, it is necessary to define and explain my choice of terms and language. 
 
A. Terminology and Language 
 
¶66 First, let me be clear about one thing: This case is not about the “right to die.” Indeed, the 
notion that there is such a “right” is patently absurd, if not downright silly. No constitution, no 
statute, no legislature, and no court can grant an individual the “right to die.” Nor can they take 
such a right away. “Death is the destiny of everything that 
 
lives. Nothing ever escapes it.”2 Within the context of this case, the only control that a person  
has over death is that if he expects its coming within a relatively short period of time due to an 
incurable disease, he can simply accept his fate and seek drug-induced comfort; or he can seek 
further treatment and fight to prolong death’s advance; or, at some point in his illness, and with 
his physician’s assistance, he can embrace his destiny at a time and place of his choosing. The 
only “right” guaranteed to him in any of these decisions is the right to preserve his personal 
autonomy and his individual dignity, as he sees fit, in the face of an ultimate destiny that no 
power on earth can prevent. 
 
¶67 Thus noted, the Patients and the class of individuals they represent are persons who suffer 
from an illness or disease, who cannot be cured of their illness or disease by any reasonably 
available medical treatment, who therefore expect death within a relatively short period of time, 
and who demand the right to preserve their personal autonomy and their individual dignity in 
facing this destiny. 
 
 
2 John Shelby Spong, Eternal Life: A New Vision, 73 (HarperCollins 2009). 
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¶68  In choosing this language, I purposely eschew bright-line tests or rigid timeframes. 
 
What is “relatively short” varies from person to person. I take this approach3 for the following 
nonexclusive reasons. First, the amount of physical, emotional, spiritual, and mental suffering 
that one is willing or able to endure is uniquely and solely a matter of individual constitution, 
conscience, and personal autonomy. Second, “suffering” in this more expansive sense may 
implicate a person’s uniquely personal perception of his “quality of life.” This perception may  
be informed by, among other things, one’s level of suffering, one’s loss of personal autonomy, 
one’s ability to make choices about his situation, one’s ability to communicate, one’s perceived 
loss of value to self or to others, one’s ability to care for his personal needs and hygiene, one’s 
loss of dignity, one’s financial situation and concern over the economic burdens of prolonged 
illness, and one’s level of tolerance for the invasion of personal privacy and individual dignity 
that palliative treatment necessarily involves. Suffering may diminish the quality of life; on the 
other hand, the lack of suffering does not guarantee a life of quality. There is a difference 
between living and suffering; and the sufferer is uniquely positioned and, therefore, uniquely 
entitled to define the tipping point that makes suffering unbearable. Third, while most incurable 
illnesses and diseases follow a fairly predictable symptomatology and course, every illness and 
disease is a unique and very personal experience for the afflicted person. Thus, the afflicted 
individual’s illness or disease informs his end-of-life choices and decisions in ways unique and 
personal to that 
  
3 See generally Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 27-33, 52-79, 
96-112 (Rutgers University Press 2001). 
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individual’s life, values, and circumstances. Fourth, advancements in medical treatment may 
become available during the period between the time when he is diagnosed as being incurably ill 
and the predicted (estimated) time of death. With those advancements, a person initially given 
three months to live may well expect to live two more months or two more years with a new 
medicine or treatment. Fifth, individual access to medical care may vary. A person living in 
proximity to a medical research facility may have access to medicines and treatments as part of a 
clinical trial, while another person living in a sparsely populated rural area may not have that 
opportunity. One individual may have access to hospice care; another may not. Sadly, an insured 
individual may have access to medicine and treatment that an uninsured individual does not. 
Sixth, each individual’s family situation is different. One individual may not have close family 
relationships; another may have a strongly involved and supportive family. One person’s family 
may live within a short distance, while another person’s family may be spread across the country 
or around the globe. The ability to say final goodbyes and the ability to die, at a predetermined 
time and place, perhaps in the company of one’s partner or friends and loved ones, is important 
to many individuals and to their families. Seventh, and lastly, to many who are incurably ill and 
dying, the prospect of putting their partner or family through their prolonged and agonizing  
death is a source of deep emotional and spiritual distress. 
 
¶69  Additionally, in my choice of language, I have intentionally chosen not to use emotionally 
charged and value-laden terms such as “terminal” and “suicide.” “Terminal” 
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conjures up the notion that the individual is on some sort of inevitable slide or countdown to 
death. This term trivializes the fact that many individuals, with what appear to be medically 
incurable diseases, nevertheless retain steadfast hope and faith that their condition will be 
reversed, along with a personal resolve to fight for life until the very end. Labeling an individual 
as “terminal” may not only discourage the individual from seeking treatment but may also 
discourage further treatment efforts by healthcare providers. A “terminal” diagnosis fails to 
acknowledge that medicine usually cannot predict the time of death with the sort of exactitude 
that the use of the term connotes. 
 
¶70 Similarly, the term “suicide” suggests an act of self-destruction that historically has been 
condemned as sinful, immoral, or damning by many religions. Moreover, in modern parlance, 
“suicide” may be linked with terrorist conduct. Importantly, and as reflected in the briefing in 
this case, society judges and typically, but selectively, deprecates individuals who commit 
“suicide.” On one hand, the individual who throws his body over a hand grenade to save his 
fellow soldiers is judged a hero, not a person who committed “suicide.” Yet, on the other hand, 
the individual who shoots herself because she faces a protracted illness and agonizing death 
commits “suicide” and, as such, is judged a coward in the face of her illness and selfish in her 
lack of consideration for the pain and loss her act causes to loved ones and friends. Assisting this 
person to end her life is likewise denounced as typifying “ ‘a very low regard for human life.’ ” 
Dissent, ¶ 118 (quoting the Commission Comments to § 45-5-105, MCA). To the contrary, 
however, the Patients and their amici argue that a physician who provides aid in 
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dying demonstrates compassionate regard for the patient’s suffering, recognition of the patient’s 
autonomy and dignity, and acknowledgement of death’s inevitability. 
 
¶71 “Suicide” is a pejorative term in our society. Unfortunately, it is also a term used liberally 
 by the State and its amici (as well as the Dissent) in this case. The term denigrates the complex 
individual circumstances that drive persons generally—and, in particular, those who are 
incurably ill and face prolonged illness and agonizing death—to take their own lives. The term is 
used to generate antipathy, and it does. The Patients and the class of people they represent do not 
seek to commit “suicide.” Rather, they acknowledge that death within a relatively short time is 
inescapable because of their illness or disease. And with that fact in mind, they seek the ability 
 to self-administer, at a time and place of their choosing, a physician-prescribed medication that 
will assist them in preserving their own human dignity during the inevitable process of dying. 
Having come to grips with the inexorability of their death, they simply ask the government not 
 to force them to suffer and die in an agonizing, degrading, humiliating, and undignified manner. 
They seek nothing more nor less; that is all this case is about. 
 
¶72 Finally, I neither use the terms nor address “euthanasia” or “mercy killing.” Aside from the 
negative implications of these terms and the criminality of such conduct, the Patients clearly do 
not argue that incompetent, nonconsenting individuals or “vulnerable” people may be, under any 
circumstances, “euthanized” or “murdered.” To read their arguments as suggesting either is, in 
my view, grossly unfair and intellectually dishonest. The only reason that “homicide” is 
implicated at all in this case is because (a) the State 
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contends that a licensed physician who provides a mentally competent, incurably ill patient with 
the prescription for a life-ending substance, to be self-administered by the patient if she so 
chooses, is guilty of deliberate homicide and (b) our decision holds that it is not against public 
policy under the consent statute to permit the physician to do so. 
 
¶73 With that prefatory explanation, I now turn to Article II, Section 4 and the right of  
individual dignity. 
 
B. Construction of Article II, Section 4 
 
 ¶74 Article II, Section 4 of Montana’s 1972 Constitution provides: 
 
Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be 
denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, 
corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil 
or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or 
political or religious ideas. 
 
 
While there are differing interpretations of this language, which I note below, it is my view that 
the first clause of Article II, Section 4 (the Dignity Clause) is a stand-alone, fundamental 
constitutional right. See Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶¶ 74, 82, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872 
(explaining that the rights found in Article II are “fundamental” and that the plain meaning of 
 the Dignity Clause “commands that the intrinsic worth and the basic humanity of persons may 
not be violated”). 
 
¶75 First, I categorically reject the notion that the Dignity Clause is merely some “aspirational 
introduction” to the equal protection and nondiscrimination rights which follow it—a  
proposition for which there is no authority. Our Constitution is “a limitation upon the powers of 
government,” Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258, 263, 175 P. 878, 880 
 
 
 357 
 
(1918), and in construing a constitutional provision, we are required “to give meaning to every 
word, phrase, clause and sentence therein, if it is possible so to do,” State ex rel. Diederichs v. 
State Highway Commn., 89 Mont. 205, 211, 296 P. 1033, 1035 (1931). Accordingly, the 
command that “[t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable” must be acknowledged as the 
freestanding limitation it is on the power of the government—much in the same way we 
recognize that trial by jury, which is similarly “inviolate” (Mont. Const. art. II, § 26), is not 
merely “aspirational” but is in fact a concrete right guaranteed by the Constitution. 
 
¶76 Second, I likewise reject the notion that the right of dignity is fully implemented by the 
Equal Protection and Nondiscrimination Clauses or that these clauses are the sole “operative 
vehicles” for achieving dignity. In other words, I cannot agree that the inviolable dignity of a 
human being is infringed only when the person is denied equal protection of the laws or suffers 
discrimination for exercising his or her civil or political rights. Indeed, such an interpretation of 
Article II, Section 4 attributes an implausibly narrow meaning to the term “dignity.” As the 
Dissent notes, the Dignity Clause can be traced to West Germany’s 1949 Constitution, which 
was developed in response to the Nazi regime’s treatment of the Jewish people (as well as 
homosexuals, Gypsies, persons with disabilities, and political opponents). Dissent, ¶ 116 n. 4. 
These “inferior” people 
 
            (so-called “useless eaters”4) were not merely denied equal protection of the laws.  The  
 
 
4 George J.  Annas, The Man on the Moon, Immortality, and other Millennial  
Myths: The Prospects and Perils of Human Genetic Engineering, 49 Emory L.J. 753, 758 2000) 
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government placed them in concentration camps and used them for slave labor. Medical 
experiments were performed on them. They were persecuted and killed. They were viewed and 
treated as subhuman, without any dignity. The West German Constitution and its command that 
“[t]he dignity of man shall be inviolable” must be understood in this context. Doing so, it simply 
cannot be maintained that Article II, Section 4 prohibits only discrimination and the denial of 
equal protection. The Dignity Clause broadly prohibits any law or act that infringes upon our 
inviolable dignity as human beings. This is not some “vague, lurking” right as the Dissent 
suggests. Dissent, ¶ 116. Rather, it is an imperative; an affirmative and unambiguous 
constitutional mandate. 
 
¶77 This interpretation is supported by the structure of Article II, Section 4. In this connection, I 
agree with the construction proffered by Matthew O. Clifford and Thomas 
P. Huff in their article Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution’s 
“Dignity” Clause with Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 301, 305-07 (2000). They point 
out that the language of Article II, Section 4 (which is titled “Individual Dignity”) moves in a 
logical progression from the general to the specific. The first sentence (the Dignity Clause) 
declares that human dignity is inviolable. The second sentence (the Equal Protection Clause) 
goes on to declare one way in which human dignity can be violated: by denying someone the 
equal protection of the laws based on some sort of arbitrary classification. They observe that our 
legal tradition has long recognized such classifications as affronts to the dignity of persons 
(citing as an example of this Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954)). 
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Finally, the third sentence (the Nondiscrimination Clause) fleshes out the meaning of the equal 
protection right by enumerating certain types of classifications which the framers of Article II, 
Section 4 believed to be arbitrary: race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, and 
political or religious ideas. 
 
¶78 Clifford and Huff note that the classifications identified in the Nondiscrimination Clause 
cannot be read as an exhaustive list of all possible arbitrary classifications. Otherwise, if the list 
were exhaustive, the Equal Protection Clause would be surplusage. The more reasonable 
interpretation, they conclude, is that by including the separate and more general Equal  
Protection Clause, the framers intended to leave open the possibility that there are other 
prohibited classifications beyond those which were recognized at that point in history (i.e., in 
1972). And by the same logic, the inclusion of a more general prohibition against the violation  
of human dignity leaves open the possibility that human dignity can be violated in ways that do 
not involve some sort of arbitrary classification. Indeed, they argue, and I agree, that in order to 
give distinct and independent meaning to the Dignity Clause, avoiding redundancy, “this clause 
should be applied separately when there is a violation of the dignity of persons that does not 
reflect the forms of unequal treatment or invidious discrimination prohibited by the two 
subsequent clauses. Presumably anyone could experience such a violation of dignity, not just 
persons who are 
 
members of protected classes.”5  Clifford and Huff, 61 Mont. L. Rev. at 306-07.  
 
 
 
5 Such is the case here, and that fact distinguishes my analysis herein from my 
analysis in Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 2004 MT 390, 325 Mont. 148, 
104 P.3d 445. Snetsinger involved discrimination and equal protection issues relating 
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 ¶79  This interpretation is consistent with the debate on Article II, Section 4 at the 
 
1971-1972 Constitutional Convention.6  During the debate, Delegate Jerome T. Loendorf 
 
inquired whether the express prohibition against discrimination was necessary, given that 
 
the right of equal protection already prohibits discrimination.  Delegate Wade J. Dahood 
 
(chair of the Bill of Rights Committee) acknowledged that the Nondiscrimination Clause 
 
was “subsumed in” the Equal Protection Clause, but he explained that “when we’re 
 
dealing with this type of right, Delegate Loendorf, and we are dealing with something 
 
that is this basic, to an orderly and progressive society perhaps sometimes the sermon that 
 
can  be  given  by  constitution,  as  well  as  the  right,  becomes  necessary.”  Montana 
 
Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Mar. 7, 1972, pp. 1643-44.  Thus, the 
 
delegates decided that it was preferable to include the additional language making certain 
 
facets of the equal protection right explicit.  This same principle supports the notion that 
 
denying someone the equal protection of the laws is but one way in which human dignity 
 
can be violated, as discussed above.  
 
 
 
 
 
sexual orientation. Thus, applying Clifford and Huff’s analytical model, I analyzed these issues 
under each sentence of Article II, Section 4. See Snetsinger, ¶¶ 71-97 (Nelson, J., specially 
concurring). The present case, however, does not involve discrimination or equal protection 
claims. It is appropriate, therefore, to apply only the Dignity Clause, as a stand-alone 
constitutional protection. 
  
6 I acknowledge that the intent of the framers should be determined from the plain 
meaning of the words used and, if that is possible (as it is here), then we apply no other 
means of interpretation. Indeed, “[w]e are precluded . . . from resorting to extrinsic 
methods of interpretation.” Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Public Schools, 255 
Mont. 125, 128-29, 841 P.2d 502, 504 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
Dissent, however, relies on the Constitutional Convention record. Dissent, ¶¶ 112-116. 
Thus, I discuss this record for purposes of responding to the Dissent’s arguments. 
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¶80 In arguing against this interpretation of Article II, Section 4, the Dissent points to Delegate 
Dahood’s statement that “[t]here is no intent within this particular section to do anything other 
than to remove the apparent type of discrimination that all of us object to with respect to 
employment, to rental practices, to actual associationship in matters that are public or matters 
that tend to be somewhat quasi-public.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim 
Transcript, Mar. 7, 1972, p. 1643. This statement, however, must be understood in context. 
Dahood was not purporting to limit the scope of Article II, Section 4. In fact, he was trying to 
keep the provision broad. Delegate Otto T. Habedank had voiced a concern that the language 
“any person, firm, corporation, or institution” in the Nondiscrimination Clause would prohibit 
private organizations from limiting their membership and would force individuals to associate 
with people they otherwise would choose not to associate with. See Montana Constitutional 
Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Mar. 7, 1972, p. 1643. Habedank therefore had moved to 
delete the “any person, firm, corporation, or institution” language from the Nondiscrimination 
Clause, thereby rendering the clause applicable to only the state. See Montana Constitutional 
Convention, Verbatim Transcript, Mar. 7, 1972, p. 1642. Dahood, in turn, argued against this 
amendment (which ultimately was defeated 76 to 13) and in favor of applying the 
nondiscrimination prohibition to entities other than the state, such as employers, landlords, and 
public or quasi-public associations. Dahood made no remarks about the Dignity Clause itself. 
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¶81 In contrast, Delegate Proposal No. 33 specifically recognized an independent right 
 
of individual dignity.  It stated: “The rights of individual dignity, privacy, and free 
 
expression being essential to the well-being of a free society, the state shall not infringe 
 
upon these rights without the showing of a compelling state interest.”  See Montana 
 
Constitutional Convention, Delegate Proposals, Jan. 26, 1972, p. 127.  This proposal was 
 
referred to the Bill of Rights Committee, which adopted the proposal in its entirety.  See 
 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, Feb. 23, 1972, 
 
p. 647.  The  right  of individual  dignity,  the  right  of privacy,  and  the  right  of free 
 
expression were then incorporated, respectively, into Sections 4, 10, and 7 of Article II.7 
 
¶82  In sum, given the plain language of Article II, Section 4 and the structure of this 
 
provision, I conclude that the Dignity Clause—stating that the dignity of the human being 
 
is inviolable—is a  stand-alone, fundamental constitutional  right.  This conclusion is 
 
supported by the record from the Constitutional Convention.  I now turn to the substance 
 
of this right. 
 
C. The Right of Human Dignity  
 
 
 
7 In this regard, the Dissent points out that the Bill of Rights Committee did not 
adopt Delegate Robert L. Kelleher’s Proposal No. 103, which stated: “A human fetus has 
the right to be born. The incurably ill have the right not to be kept alive by extraordinary 
means.” See Dissent, ¶¶ 113-115. Of course, we are not dealing in this case with “the 
right not to be kept alive by extraordinary means”—a matter already addressed statutorily 
by the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (Title 50, chapter 9, MCA). Moreover, 
the reasons behind the committee’s decision on Proposal No. 103 are not stated in the 
Constitutional Convention record, and this Court has already rejected a similar attempt to 
read more than is warranted into the disposition of this proposal (see Armstrong v. State, 
1999 MT 261, ¶¶ 43-48, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364). In short, the disposition of 
Kelleher’s proposal is simply not instructive here. 
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¶83 Human dignity is, perhaps, the most fundamental right in the Declaration of Rights. This 
right is “inviolable,” meaning that it is “[s]afe from violation; incapable of being violated.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 904 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed., West 2009) (emphasis added). 
Significantly, the right of human dignity is the only right in Montana’s Constitution that is 
“inviolable.”8 It is the only right in Article II carrying the absolute prohibition of “inviolability.” 
No individual may be stripped of her human dignity under the plain language of the Dignity 
Clause. No private or governmental entity has the right or the power to do so. Human dignity 
simply cannot be violated—no exceptions. Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 2004 MT 
390, ¶ 77, 325 Mont. 148, 104 P.3d 445 (Nelson, J., specially concurring). 
 
¶84 But what exactly is “dignity”? It would be impractical here to attempt to provide an 
exhaustive definition. Rather, the meaning of this term must be fleshed out on a case-by-case 
basis (in the same way that the parameters of substantive due process have been determined on a 
case-by-case basis). I note, however, a couple of interpretations that are useful for purposes of 
the present discussion. Law professor Raphael Cohen-Almagor states that the concept of dignity 
“refers to a worth or value that flows from an inner source. It is not bestowed from the outside 
but rather is intrinsic to the person.” Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity, 17 
(Rutgers University Press 2001). He argues that “[t]o have dignity, means to look at oneself with 
self-respect, with some sort 
 
 
8 As noted, the right of trial by jury is “inviolate.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 26. “Inviolate,” 
however, means “[f]ree from violation; not broken, infringed, or impaired,” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 904, which is not the same as “incapable of being violated.” 
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of satisfaction. We feel human, not degraded.” Cohen-Almagor, The Right to Die with Dignity at 
17. Similarly, Clifford and Huff explain that in our Western ethical tradition, especially after the 
Religious Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries, dignity has typically been associated with 
the normative ideal of individual persons as intrinsically valuable, as having inherent worth as 
individuals, at least in part because of their capacity for independent, autonomous, rational, and 
responsible action. Clifford and Huff, 61 Mont. L. Rev. at 307. Under this conception, dignity is 
directly violated by degrading or demeaning a person. Clifford and Huff, 61 Mont. L. Rev. at 
307; see also e.g. Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶¶ 81-84, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872 
(recognizing this principle and holding that the correctional practices and living conditions to 
which Walker was subjected at the Montana State Prison violated his right of human dignity).  
Or dignity is indirectly violated by denying a person the opportunity to direct or control his own 
life in such a way that his worth is questioned or dishonored. For example, dignity could be 
indirectly undermined “by treatment which is paternalistic—treating adults like children 
incapable of making autonomous choices for themselves, or by trivializing what choices they do 
make about how to live their lives.” Clifford and Huff, 61 Mont. L. Rev. at 307-08; cf. Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857 (1990) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (requiring a competent adult to endure the procedures of being fed artificially by 
means of a tube against her will “burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine 
the course of her own treatment”). Significantly, this Court has held that “[r]espect for the 
dignity of each individual . . . 
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demands that people have for themselves the moral right and moral responsibility to 
 
confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives 
 
and the intrinsic value of life in general, answering to their own consciences and 
 
convictions.”  Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, ¶ 72, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364. 
 
 ¶85  Clifford and Huff also point out that if the Dignity Clause is to maintain its force 
 
as a shared public ethical norm, 
 
the substantive meaning of the clause must not be identified with, or justified by, any 
specific controversial religious or philosophical doctrines. The only reasonable political 
compromise we can reach in modern times (after the Reformation), when we must accept 
as fact that different segments of society will have deeply conflicting personal, religious, 
and philosophical views about how one ought to live one’s life, is to agree to treat each 
other, and our respective values, with mutual respect and tolerance. This compromise 
makes possible the modern constitutional democracy, focused on securing the liberty and 
protecting the dignity of each person. Thus, the only conception of dignity that we can all 
share as citizens, despite our other differences, in a post-Reformation state (the 
conception of dignity that, for example, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
could share), must focus on honoring the worth of autonomous individuals. To remain 
consistent with this shared, public ideal of dignity, the right to treatment with dignity 
must not be defined according to some parochial, sectarian religious or some 
controversial, philosophical notion of human dignity—those richer conceptions of dignity 
about which we have agreed to disagree. 
 
Clifford and Huff, 61 Mont. L. Rev. at 326-27 (footnote omitted). 
 
 ¶86  Given its intrinsic nature, it is entirely proper, in my view, that the right of dignity 
 
under Article II, Section 4 is absolute.  Indeed, human dignity transcends the Constitution 
 
and the law.  Dignity is a fundamental component of humanness.  It is inherent in human 
 
self-consciousness.  Dignity belongs, intrinsically, to our species—to each of us—as a 
 
natural right from birth to death.  It permeates each person regardless of who that person  
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is or what he does. It cannot be abrogated because of one’s status or condition. While the 
government may impinge on privacy rights, liberty interests, and other Article II rights in proper 
circumstances (e.g., when one becomes a prisoner), the individual always retains his right of 
human dignity. So too with persons suffering from mental illness or disability and involuntary 
commitment: Each retains the right to demand of the State that his dignity as a human being be 
respected despite the government’s sometimes necessary interference in his life. 
 
¶87 I am convinced that each of us recognizes this intrinsic, elemental nature of human dignity. 
Indeed, that recognition explains why we collectively recoil from the pyramid of naked enemy 
soldiers prodded by troops with guns and dogs at Abu Ghraib; why disgust fills most of us at the 
descriptions and depictions of water boarding and torture; and why we revolt from ethnic 
cleansing and genocide. It is why we should collectively rebel, as well, when we see our fellow 
human beings in need from lack of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and education. 
 
¶88 Experience teaches, and we understand innately, that once we strip an individual of dignity, 
the human being no longer exists. A subhuman is easy to abuse, torture, and kill, because the 
object of the abuse is simply that—an object without worth or value and devoid of the essential 
element of humanness: dignity. Six million Jewish people, along with homosexuals, Gypsies,  
and persons with disabilities stand as mute testament to what happens when human beings are 
stripped of their dignity. 
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 ¶89  I believe this is why we also collectively recoil from accounts of our fellow human 
 
beings forced to endure the humiliation and degradation of an agonizing death from an 
 
incurable illness.9  Pain may, in theory, be alleviated to the point of rendering the person  
 
 
 
9 In this regard, twelve individuals who identify themselves as “surviving family 
members” submitted an amicus curiae brief with attached affidavits in support of the 
Patients. I note two of the stories here, though each story is compelling. These stories 
demonstrate that the State’s “palliative care is the answer” argument has real limitations 
and grossly dehumanizing failures. 
 
Richard’s Story  
First, one of the surviving family members describes the death of her longtime companion, 
Richard, who died of Lou Gehrig’s disease:  
During the last two weeks of Richard’s life, despite the conscientious efforts of his 
personal doctor, hospice nurses, and caregivers to provide comfort, he endured both 
physical and emotional pain of stunning magnitude. His mind was haunted by an acute 
awareness that his body was stiffening, becoming rigid, and rendering him immobile. He 
described a sense of being “stuck,” “trapped,” “chained to the bed,” “tied down,” “in 
prison.” He suffered anxiety, panic attacks, and claustrophobia. In addition, he endured 
severe muscle spasms, frequent episodes of shortness of breath and the fear of 
suffocation, swallowing difficulty, and soreness of limbs. 
 
Richard eventually stopped eating and drinking, went into a coma, and died shortly thereafter. 
Notably, before his death, Richard explored various death-with-dignity options but did not find a 
Montana doctor willing to aid him in this manner. Aff. Doris Fischer ¶¶ 3-6 (May 11, 2009). 
 
Betty’s Story  
Second, another of the surviving family members describes the death of her sister, 
Betty, who died of multiple sclerosis:  
[T]he ravages Betty suffered from MS left her unable to simply hold a book and to turn 
its pages; she could no longer hold utensils with which to feed herself; she could no 
longer hold up her head and, therefore, spent all the waking hours of her day slouched 
with her chin resting on her chest, in her wheelchair. She was essentially paralyzed. 
Because swallowing was nearly impossible, she could choke while attempting to swallow 
even the slightest bit of liquid or puréed foods. Her body would endure terrible, even 
violent and uncontrollable spasms. One of those spasms actually  
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unconscious.  But in those circumstances, we still cannot deny that the individual’s 
 
human dignity has been dealt a grievous blow long before death claims her body.  Indeed, 
 
in response to the State’s argument that palliative care is a reasonable alternative to 
 
physician aid in dying, Mr. Baxter explained: 
 
I am appalled by this suggestion and the loss of personal autonomy it involves. I 
understand that terminal or palliative sedation would involve administering intravenous 
medication to me for the purpose of rendering me unconscious, and then withholding 
fluids and nutrition until I die, a process that may take weeks. During this final period of 
my life I would remain unconscious, unaware of my situation or surroundings, 
unresponsive from a cognitive or volitional standpoint, and uninvolved in my own death. 
My ability to maintain personal hygiene would be lost and I would be dependent on 
others to clean my body. My family would be forced to stand a horrible vigil while my 
unconscious body was maintained in this condition, wasting away from starvation and 
dehydration, while they waited for me to die. I would want to do whatever I could to 
avoid subjecting my family to such a painful and pointless ordeal.  
While the option of terminal sedation might be acceptable to some individuals – and I 
respect the right of others to choose this course if they wish to do so – it is abhorrent to 
me. The notion that terminal sedation should be the only option available to me if my 
suffering becomes intolerable is an affront to my personal values, beliefs and integrity. I 
have always been an independent and proud individual, and consider this form of medical 
treatment to be dehumanizing and humiliating. I feel strongly that my privacy, dignity 
and sense of self-autonomy will be forfeit if my life has to end in a state of terminal 
sedation.  
 
threw her from the confines of her wheelchair and resulted in a broken femur. 
Additionally, she had obscenely huge bed sores, as a result of her incapacity to move, as 
well as the fact that her body’s protein was breaking down. . . . [T]hese bedsores were so 
large in some areas of her body that her bones were visible. It was an absolute nightmare 
for both of us – for her to bear, and for me to treat.  
Betty made plans to move to Oregon, but she had to be hospitalized because of her broken 
femur. “She was painfully wasting away and was exhausted – beyond imagination.” Although 
Betty was a stoic person, she often pleaded with her sister: “This is no life and I cannot stand it.” 
She ultimately slipped into a coma and died shortly thereafter. Aff. Mary Fitzgerald ¶¶ 3-6 (May 
12, 2009). 
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Supp. Aff. Robert Baxter ¶¶ 3-4 (Aug. 25, 2008). 
 
¶90 Few of us would wish upon ourselves or upon others the prolonged dying that comes from 
an incurable illness. And it is for this reason that some of our fellow human beings demand—
rightfully, in my view—that we respect their individual right to preserve their own human 
dignity at a time when they are mentally competent, incurably ill, and faced with death from  
their illness within a relatively short period of time. 
 
¶91 The State asserts that it has compelling interests in preserving life and protecting vulnerable 
groups from potential abuses. This broad assertion, however, is entirely inadequate to sustain the 
State’s position in opposition to physician aid in dying. We are dealing here with persons who 
are mentally competent, who are incurably ill, and who expect death within a relatively short 
period of time. The State has failed to explain what interest the government has in forcing a 
competent, incurably ill person who is going through prolonged suffering and slow, excruciating 
physical deterioration to hang on to the last possible moment. Moreover, the State has not come 
close to showing that it has any interest, much less a “compelling” one, in usurping a competent, 
incurably ill individual’s autonomous decision to obtain a licensed physician’s assistance in 
dying so that she might die with the same human dignity with which she was born. In point of 
fact, the State’s position in this appeal is diametrically in opposition to the public policy  
reflected in the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: that a mentally competent, incurably 
 ill individual should have autonomy with regard to end-of-life decisions and should be afforded 
respect and assurance that her life-ending wishes will be honored. 
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¶92 Furthermore, it must be remembered that an individual’s right of human dignity is 
inviolable; it is incapable of being violated. Thus, there is absolutely no merit to the State’s 
suggestion that it may strip a human being of his dignity in order to satisfy an interest that the 
government believes is “compelling.” The right of dignity is absolute, and it remains absolute 
even at the time of death. It may not be stripped from the individual by a well-meaning yet 
paternalistic government. Nor may it be stripped by third parties or institutions driven by 
political ideology or religious beliefs. Cf. Clifford and Huff, 61 Mont. L. Rev. at 330 (“To be 
forced into degrading or dehumanizing pain or suffering because of someone else’s conception 
of a good or proper death exacerbates the loss of dignity . . . .”). Dignity defines what it means to 
be human. It defines the depth of individual autonomy throughout life and, most certainly, at 
death. Usurping a mentally competent, incurably ill individual’s ability to make end-of-life 
decisions and forcing that person against his will to suffer a prolonged and excruciating 
deterioration is, at its core, a blatant and untenable violation of the person’s fundamental right of 
human dignity. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
¶93 In conclusion, while I join the Court’s decision, I also would affirm the District Court’s 
ruling on the constitutional issues. I agree with the Court’s statutory analysis, but I also agree 
with Judge McCarter that physician aid is dying is firmly protected by Article II, Sections 4 and 
10 of the Montana Constitution. Under these sections, individuals who are mentally competent 
and incurably ill and face death within a relatively short period of time have the right to self-
administer, at a time and place of 
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their choosing, a life-ending substance prescribed by their physician. The physician simply 
makes the medication available to the patient who requests it and the patient ultimately chooses 
whether to cause her own death by self-administering the medicine. 
 
¶94 This right to physician aid in dying quintessentially involves the inviolable right to human 
dignity—our most fragile fundamental right. Montana’s Dignity Clause does not permit a person 
or entity to force an agonizing, dehumanizing, demeaning, and often protracted death upon a 
mentally competent, incurably ill individual for the sake of political ideology, religious belief, or 
a paternalistic sense of ethics. Society does not have the right to strip a mentally competent, 
incurably ill individual of her inviolable human dignity when she seeks aid in dying from her 
physician. Dignity is a fundamental component of humanness; it is intrinsic to our species; it 
must be respected throughout life; and it must be honored when one’s inevitable destiny is death 
from an incurable illness. 
 
 ¶95  I specially concur. 
 
 
 
 
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting. 
 
¶96 The prohibition against homicide—intentionally causing the death of another— protects and 
preserves human life, is the ultimate recognition of human dignity, and is a 
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foundation for modern society, as it has been for millennia past. Based upon this foundation, 
Anglo-American law, encompassing the law of Montana, has prohibited the enabling of suicide 
for over 700 years. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2263 (1997) 
(citations omitted). However, in contradiction to these fundamental principles, the Court 
concludes that physician-assisted suicide does not violate Montana’s public policy. In doing so, 
the Court has badly misinterpreted our public policy: assisting suicide has been explicitly and 
expressly prohibited by Montana law for the past 114 years. More than merely setting aside the 
District Court’s order herein, I would reverse the judgment entirely. 
 
¶97 A flaw that underlies the Court’s analysis is its failure to distinguish between the  
physician’s basic intention in the assisted-suicide case from the physician’s intention while 
rendering treatment in other cases. As developed further herein, the intentions in these two cases 
are diametrically opposed, and create the very difference between a criminal and noncriminal 
act. Physician-assisted suicide occurs when a physician provides a lethal drug with the intent to 
cause, when the drug is taken by the patient, the patient’s death. With palliative care, the 
physician does not intend his or her actions to cause the patient’s death, but rather intends to 
relieve the patient’s pain and suffering. For this reason a physician providing palliative care, 
even in cases where the treatment arguably contributes to the patient’s death, lacks the requisite 
mental state to be charged under homicide statutes. Kan. v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 214 (Kan. 
App. 1998) (quoting Gordon & Singer, Decisions and Care at the End of Life, 346 Lancet 163, 
165 
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(July 15, 1995)); see also §§ 45-5-102, -103, -104, MCA (2007). A similar distinction arises in 
the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment that merely prolongs the dying process, 
pursuant to the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. Under the Act, a patient may refuse 
treatment and allow death to occur naturally, and physicians incur no liability, having not 
administered any death-causing treatment. Sections 50-9-103, -204, MCA. 
 
¶98 Criminal acts may be defended on the basis of a victim’s consent to the act in certain 
circumstances. Section 45-2-211(1), MCA. However, this statute makes consent “ineffective” if 
“it is against public policy to permit the conduct or the resulting harm.” Section 45-2-211(2), 
MCA. The Court concludes from its review of Montana law that “it would be incongruous to 
conclude that a physician’s indirect aid in dying is contrary to public policy.” Opinion, ¶ 38. 
Because, generally, “the public policy of the State of Montana is set by the Montana Legislature 
through its enactment of statutes” Duck Inn, Inc. v. Mont. State University-Northern, 285 Mont. 
519, 523-24, 949 P.2d 1179, 1182 (1997) (citations omitted), I turn to the very statutes which 
address the assisting of suicide. 
 
The Statutory Prohibition on the Aiding or Soliciting of Suicide 
 
“If the conduct of the offender made him the agent of the death, the offense is criminal homicide 
notwithstanding the consent or even the solicitations of the victim.” ~ Commission Comments, § 
45-5-105, MCA. 
 
¶99 Montana originally enacted a prohibition on the aiding or soliciting of suicide statute in 
1895, providing that “[e]very person who deliberately aids, or advises or 
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encourages another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony.” Section 698, Mont. Penal Code 
(1895). The prohibition on aiding suicide has been the formally enacted public policy of our  
state for the succeeding 114 years. Under the 1895 enactment, the death or survival of the victim 
was irrelevant, as the crime only required that a defendant deliberately aid, advise, or encourage 
another to commit suicide. The Legislature left the statute untouched for over seventy years. 
 
 ¶100 In 1973, the Legislature revised the statute to read: 
 
(1) A person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide, but such 
suicide does not occur commits the offense of aiding or soliciting suicide. 
 
(2) A person convicted of the offense of aiding or soliciting a suicide shall be 
imprisoned in the state prison for any term not to exceed ten (10) years. 
 
Section 94-5-106, RCM (1973). The Legislature codified this provision within the homicide 
statutes. The current version of the statute is the same as the 1973 version, except that the 
Legislature has increased the potential punishment for the crime by authorizing a $50,000 
penalty. Section 45-5-105(2), MCA (2007). 
 
¶101 Under the wording of the current version of the statute, a person may be prosecuted for 
aiding or soliciting another to commit suicide only if the victim survives. The purpose of this 
change of the statutory language from the pre-1973 version was explained by the Criminal Code 
Commission that proposed it. When the victim dies, the act is to be prosecuted as a homicide. “If 
the conduct of the offender made him the agent of the death, the offense is criminal homicide . .  
.” Commission Comments, § 45-5-105, MCA (emphasis added). The Commission Comments 
then direct attention to the other 
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crimes codified within the same homicide section—deliberate homicide, mitigated deliberate 
homicide, and negligent homicide. Commission Comments, § 45-5-105, MCA (citing §§ 45-5-
102, -103, -104, MCA). Like the other homicide statutes, the statute prohibiting the aiding or 
soliciting of suicide makes the offense a felony. Sections 45-5-102(2), -103(4), -104(3), -105(2), 
MCA. The justification for the felony designation of the offense, despite the fact the victim has 
survived, was provided by the Commission: “The rationale behind the felony sentence for the 
substantive offense of aiding or soliciting suicide is that the act typifies a very low regard for 
human life.” Commission Comments, § 45-5-105, MCA (emphasis added). This clear statement 
of the State’s policy to protect human life is steadfastly avoided by the Court in its analysis. 
 
¶102 Thus, under Montana law, physicians who assist in a suicide are subject to criminal 
prosecution irrespective of whether the patient survives or dies. If the patient survives, the 
physician may be prosecuted under aiding or soliciting suicide. Section 45-5-105, MCA. If the 
patient dies, the physician may be prosecuted under the homicide statutes. Commission 
Comments, § 45-5-105, MCA (citing §§ 45-5-102, -103, -104, MCA). 
¶103 Importantly, it is also very clear that a patient’s consent to the physician’s efforts is of no 
consequence whatsoever under these statutes. The Commission Comments explain that a 
physician acting as the agency of death may not raise “consent or even the solicitations of the 
victim” as a defense to criminal culpability. Commission Comments, § 45-5-105, MCA 
(emphasis added). This principle has likewise been stated and restated 
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by courts around the country: Mich. v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 331 (Mich. App. 2001) 
(“consent and euthanasia are not recognized defenses to murder”); Gentry v. Ind., 625 N.E.2d 
1268, 1273 (Ind. App. 1st Dist. 1993) (“consent is not a defense to conduct causing another 
human being’s death”) (citation omitted); Pa. v. Root, 156 A.2d 895, 900 (Pa. Super. 1959) 
(“The Commonwealth is interested in protecting its citizens against acts which endanger their 
lives. The policy of the law is to protect human life, even the life of a person who wishes to 
destroy his own. To prove that the victim wanted to die would be no defense to murder.” 
(Emphasis added.)), overruled on other grounds, Pa. v. Root, 170 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1961). 
 
¶104 The Court offers curious reasons for rejecting these clear and express statements of the 
State’s public policy. Opinion, ¶ 39-42. It criticizes the citation to the Criminal Law 
Commission’s Comments about the intent and the structure of the homicide statutes, despite the 
fact the Court has repeatedly used the Commission Comments in the application of our statutes. 
See e.g. State v. Wooster, 1999 MT 22, ¶ 34 n. 1, 293 Mont. 195, 974 P.2d 640; State v. Hawk, 
285 Mont. 183, 187, 948 P.2d 209, 211 (1997); State v. Shively, 2009 MT 252, ¶ 17, 351 Mont. 
513, 216 P.3d 732; State v. Price, 2002 MT 229, § 18, 311 Mont. 439, 57 P.3d 42; State v. 
Meeks, 2008 MT 40, ¶ 9, 341 Mont. 341, 176 P.3d 1073. The Comments are critical here 
 because they provide the intent behind and the interrelation among the homicide statutes—how 
they are designed to work together and the inapplicability of the defense of consent—and thus 
answer the specific question before the Court, an answer not made clear from the wording of the 
statutes themselves. 
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The reader should find it astonishing that, in this case only, involving an issue of life and death, 
the Court refuses to consider the Comments which stand in direct contradiction to its decision. 
Dispensing with the Comments allows the Court to construct an artificial artifice between the 
aiding suicide statute and the other statutes in the homicide section of the Criminal Code, when 
the clear intent was just the opposite—that there was to be no 
 
artifice.1 
 
 ¶105  The Court then criticizes this Dissent as offering circular reasoning.  Opinion, ¶43 
 
The Court believes the Dissent is arguing that the consent statute is inapplicable merely because 
the conduct of physician-assisted suicide is defined as an offense and that such reasoning would 
obviate the consent statute for all offenses. However, the Court has misstated the Dissent. The 
consent statute is inapplicable, not simply because physician-assisted suicide is defined as illegal 
conduct, but because the intent of the Legislature was that the consent defense would not apply 
to this particular crime. Again, “[i]f the conduct of the offender made him the agent of the death, 
the offense is criminal homicide notwithstanding the consent or even the solicitations of the 
victim.”  
   
 
 
1 If further demonstration of the propriety of consulting the Commission Comments is desired, 
the District Court’s observations about the statute may be considered: 
 
The Court: I thought “How strange,” but then I realized, thought later maybe it’s because 
if the person does die, they aren’t charged with assisted suicide, they’d be charged with a 
homicide. 
 
Mr. Johnstone: That’s what my criminal Counsel, Ms. Anders, has told me. 
 
The Court: But it was really strange when I first ran across that. I had to read it ten times 
to figure that one out. 
 
Hrg. Transcr. 63:3-12 (Oct. 10, 2008) (emphasis added).  
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Commission Comments, § 45-5-105, MCA. Application of the consent statute to other crimes is 
not affected by the Legislature’s elimination of the consent defense for this particular crime. If 
this is circular or illogical, then the blame rests with the Legislature, because the only reasoning 
here offered by the Dissent is to point out the plain explanation of the working of the statutes. 
The Dissent has added nothing more. It is the Court who offers many words in an effort to  
reason away from this plain language and clear intent, when it is not our duty to agree or 
disagree with the Legislature’s determination. “[T]his Court may not concern itself with the 
wisdom of such statutes” by arguing the Montana Legislature’s logic is somehow circular or 
otherwise inappropriate. Duck Inn, Inc., 285 Mont. at 523-24, 949 P.2d at 1182. The Court’s  
role is simply to find the public policy. The homicide statutory framework and the prohibition 
against consent, by itself, is more than enough to foreclose any suggestion that Montana even 
remotely 
 
favors or supports physician-assisted suicide.2  However, there is further evidence. 
 
The Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 
 
¶106 In 1991, the Legislature enacted the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (Montana 
Act) by substantially adopting the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (Uniform Act).  
Secs. 1-16, Ch. 391, L. 1991 (codified at §§ 50-9-101 to -206, MCA). 
 
 
2 The Court’s approach is also disconcerting when considering the ambiguity this 
Opinion will bring for those who are not physicians. Physician assistants, nurse-
practitioners, nurses, friends, and family do not qualify as physicians, but they will all 
undoubtedly be involved to varying degrees in the process of physician-assisted suicide. 
Yet, the Court’s public policy reasoning is based upon the role of a physician. The net 
result of the decision, whether intended or not, is to leave “non-physicians” with the 
question of whether the decision premised upon a physician-based policy will apply to 
them as well. 
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The Prefatory Note in the Uniform Act explains that “[t]he scope of the Act is narrow. 
 
Its impact is limited to treatment that is merely life-prolonging . . . .”3  Uniform Rights of 
 
Terminally Ill Act (1989), 9C U.L.A. 311, 312 (2001) (emphasis added).  The form 
 
Declaration provided by the Montana Act for patients, by its plain language,  further 
 
supports the scope of the purposes articulated in the Uniform Act: 
 
If I should have an incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administration of 
life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of my attending physician or attending 
advanced practice registered nurse, cause my death within a relatively short time and I 
am no longer able to make decisions regarding my medical treatment, I direct my 
attending physician or attending advance practice registered nurse, pursuant to the 
Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, to withhold or withdraw treatment that only 
prolongs the process of dying and is not necessary to my comfort or to alleviate pain. 
 
Section 50-9-103(2), MCA (emphasis added).  And, as the Court acknowledges, the 
 
Montana Act is careful to explain that it “does not condone, authorize, or approve mercy 
 
killing or euthanasia.”  Section 50-9-205(7), MCA. 
 
¶107 The operative words in the Montana Act are those permitting a patient to 
 
“withhold” and “withdraw” life-sustaining treatment.  See §§ 50-9-103(2), -106, -204,  
 
 
 
3 The quoted passage, in its entirety, is as follows: 
 
The scope of the Act is narrow. Its impact is limited to treatment that is merely life-
prolonging, and to patients whose terminal condition is incurable and irreversible, whose 
death will soon occur, and who are unable to participate in treatment decisions. Beyond 
its narrow scope, the Act is not intended to affect any existing rights and responsibilities 
of persons to make medical treatment decisions. The Act merely provides alternative 
ways in which a terminally-ill patient’s desires regarding the use of life-sustaining 
procedures can be legally implemented. 
 
Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act (1989), 9C U.L.A. at 312.  
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-205, MCA. Largely self-evident, to “withhold” means “to desist or refrain from granting, 
giving, or allowing.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
2627 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1971). Similarly, “withdraw” is defined  
as “to take back or away (something bestowed or possessed).” Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language at 2626. Neither word incorporates the 
 concept of affirmatively issuing a life-ending drug to a patient. Rather, the plain language 
permits only the taking away of, or refraining from giving, certain medical treatment—that 
which merely prolongs the dying process. Sections 50-9-102(9), -103(2), -106, -204, -205,  
MCA. 
 
¶108 Although the Court reasons that because the Montana Act permits the withholding or 
withdrawal of treatment prolonging the dying process, “it would be incongruous to conclude that 
a physician’s indirect aid in dying is contrary to public policy,” the opposite is true: it is 
incongruous to conclude there is no legal distinction between the withdrawal of life-prolonging 
medical treatment and the provision of life-ending treatment. This distinction is clearly 
recognized by the wording of our statutes, discussed above, and by the courts. See e.g. Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800, 808, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297-98, 2302 (1997) (distinguishing between 
physician-assisted suicide and refusal of medical treatment does not violate equal protection); 
and compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06, 117 S. Ct. at 2261 (holding there is no 
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide) with Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 277-79, 
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110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851-52 (1990) (assuming a constitutional right for competent person to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment). 
 
¶109 To further illustrate the Legislature’s policy preference in respecting a person’s right to 
refuse medical treatment, Montana allows a person to forego cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR). Sections 50-10-101 to -107, MCA. To the extent a patient refuses the receipt of CPR, 
physicians must either refrain from conducting CPR or transfer the patient into the care of a 
physician who will follow the do not resuscitate protocol. Section 50-10-103(2), MCA. As with 
the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, a person may refuse treatment, but the tenor of the statute 
provides no support for physicians shifting from idle onlookers of natural death to active 
participants in their patients’ suicides. 
 
¶110 Thus, the law accommodating a patient’s desire to die of natural causes by withholding 
treatment does not, as the Court posits, support a public policy in favor of the deliberate action 
by a physician to cause a patient’s pre-natural, or premature, death. 
 
The 1972 Montana Constitution 
 
¶111 Montana’s longstanding public policy against the assistance of suicide was continued by 
adoption of the 1972 Constitution. It supports neither the Court’s public policy determination, 
nor the District Court’s constitutionally based decision. 
 
¶112 No statement concerning a “right to die” is included within the Constitution’s Declaration 
of Rights. This absence is neither accidental nor the product of ignorance. In this regard, it is 
important to note that “[n]o proposal was adopted or rejected without 
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considered deliberation.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee 
Proposal, February 22, 1972, p. 618. 
 
¶113 One of the proposals receiving such careful deliberation was Proposal No. 103. Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Minutes of the Bill of Rights Committee, February 9, 1972, p. 2. 
Submitted to the Bill of Rights Committee by Delegate Robert L. Kelleher, Proposal No. 103 
would have included a right to die within the Constitution’s Declaration of Rights. Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Delegate Proposals, February 2, 1972, p. 223. 
 
¶114 Delegate Kelleher’s proposal provided, in pertinent part, “The incurably ill have the right 
not to be kept alive by extraordinary means.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Delegate 
Proposals, February 2, 1972, p. 223. Delegate Kelleher testified before the Bill of Rights 
Committee, “that the person with an incurable disease should have the right to choose his own 
death.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Minutes of the Bill of Rights Committee, February 
12, 1972, p. 5. Alternatives offered to Kelleher’s proposal covered the broad spectrum of “right 
to die” scenarios. Joe Roberts testified on the same day as Delegate Kelleher, advocating for 
broader language: “There shall be a right to die. The legislature shall make appropriate 
provisions therefore.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Minutes of the Bill of Rights 
Committee, February 12, 1972, p. 6; Montana Constitutional Convention, Testimony of Joe 
Roberts Before the Bill of Rights Committee Concerning the Right to Die, February 12, 1972, p. 
4. Mr. Roberts referenced the “very poignant testimony” of witness Joyce Franks and her 
“personal 
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encounter with the agonizing death of her father.” Montana Constitutional Convention, 
Testimony of Joe Roberts Before the Bill of Rights Committee Concerning the Right to Die, 
February 12, 1972, p. 1. Ms. Franks’ testimony had described the death of her 86-year-old father 
and his wish that a doctor “give him something to put him to sleep right then.” Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Testimony of Joyce M. Franks Before the Bill of Rights Committee, 
February 3, 1972, p. 5A. Ms. Franks stated to the Bill of Rights Committee, “What I am  
working for is that every person shall have the right to determine, barring accident, the manner  
of his dying. And then, I am advocating the twin right to make it legal, if he desires this type of 
death, for a person to receive a quick and easy medicated death somehow.” Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Testimony of Joyce M. Franks Before the Bill of Rights Committee, 
February 3, 1972, p. 1. Ms. Franks therefore urged adoption of an amendment stating: “Every 
citizen shall be allowed to choose the manner in which he dies.” Montana Constitutional 
Convention, Testimony of Joyce M. Franks Before the Bill of Rights Committee, February 3, 
1972, p. 2; see also Charles S. Johnson, Right to Die Resurfaces in Montana, Independent 
Record F1 (Aug. 23, 2009) (describing Constitutional Convention’s consideration and rejection 
of a right to die). 
 
¶115 However, the Bill of Rights Committee rejected Kelleher’s proposal in its entirety and also 
rejected all of the alternatives which had been offered in conjunction with Kelleher’s proposal to 
incorporate a “right to die” of any kind within the new 
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Constitution. See Montana Constitutional Convention, Minutes of the Bill of Rights Committee, 
February 9, 1972, p. 2. 
 
¶116 Nor were other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Individual Dignity and the Right 
of Privacy provisions, drafted to include a right to die. The Constitutional Convention adopted 
the Individual Dignity Section for the express purpose of providing equal protection and 
prohibiting discrimination. The Bill of Rights Committee proposed the Individual Dignity 
Section “with the intent of providing a Constitutional impetus for the eradication of public and 
private discriminations based on race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political 
or religious ideas.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, 
February 22, 1972, p. 628 (emphasis added). During the floor debate on the provision, Delegate 
Otto Habedank expressed concern that he would be required “to associate with people that I 
choose not to associate with.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 
7, 1972, p. 1643. Delegate Wade J. Dahood, Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, 
responded to Delegate Habedank’s concern by stating, “There is no intent within this particular 
section to do anything other than to remove the apparent type of discrimination that all of us 
object to with respect to employment, to rental practices, to actual association in matters that are 
public or matters that tend to be somewhat quasi-public.” Montana Constitutional Convention, 
Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1643. Delegate Dahood’s statement was consistent with 
the expressed intent of the Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, which was, in consideration of 
 the entirety of Article II, Section 4, 
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to provide “a Constitutional impetus for the eradication of public and private discriminations . . . 
.” See Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 
1972, p. 628; Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1643. 
Nothing within these discussions or explanations suggests even a thought that the dignity clause 
contained vague, lurking rights that might someday manifest themselves beyond what the 
delegates or the citizens of Montana who approved the Constitution believed, and overturn long-
established law, here, the policy against assisted suicide. The reference to dignity therefore 
provides an aspirational introduction to the already well-established substantive legal principles 
providing the operative vehicles to achieve dignity: equal protection and the prohibition upon 
 
discrimination.4 Likewise, the right to privacy did not alter the State’s policy against assisted 
suicide. There is nothing within either the language of the provision or the convention 
proceedings which would reflect any such intention. See e.g. Montana Constitutional 
Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, pp. 1680-82; Montana 
 
 
 
4 The historical origins of the dignity clause are enlightening. At the Constitutional 
Convention, delegates reviewed two foreign constitutions, the 1949 West Germany 
Constitution and the 1951 Puerto Rico Constitution. Montana Constitutional Convention 
Commission, Constitutional Convention Studies No. 10: Bill of Rights 242 (1972); 
Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 
1972, p. 628. The West German Constitution, the eldest of the two, provided, “The 
dignity of man shall be inviolable.” Montana Constitutional Convention Commission, 
Constitutional Convention Studies No. 10: Bill of Rights at 242 (citing West German 
Const. art. I). The Montana Constitution contains the identical provision, adopted word-
for-word except for the use of the gender-neutral “human being” instead of “man.” The 
West German Constitution was developed in response to the Nazi regime’s unequal 
treatment, persecution, and ultimate killing of the Jewish people. See e.g. Gregory H. Fox 
& Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 Harv. Intl. L.J. 1, 32 (1995); George J. 
Annas, The Man on the Moon, Immortality, and other Millennial Myths: The Prospects 
and Perils of Human Genetic Engineering, 49 Emory L.J. 753, 758-59 (2000). 
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Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 1972, pp. 632-33. 
For such reasons, not one court of last resort has interpreted a constitutional right of privacy to 
include physician-assisted suicide. Kirscher v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 100, 104 (Fla. 1997); 
Sampson v. Alaska, 31 P.3d 88, 98 (Alaska 2001); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06, 117 S. Ct. at 
2261. No evidence exists that the delegates intended the right of privacy to change the state’s 
longstanding public policy. Since adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the Legislature has 
continued to enact legislation prohibiting assisted suicide. Indeed, the Legislature directed the 
Department of Public Health and Human Services to “implement a suicide prevention program 
by January 1, 2008,” including a plan that must delineate “specific activities to reduce suicide.” 
Sections 53-21-1101(1), -1102(2)(b), MCA. This is further indication of a state public policy 
against assisted suicide. 
 
¶117 Because we live in a democracy, this policy may someday change. Controlling their own 
destiny, Montanans may decide to change the State’s public policy after what would be, no 
doubt, a spirited public debate. In fact, efforts in that regard have already started. See e.g. Bill 
Draft LC1818, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 9, 2008) (The proposed “Montana Death with Dignity 
Act” had the stated purpose of “allowing a terminally ill patient to request medication to end the 
patient’s life.”). This Court should allow the public debate to continue, and allow the citizens of 
this State to control their own destiny on the issue. 
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¶118 Until the public policy is changed by the democratic process, it should be recognized and 
enforced by the courts. It is a public policy which regards the aiding of suicide as typifying “a 
very low regard for human life,” Commission Comments, § 45-5-105, MCA, and which 
expressly prohibits it. Instead, the Court rejects the State’s longstanding policy. It ignores 
expressed intent, parses statutes, and churns reasons to avoid the clear policy of the State and 
reach an untenable conclusion: that it is against public policy for a physician to assist in a suicide 
if the patient happens to live after taking the medication; but that the very same act, with the very 
same intent, is not against public policy if the patient dies. In my view, the Court’s conclusion is 
without support, without clear reason, and without moral force. ¶119 I would reverse. 
 
 
/S/ JIM RICE 
 
 
 
Hon. Joe L. Hegel, District Court Judge, sitting in place of Chief Justice Mike McGrath, joins in 
the dissenting Opinion of Justice Jim Rice. 
 
 
/S/ JOE L. HEGEL  
Honorable Joe L. Hegel, District Judge 
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APPENDIX J 
Institutional Review Board 
Protocol Exemption Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD DETERMINATION:   
 
  This research protocol is Exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight under 
Exemption Category 4.  You may begin your study immediately. If the nature of the research 
project changes such that exemption criteria may no longer apply, please consult with the 
IRB Administrator (irb@valdosta.edu) before continuing your research. 
  
  
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:   
 
 
 
 
 
  If this box is checked, please submit any documents you revise to the IRB Administrator at 
irb@valdosta.edu to ensure an updated record of your exemption. 
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